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WHAT IS REPRESENTED IN REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT?

W. D. HANDCOCK, M.A., B.Litt.

IT is an odd thing that after two and a half centuries' experience of representative government—if we take the 1688 Revolution as our starting point—we have still no very certain or coherent theory of what it represents. The easy-going eighteenth-century idea that their own sense of political responsibility and the ties of political sympathy uniting them to the people at large enabled representatives chosen from among the "natural" leaders of the nation adequately to fulfil their representative role, despite the meagre measure of choice exercised in their denomination; and the rather later notion that the function of a representative system was to reflect the class structure and dominant interests of the nation, have both failed to survive criticism at the hustings, and the spread of political consciousness associated with the rise of democracy. Modern ideas identify representative government with self-government, and insist on applying to it Colonel Rainboro's dictum that "the poorest he (or she) that is in England hath a life to live, as the richest he." On the subject of what representative government represents there may nowadays be distinguished two views; what may be called the popular, or hustings view, and the academic theory, which, while different in form, preserves the same general character as the hustings view.

The hustings view is unqualified majoritarianism. Representative government is government by the will of the majority. Certain ideas underlying, or associated with this view may profitably be distinguished. The most important is that of individual right. Majoritarianism is no respecter of tradition, or birth, or inborn talents, or acquired experience; it is no respecter of persons at all, only a counter of them. In its view there is no species of authority that gives one person or class of persons the right to push others around; everyone,

indeed, has a presumptive right not to be pushed around. The admitted exception to the presumption proves the rule; the authority that can and must be accepted is the right of a majority to will what it wills even over the opposition of dissentient minorities and individuals. This is democratic rule, and must be accepted whithersoever it may lead, and it has led a long way from its starting-point. The corollaries that follow from this rule are that extensions of the suffrage are everywhere good; that no government or act of governmental authority that has not the warrant of a majority under universal suffrage has more than provisional right; that no government not based on universal suffrage is solidly and permanently founded, and that governments so based are; and that the most "logical" system of representative government is that which, within the unit of government, gives the most precise effect to the majority principle. Associated with these ideas is an even profounder vein of sentiment; the feeling that good government is popular government, that successful measures are those which show the deepest insight into the conditions and feeling of the country as a whole; and this finds expression in the belief that political wisdom and authority ascends upwards, that the source of governmental inspiration is the people, that to be popular, in a literal sense, is for government the receipt which will infallibly make it both wise and strong.

It is not difficult to riddle majoritarianism with criticism. But criticism in the past has not had much effect on it; and indeed it is always difficult to kill a major organizing idea by criticism, even if the criticism reaches its root, which perhaps has not been the case in the present instance. Literally, self-government is anarchism, no government at all. If right means anything, majority right means nothing; moral questions are not mathematical ones, and a majority may have the power, but no tenable argument can demonstrate its right to override the right of minorities and individuals. Nor does counting heads always save breaking them; there are things that minorities will not stand from majorities, and force is not always with the majority. As J. S. Mill wrote from under the shadow of the hedonistic calculus, "one person with a belief is a social power equal to ninety-nine who have only interests." Majoritarianism affords no indication of the unit within which majority right is supposed to prevail; on its own terms it applies as much to a chance collection of Englishmen and Russians, black men and white men, as to a historic nation or province, such as Ireland or Ulster; or in another direction, it makes no distinction between a historic church and a claret-club.

Nor does popular government stand up any better to analysis. Great Britain combines the longest effective tradition of constitutional government with universal suffrage, and in this country, if anywhere, evidence of popular control should appear in the working

of representative government. Yet from the standpoint of the average citizen it amounts to little more than that approximately once every five years he is given the opportunity of voting for one of two or more persons belonging to organized sets of persons known as parties, each of which puts forward, as an inducement for his vote, its proposals or programme for the government of the country in the future, particularly the next five years. Unless he belongs to a relatively small politically active minority, he has had no share either in the choice of the persons for one of whom he is to vote, or in the drawing up of the programmes. It is true that the latter will have been composed with an eye on him and his like, but they are most probably calculated to as little as can be expected to keep him quiet, or as much as he can be expected to stand; and under any form of government he may well get as much attention as this. The candidates proposing themselves for his suffrage will be more concerned with their party's programme, or with their own ideas, than with his. With the casting of his vote his participation in political processes, which is supposed particularly to distinguish the representative form of government among others, ceases in the main for another five years. From time to time remedies have been proposed to strengthen and increase the popular participation in government; closer control over party policy by party congresses, proportional representation or the alternative vote, the referendum, and stricter control over representatives. None of these has made an effective conquest of the jurisprudence of democracy, and their lack of marked success suggests a lack of vitality and realism in the principle which dictates them. In the Weimar Constitution of the German Republic, described by Mr. A. J. P. Taylor as a "text book constitution for the Professor of Political Science," the attempt to apply the majority principle was made with Teutonic thoroughness. The weakness of the resulting governments opened the way to Nazism.

The academic view is that what is represented in representative government is the national or the general will. The theory is variously stated. In its more extreme form it postulates a unitary general will, not perhaps necessarily distinct from individual wills, so that the number of wills in the society is the number of individuals plus one, but as fully a will as individual wills, and underlying and subsuming them. More moderate views, while admitting the interdependance and common conditioning of individual wills, deny that these justify the postulate of a common will, and are content to think of the general will as no more than a common form of expression of individual wills. Summarizing very broadly, the grounds on which the general will is alleged may be brought under two heads; the historic process, which deals wholesale rather than retail with

men; moulds societies, creates standing communities of interest, prejudice, sympathy, antagonism and aspiration; and mass-produces individuals even to the flavour of the time and place in their characters, rather than being itself the product of individuality: and the moral and social nature of man, which makes us members one of another in the fullest and profoundest sense, and which in each individual finds adequate polarization only in the idea of a good common to his fellow members of society with himself. These factors constitute the basic unity of the state, and condition the expression of individual wills. In representative government what is important to be represented is these common elements in the social life, rather than individuality as such; and in the context particularly of current political issues, the machinery of representative government is looked on primarily as a means of elucidating and clarifying them. The policy which expresses them is a true expression of the wills of the members of the society. This seems to be the view of representative government dominating the recent discussion of the subject by Sir Ernest Barker.

The general will theory represents a considerable and important advance on majoritarianism. It recognizes the significance of history for political theory. Majoritarianism is, in origin and intrinsic character, pre-historical and pseudo-scientific. It admits only one reality in the processes of social life, the individual will; conceives it as a self-contained entity; and knows only one way, counting, of dealing with it. It is a view which makes history the accident of individual decisions, and the historical interpretation of individual character meaningless. Secondly, the general will theory indicates the unit within which self-government is a reality, the unit within which solidarities of the kind referred to above in fact exist, or can reasonably be anticipated. Thirdly it provides the basis of a theory of political obligation, which majoritarianism cannot do; by insisting that personality, in the sense of the full life of a man, cannot be achieved in a society of self-contained and self-regarding individuals, it makes it intelligible why the individual should obey an authority outside of himself and not wholly referable to himself. Fourthly, it provides a more realistic criterion of the machinery of representative government than the mathematical one of majoritarianism; its purpose is to maintain a relation of lively responsiveness between society, conceived as a system of integrated interests, beliefs, desires and sympathies, and the organs of its government.

But as an answer to the fundamental question about representative government, the question, namely, what it represents, the general will theory cannot be regarded as satisfactory. In one sense it is too historical; it confounds the present with the past, and swallows up politics in history. The historian, regarding past epochs,

when time has eroded inessentials and knit together division, can look on their conflicts as moments, simply, in the unfolding of a single process, expressions of a single national will; but at the time of their enactment the ends are all open, the conflicts are real, and it is the condition of their dialectical resolution that those taking part in them should regard them as real. Thus, when it is wanted to supply the answer to an urgent political problem the general will is not there. It may be said that if not present *in esse*, it is present *in posse*, that it is ascertained through the processes of the constitution. Argument here tends to be circular; on the one hand constitutions are to be framed to elicit the general will; on the other, although at the time of the conflict no general will exists, decisions arrived at through constitutional process are to be regarded as decisions of the general will. A view put forward by Professor MacIver, in his *Modern State*, distinguishes between the "General Will not so much the will of the State as the will for the state," and the support of the constitution, the Will of the People, the Ultimate Sovereign, which really governs, and the Legislative Sovereign, which presumably reigns, but does not govern. Lord Lindsay enunciates the sovereignty of the constitution as the expression of the settled will of the community as to its mode of living and proceeding. It is not easy, however, to distinguish between willing in the constitutional context, and willing in any other political context. Even rigid constitutions, where the distinction corresponds to formal hypothesis, grow by constitutional conventions, and at times show a quite improper flexibility. So far as concerns the British constitution, it seems proper to remind the proponents of this class of theory that *'il n'y en a point!'*. Constitutional law is the same as any other law. The element of permanence about it is due, not to the mobile factor of will, but to stable factors of tradition, circumstance, and purpose, which incidentally would seem solid enough to sustain that "necessary minimum of Natural Law" which Francois Gény postulated. Will theories face an inescapable dilemma. Either there is a unitary general will, in a real and not merely in a metaphorical or illustrative sense, or there is not. If there is not, we are left with individual wills, and in explaining the constancy of what is, by definition, the free and mobile factor in social process, we must look for stabilizing factors; the social nature of man, historical tradition, standing circumstances and permanent needs; and distinguish these from the wills which they condition. Otherwise we confuse factors whose role in the social process is essentially different. The general will theory belongs, in fact, to the mythology of politics, not that it does not convey very important truths, but that it is not true itself.

The root of confusion is that the general will theory is attempting

to answer, not the questions arising from its own fundamental conception of social reality, but those suggested by the atomistic individualism which it superseded—the question, namely, by what right the State overrides the sovereignty of his own will with which the individual is born. It is trying, as it was with Rousseau, to find the form of an association in which the individual is as free as he was before. Historically, however, the general will theory marks the transition from the conception of a pre-social state, in which men, as Bentham put it, merely conversed together, without forming permanent social ties, to the view, which the whole body of speculation, and of historical and anthopological study since has confirmed, that however far back we go historically we do not reach a pre-social state, and however far we carry our analysis of human nature, we do not succeed in emptying it of social content. It follows from this that man is born, not free, as Rousseau said, but in chains, caught in social ties, bound by rule, subject to authority. The authority to which he is subject is not accidental, or purely arbitrary, it is the authority of things as they are; and the principle of human freedom lies, not in the repudiation of authority, which is anarchism in principle and impossible in fact, pure errancy of will, nor in the attempt to reduce authority to present will without understanding how it arises and what it is there for, but in the ultimate power of the will to make things as they are things as they might be—a power that to be effective must be exercised according to circumstances, and since circumstances are in continual flux, is bound to the labour of Sisyphus. As Professor Collingwood has written, "The rational activity which historians have to study is never free from compulsion, the compulsion to face the facts of its own situation. The more rational it is the more completely it undergoes this compulsion. To be rational is to think; and for a man who proposes to act the thing that it is important to think about is the situation in which he stands. With regard to this situation he is not free at all . . . The freedom that there is in history consists in the fact that this compulsion is imposed upon the activity of human reason not by anything else, but by itself."[1] Authority is a social fact; no authority is intrinsically legitimate, and therefore none intrinsically illegitimate. What legitimates or condemns it is the use to which it is put.

The supererogatory anxiety to prove a right to authority has resulted in the will theory's misconceiving the fundamental nature of the State. Green's well-known dictum—which, incidentally, had the distinction been current in his time, would have been applicable to society, not the State—has to be reversed. Force, not will, is the basis of the State. Mightless right makes no State; on the other

[1] R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History*, 1946, p. 316

hand rightless might may do. A state is justified by works, and to do them it must work. Government corresponds to permanent necessities of man's condition. Two elements only are essential to the State—power, and the ability and willingness of power to govern. Willingness can usually be taken for granted. The elements of power vary according to the conditions of the society; from military prowess, the ownership of many flocks, the reputation of special intimacy with the Gods, through hereditary position and possessions, to the control of large economic undertakings or of formidable propaganda organizations. Power politicalized, that is power that has taken on the job of government, is already becoming transformed; it is adding increments to itself as recognition of its function is established, and it is enlarging its own purview. The binding in of outside sources of power to the organization of governmental power—as they develop, and as occasion offers—so that on the one hand, the instrument of power may be secure, and on the other, power may learn to take responsibility—or alternatively, the breaking of power that cannot be used for government—this is the practical task of State-building and State-maintenance. It has nothing necessarily to do with the will of the people, except in circumstances where the will of the people—which in less pretentious terms means that of popular political organizations—represents both solid and usable political power.

As to the job of government, its content depends entirely on circumstances. Its form can be defined along traditional lines as the maintenance of law and order, so long as it is remembered that law and order has a concrete content, and that government can break its teeth trying to maintain one kind of law and order, and establish itself unchallengeably in maintaining another. A safer definition is perhaps the maintenance of the necessary uniformities, understood in relation to the time and the place, things and people as they are. It is because its task is the maintenance of uniformities that government needs force, and needs—not necessarily a monopoly of force, which in concrete terms is impossible—but as much force as will comfortably cover the jobs actually in hand or in immediate prospect. The filling up of the form of government with the content of policy and measures can perhaps be conceived, but it cannot practically be approached in terms of carrying out the will of the people, or, to substitute again a less pretentious but more realistic phrase, in terms of carrying out people's wills. Government cannot be carried on in defiance of people's wills, nor, for any length of time, without their support. But people's wills are conditioned by their circumstances, as often unconsciously as consciously, and what represents them is not what they will say in answer to an open question, but what they prove to want of the alternatives practically before them.

It is on political leaders—acting with more or less responsibility as the maxim that responsibility should follow power has been given effect in the government—that they depend for knowledge of the feasible alternatives, that is, for knowledge of their own wills. The job of government is, therefore, to be directly defined by the necessities of the given social situation on the one hand, and its possibilities on the other—again given things and people as they are. For the practising politician it lies between the extremes of the least that will keep people quiet and the most they will stand. It is the specific expertize of politics to discern these limits. Between them there is room for everything from ruthless and tyrannical exploitation of class or popular passion and greed to the leadership which by realization of the best possibilities of the time prepares the way for a better. Outside of them is the field in which labour the idealists who sow and tend the aspirations towards which the future can be shaped by a new generation of politicians working in new circumstances, and the as-yet unrecognized social forces and changes whose effects, in one generation, so often mock the hopes of its predecessor. Government must operate within the limits of the politically possible, and within those limits it must also accomplish a job, or it will come to grief, and have to give place to another—a clique of revolutionaries in possession—the phrase is Louis Madelin's —to a Napoleon, a Nicholas II to the embarrassed phantom of a Kerensky, and ultimately—not by processes of constitutional right —to a Lenin, a Weimar Republic to a Hitler. Political power is thus socially conditioned. It arises from the circumstances of its time, is supported or tacitly accepted because it accords with the facts and needs and ideas of its time, and passes when it persistently misconstrues its time. The prejudice against accepting the definition of the State as force arises from considering force in too abstract a light; from a failure to realize that what must, in the nature of things, be intended is social force, which cannot transcend, and must to some extent be subdued to the medium in which it works. Yet the notion of political authority must also be precise; it is the power to impose upon men's wills, sanctioned by sufficient penalties; in Duguit's brutal phrase[1] it is the axe of the executioner, and the sabre of the gendarme. Force is the instrument of government; yet it is in the exercise of a wise, and ultimately of a necessary foresight, that, as Rousseau says, the holders of force seek in general to convert their force into right. In the measure that they see and do the jobs to be done they succeed, and force gathers to itself consent, which multiplies its efficacy and eases its tasks. This constitutes a pragmatic right, which lasts as long as it continues to be earned. On the other hand, the abdication or surrender of a force which is adequate to its job is,

[1] Léon Duguit, *Traité de Droit Constitutionnel*, 1921, vol. 1, p. 395.

on the part of the holder of the force an abdication of the duty he has set himself; it is also a denial of the legitimate expectations, which amount to pragmatic rights, of the governed; and is contrary to the principle of government, which is that the instrument of government must be preserved.

We return to our original question, what is represented in representative government? The answer imposed by what we have already said is of a simplicity almost as engaging as that of the small boy who was asked to comment on the Emperor's new clothes. What is represented in representative government is opinion organized as force. One of the most quoted of dicta is Hume's statement that all government rests on opinion. We need not dispute its truth; while noting, however, that minds less acute than Hume's have drawn the corollaries that all and any opinion serves as a basis for government, and that government does not reach its logical term until it is based on all opinion. All government is therefore in some measure representative. In the instances of so-called despotic government which Hume quotes, where the circles from which government draws its positive support are restricted in relation to the much wider circles which it has only to take care not too far to antagonize, government, which functionally is care of the public thing, is representative only in a limited sense, since its function and its principle of structure are out of line. It becomes virtually representative in so far as it identifies itself with popular interests and feelings; and in politically undeveloped communities may, in fact, provide a more real representation in this way than could be afforded by electoral machinery. Whether, therefore, virtual should be changed into formal and actual representation, is a question to be decided by the probable consequences, in the light of actual facts and circumstances, rather than on general principle. Constitutionalism, to justify itself, must signify a higher power of government than that which precedes it, or is in possession; either in the sense of integrating further bodies of solid and reliable opinion with the existing instrument of government, or in that of widening and sharpening the government's perception of the jobs to be done, which in practical politics is not so very different a thing. It was within this range of ideas, under Tudor aegis, that constitutionalism in this country began its effective career; and such conceptions may not unfairly be said to have limited the successive extensions of the franchise under the Reform Bills of the nineteenth century. Nor, on the face of things, need it be said that those of the twentieth century have disregarded this principle, except that franchise extension has now been carried as far as it can be, and, in politics, at any rate, when there is no longer some inconsistency about the practical application of a principle to keep its spearhead foremost, what lies behind the point is apt to be

forgotten. It is, however, a fallacy too widely accepted, or at any rate too rarely challenged, that increments of voters invariably bring accessions of wisdom and strength to government.

The normal idea of representative government is of one in which popularly elected representatives play a leading part. One form of this is Parliamentary, as distinct from cabinet and party government. In this the principal part of power lies with the representatives themselves, not as members of parties dividing both Parliament and electorate, but in their quality as representatives. A near cousin is where parties are local and sectional, and transitory, rather than national and permanent. This form of government fulfils neither the idea of government, nor that of representation. It is not fully government because it is not continuously concerned with the public thing, but with steering between sectional or party and personal interests which by hypothesis make no pretence to be national. It is not fully representative because there is not, in local and sectional parties, anything relevant to government to represent. Government is concerned with national interests and policy, and with sectional interests only in so far as they form part of the national whole. Under the circumstances of Parliamentary government, government has to be achieved in spite of, rather than through the representative principle, and this form of government is useful only as a transitional and educational stage in the preparation for the governmental role of bodies of opinion too strong or too obstreperous safely to be left out in the cool. It proves, sometimes, a luxury beyond the means of a society anxious to embark on a career of self-government. Professor Namier's studies of the workings of eighteenth-century parliamentarism throw a searching and valuable light on this subject. Broadly speaking, before 1688, government was in the hands of the King, and party was opposition. After 1688 in theory the position was the same, but in practice the increased strength of Parliament meant that if government in any real and full sense was to be possible, Parliament had to be more than a check on government, it had to be part of government itself; and the period up to the fall of George III's personal government in 1782 is more even than a period of transition, it is a period of experiment, until the lines of a solution of the problem began to emerge. The solution was, of course, cabinet and party government. But the elements of this solution were not historically prepared in 1688. Party was still predominantly connexion, based on personal and local ties. Professor Namier shows how this situation affected government. To secure steady support from parties and groups whose constitutive principle was not policy but interest, "corruption" was essential. It was the only way in which the power to follow a policy could be secured. It played the same part in the working of eighteenth-century parliamentarism

that party organization and discipline play to-day. It was, in fact, operated without any particular sense of shame. The recipients of favour were not inordinately selfish or grasping men; indeed, on clear issues of national honour and interest they were as capable as anyone else of rising above considerations of self. But Parliament did not conduct its daily business on the basis of the public interest, because the parties which conducted elections to it were not extended to that basis. *Mutatis mutandis*, the same may be said of the parliamentarism of the Third French Republic, and of the Weimar Republic in Germany.

The way out of this impasse was pointed by Burke in his famous definition of party in the *Present Discontents*. "Party is a body of men united for promoting by their endeavours the national interest upon some particular principle upon which they are all agreed." This defines the soul, but not the substance of party. Party, in the sense in which it is an effective instrument of government under representative democracy, is a union of interests on a national scale, professing principles of national well-being. The Elder Pitt's principle of popularity, and the Younger's intuition for political and parliamentary management had to be clothed upon Burke's conception, and the conditions of politics changed by the passing of the Reform Bill, before party could play its present part in government. As party functions to-day, almost its least important aspect is that it is an association, an organization of people who happen to feel the same way about the public thing. If that were its essence there would be dozens of parties, and new ones would spring up every day. Primarily, party is an instrument of power. Its development in England has been almost wholly under the sanction of hard compulsions of power, and it is to this fact that the strength and quality of English government is largely due. Party government has been grafted on royal government, that is on the form of government in which power and visible responsibility are at their maximum. The simplicity of pattern has been maintained; the power content changed. The first aim of party was to wrest control of policy from the monarchy. Since they cut their second teeth, parties in this country have been coalitions more or less united for practical ends, and the first practical end, governing the formative phase, was this. The battle was not won at once; indeed very much the reverse; in the early stages of party government monarchical power was in the background, ready to take advantage of mistakes, or signs of irresponsibility in parties and their leaders to re-establish its own power. When a return to royal government had ceased to be among the political possibilities, the place of this threat as a sanction for unity and responsibility, was taken by the struggle of "ins" and "outs." The clear public advantages of the public and legal com-

petition for power secured its retention. Power, in terms of political mechanics, implies unity; responsibility, division, the threat of power in the background if irresponsible courses are followed. It is to this elementary political mechanics, rather than to any inherent dualism of the English mind, the division of Church and chapel, of country and town, of possessing and non-possessing classes, of the contrast of conservatism and progress, that the constant tendency towards a two-party structure is due. In the Third Republic and under the Weimar constitution, thanks largely to the influence of "democratic" ideas, State power was not sufficiently concentrated, nor responsibility clearly enough defined to produce comparable results, and bad government was the consequence. Secondly, party is an instrument of propaganda. It seeks to make opinion, rather than to represent it. Its core is a group of men with ideas and ambitions for government, with their hands on the levers of power in a great propaganda organization, with the prestige of party traditions at their service, anxious to snuff out rivalry, determined to maintain discipline and unity, but sure, as government is, provided it can deliver the goods, of loyalty and support, and even of acclaim, because party has come to be recognized as the instrument of government, through which alone things can be done. So far as party is representative—that is of opinion which is there, as distinct from opinion that it makes—it is so indirectly, and because it is an instrument of popular power, rather than of set intention. It becomes representative because its leaders cannot afford to let any issue or grievance ferment unheeded in the public mind. To do so is to present opportunities to the opposition party, or to potential rebels within the leader's own camp. Its sensitiveness and its discrimination in this respect—its skill in determining issues of genuine and enduring importance, its refusal to stake its existence on others, or to take up any in such ways as seriously to prejudice the public weal—these provide the test of a party's statesmanship, in the first place, and of its democratic serviceability in the second.

These characteristics of party are common to all democratically based governments, be their inspiration Communist, Fascist, or simply democratic. The difference in practice between the older and the newer democratic traditions is in the degree of freedom accorded to opposition. In judging the practices of other states, we should perhaps consider our own position and theirs. It is only since the eighteenth century that the practice of impeaching fallen ministers and of regarding opposition as a misdemeanour, if not a crime, ceased in this country; and liberty of the press and of assembly are of even more recent date. We flatter ourselves, perhaps, if we attribute this result to the development of democratic traditions, and not to the establishment in general acceptance of our régime,

the bringing of practically the whole of the population within the discipline of responsible party, the consolidation of a public opinion which voluntarily and spontaneously performs the more onerous duties of a censor in checking irresponsible and dangerous discussion. The position of States in which monarchy is discredited, the leadership of the landed classes no longer acceptable, the middle classes neither numerous, nor organized, nor politically trained; in which, in short, natural elements of political power are lacking, and in which instruments of government in the shape of disciplined parties have been barely, and often by desperate means established, is very different from our own. The first requisite of government is an instrument of government; and these, when established with difficulty, should be judged, it might seem—and at that somewhat indulgently—by the more ordinary canons of government—whether they have in them the promise of law and order, of founding a régime, and securing some stability of economic and political relations, rather than by the canons appropriate to a special and highly developed form of society and government. If quarrel we must over government, let us quarrel because governments are bloody, tyrannical and ineffective. Similar caution and consideration of the really relevant factors might not inappropriately be urged in the context of the many proposals for the substitution of constitutionalism for administrative régimes within the Empire which are at present, or are likely to be brought before us. Conscious and courageous political realism never fails of its reward. In the framework of an accepted régime, working on the basis of a public opinion trained within the discipline of experienced and responsible parties, constitutionalism has the advantages of a settled provision for public order, a power of peaceful change, and a responsiveness to new needs such as perhaps other forms of government do not have in the same measure. Apart from such conditions, its merits are few, and its weaknesses all too patent. That it claims to be representative is no public advantage if all there is to represent is interest, and irresponsible and fickle opinion. Canning, Professor Temperley tells us, held the view that the very uniqueness of our liberal institutions was a prime cause of our strength; that the course of wisdom lay in preserving them ourselves, but not in seeking to spread them elsewhere; and that Europe would not benefit from the imposition on its history of the different results of our own. The century that has passed seems to have confirmed this judgment, and to recommend it to our consideration in our present circumstances. Meanwhile government is necessary everywhere in the world, and the high-road to its becoming representative government—since we attach importance to this result—is, as this paper has sought to show, that it should aim primarily only at being good government.

ARISTOTLE'S CONCEPT OF GOD AS FINAL CAUSE

PROFESSOR T. M. FORSYTH

DURING my student days at Edinburgh I became particularly interested in Aristotle's doctrine of God as Final Cause. Concern with other problems and periods of Philosophy, along with many years of teaching in most of its branches, has kept me from ever writing anything down on the subject except in the very briefest way. But it has always seemed to me to claim fuller attention than is commonly accorded to it. That Aristotle's conception, however independently it was worked out, owes much to the philosophy of Plato appears to be beyond question. The design of the present article is to relate Aristotle's view on the subject with that of Plato. I will first state Plato's allied doctrine; then, after indicating Aristotle's criticisms of Plato, so far as relevant to the subject, summarize his argument for his own position; and, lastly, consider the significance of the concept concerned.

PLATO'S KINDRED DOCTRINE

Plato's doctrine—as stated more especially in the *Timaeus*,[1] though other Dialogues are fuller on certain points—may be expressed as follows.[2]

First of all a distinction must be made between what always is and has no becoming and what is always changing—ever coming into and passing out of existence—and has no permanent being. The former is known by thought or reason, while the latter is perceived by the senses and apprehended in judgments based on sense. Further, all change or becoming needs a cause or agent (*αἰτία*) of some kind. Now the sensible world or visible universe shows order and pattern, and must therefore be fashioned on the model of what is abiding and changeless. It can, accordingly, be represented as the work of an eternal creator, whose nature it reveals, just as that of the artist or craftsman is shown by his handiwork. This eternal

[1] Whatever distinction may be drawn between Plato's teaching in the Academy and the immediate tenor and purpose of this or of other Dialogues, I take it as indubitable that these give, in certain doctrines repeatedly stressed, an authentic presentation of Plato's philosophy.

[2] A short statement of Plato's cosmological theory was contained in a previous article of mine—"The New Cosmology in its Historical Aspect: Plato, Newton, Whitehead" (*Philosophy*, Vol. VII, No. 25, January 1932). What follows is on the same lines, but is concerned rather with the theological implications.

being that is the cause—or ground, which is at once cause and reason—of all becoming is hard to discover and to make intelligible to the human mind. Moreover, any account of the production of the image or likeness (εἰκών) of the intelligible in the sensible can at best be only the most likely one.[1]

The reason for the existence of the ordered world of becoming or cosmos can best be expressed by saying that the maker and father of the universe, being supremely good, desires that it too should be as good as possible. Hence it exhibits not only the regularity of pattern and the uniformity of movement that might belong to a material system set up and kept going by mechanical impulsion, but also the kind of action peculiar to mind, namely movement from within and with an aim. It is endowed with life and soul as well as body, and displays reason along with necessity.[2]

Soul prior to body.—The principle that, while body and soul are coextensive and coeval, soul is by nature prior to body, is stated in other dialogues besides the *Timaeus*. Plato maintains that soul is the cause or origin (ἀρχή) of motion inasmuch as it alone is self-moved, whereas body is only or at least primarily moved by soul or mind. Thus in the *Phaedrus* it is contended that what moves anything else, as one body moves another, but is itself moved by something else, has not the character needful in the real source of motion. This can be found only in that which moves itself and is ever in motion. But this is the very nature and the true definition of life and soul; therefore soul and not body is the beginning of motion.[3] Similarly in the *Laws* it is argued that soul is prior to body, and is the only real cause, inasmuch as the primary source of motion must lie in that which is self-moving, i.e. whose motion is internal or spontaneous, while all external motion or causation can only be secondary. In short, the ultimate principle of motion resides not in material forces of any kind, but in the activity characteristic of mind or soul, such as that of desire, thought, and feeling.[4]

The medium or vehicle for the manifestation in the sensible world of the intelligible reality which is its model or pattern (παράδειγμα) is twofold, namely time and space. Plato defines time as the moving image of eternity. The eternal reality has no distinction of before and after or past, present, and future; but its abiding nature is expressed in the world of becoming in the endless sequence of changes which are numbered or measured by what is most enduring and most uniform in it, namely the movements of the heavens. Time is indeed, as Aristotle more expressly says, just this numbering

[1] *Timaeus*, 27d–9d. [2] 29d–30c; 34b–c.

[3] *Phaedrus*, 245c–d; cf. *Philebus*, 28–30, where soul or mind is shown to have the essential nature of a cause.

[4] *Laws*, X, 895e–7b.

or measuring of motion. By its means there is conveyed a representation of the everlasting activity of the creative cause.[1]

Space, again, is defined as the receptacle (*ὑποδοχή*) or matrix of all changes or processes that make up the sensible world. It is the permanent basis of all sensible qualities, which are fleeting images appearing in it. It is not a void in which things move, but rather an indeterminate medium wherein the intelligible forms or ideas are represented as on a screen (or reflected as in a mirror) in endlessly varying images or appearances. These appearances in their outward or objective aspect constitute what is called matter. Space is thus identifiable with body or matter, not as implying the reduction of matter to geometrical figures or to inert particles with no inherent motion, but as the vehicle, along with time, for the whole process of becoming which is set up as the expression or embodiment of mind or soul.[2]

Reason and necessity.—While the one ultimate source of all motion is self-moving soul, and the true cause or reason of the existence of the world and of the order which it displays is the desire of the best, there is in it an element of chaos or disorder such as implies another factor in conflict with the wisdom that tends towards the good. This cause or principle running counter to reason Plato calls necessity. The creation of the world or the ever-changing process of becoming is due to the interplay of reason and necessity. Order comes out of chaos according as necessity is overruled by reason and persuaded to work towards the best.[3]

The mythical Demiurge creating the world out of primal chaos

[1] *Timaeus*, 37c–8c.

[2] 48e–53c. Cf. F. M. Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology*, pp. 199–206.—Aristotle also looks upon space as a kind of receptacle or container; but he dissents from the identification of space and matter, which he finds in Plato's statement, on the ground that this involves defining body or matter by reference to its spatial form (*Physics*, IV. 4, 212a 20; 2, 209b 11).

[3] 46c–e; 47e–8a. Cf. J. B. Skemp, *The Theory of Motion in Plato's Later Dialogues*, p. 75.—There are difficulties of interpretation here, especially as to the precise relation of necessity to what Plato calls adventitious or subsidiary causes (*συναίτια*), I take them to be essentially identical. This is not to say that the distinction of reason and necessity is that of mind and matter viewed as quite independent existents; for mind or soul is the only real cause. It is the distinction between mechanism and purpose, that is between the aimless and random ("errant") operation of natural sequence, which Plato calls by the name of chance, fate, or necessity (*ἀνάγκη*), and the spontaneity or freedom implied in working for a desirable end or good, which he identifies with law and reason. In modern terminology it is the distinction between "the processes of nature" and their "control through knowledge." But I think the difference between matter (or body) and mind is ultimately one with this difference between mechanism and purpose or necessity and freedom. (This was suggested in a short paper of mine published in the *South African Journal of Science*, vol. xiv, "Note on the Relation between Mind and Body"; cf. *English Philosophy: A Study of its Method and General Development*, p. 203 ff.).

at the beginning of time is thus Plato's imaginative representation of the universe as being the expression of mind and purpose, and not the outcome of mere chance or the blind operation of mechanical occurrence.[1] This is the cardinal principle of Plato's philosophy, implied if not expressed in a whole series of dialogues. What Plato calls necessity as opposed to reason means the discordant action and haphazard relations that are inevitably involved in the adjustment of particular natures and individual wills, which only gradually attain harmony or unity. It signifies, therefore, the necessary conditions implied in there being a process of becoming at all.[2] The so-called intractability of matter denotes the difficulty attending the control of untoward conditions of any kind in the interests of the good, the true, and the beautiful. The persuasion of necessity by reason is the progressive overcoming of evil by good, the direction of impulse by thought, the replacement of force by law.[3]

Relation to the Theory of Ideas

Plato's doctrine is not so definitely expressed as is Aristotle's in terms of final cause. But its underlying principle is the Idea of the Good.[4] The main problem concerning Plato's conception is that of the relation of the ideas or forms to the cause or origin of movement. That Plato fully appreciated the need of relating the forms, with their culmination or union in the idea of the good, to the movement involved in the process of becoming, or, more definitely, to the activity of mind or soul as the cause of motion, is seen in more than one of his dialogues. This is perhaps already indicated in the *Phaedo*,[5] where Socrates is represented as finding proof of the

[1] Plato's distinction in the *Timaeus* is therefore the same as that which Socrates is represented as making in the *Phaedo* (98–9); cf. also the passage in the *Laws* already referred to. Skemp (*op. cit.*, p. 21) makes an interesting reference to *Sophist*, 265, where "the 'demiurgic' work of God is distinguished from the workings of *φύσις ἄνευ διανοίας*."

[2] A somewhat similar principle is expressed by Tolstoy in *War and Peace* when he says: "If we allow that human life is always guided by reason, we destroy the premise that life is possible at all."

[3] Cf. the article in *Philosophy* mentioned above.—That the opposition of necessity and reason does not imply a principle of evil wholly independent of the good—although the possibility of evil is involved in the very conditions under which particular finite creatures can alone realize the good—seems an essential aspect of Plato's thought. This is indicated in his statement that for the most part necessity is subservient to reason.

[4] Though the Idea or Form of the Good is explicitly mentioned only in the *Republic*, where (509b) it is said to be above both being and knowledge as their source or condition, the principle of the Good none the less dominates all or most of Plato's thought.

[5] Esp. 74–6, 78–9. The relation becomes still clearer by connecting the argument for immortality in the *Phaedo* with that of the *Phaedrus* (in the passage referred to before).

immortality of the soul in its connection with the ideas; but it is more evidently implied in later dialogues.[1]

The final outcome of Plato's metaphysic seems to be that the ideas are *not* abstract and independently existing entities, in which nevertheless concrete things and events somehow participate and thereby have movement imparted to them. They are expressions of the nature of the eternal reality which is the mind or spirit, supremely wise and good, that is the ground of all being and becoming. Although Plato may never actually identify God as the ultimate source or origin of movement with the Idea of the Good,[2] they are in principle identifiable inasmuch as this idea, form, or essence is that which seems to be the truest and most comprehensive expression of the nature of reality and of the meaning of existence.

Plato represents God as creating the world on the pattern of the ideas or forms which are eternal and changeless principles. This does not mean that these forms or principles are independent of God,[3] but that they are the expression of the being and nature of God. The infinite and eternal reality manifests itself in a world of process or becoming, which exhibits ceaseless change as particular things come into and pass out of existence, but at the same time contains order and principle that proclaims its origin in mind and reason.

Thus the universe, although ultimately timeless and changeless, may be represented in thought as involving a process or movement in space and time in which a formless, indeterminate[4] matter or stuff takes on in varying ways and degrees the impress of the eternal forms. As related to one another in the one world or cosmos the changes in particular things can in some measure be explained as though constituting a system or series of causes and effects of a mechanical kind. But such material or mechanical causation, although it expresses the conditions under which things act or changes in things occur, is subordinate to ultimate causation. The ultimate cause or ground of all change and becoming is eternal being. The

[1] Skemp (*op. cit.*, pp. 16–18) quotes in full a passage from the *Sophist* (248e–9d) which clearly has this implication.

[2] See Skemp (*ibid.*, p. 115).—C. Ritter upholds the identification (*The Essence of Plato's Philosophy*, pp. 374–6).—In his treatment of the theory of ideas Ritter reiterates (e.g. pp. 111–13, 184) the conception that its essential meaning is the assertion of the objectivity of knowledge—that the distinction of truth and falsity depends on the principle that knowledge as such is knowledge of reality, and that the idea, therefore, *is* reality. The theory of ideas is thus Plato's answer to subjectivism and scepticism, as his doctrine of self-moving soul is his answer to materialism and mechanism.

[3] Nor again that they are, properly speaking, made by God, as the language of *Republic*, 596–7, might suggest.

[4] The ideas as numbers express the determinate ratios or proportions which constitute the essential natures of different things by giving limit or definite character to what is indeterminate or limitless.

eternal reality, which is to be identified with mind or soul as distinct from body or matter, creates or causes all things by its presence in all existence as an inherent impulse towards the perfect form or ideal unity that is the Idea of the Good. God, who is one with the Good, is thus both the originator of the movement in the universe and its end or final cause.

Aristotle's Criticism of Platonic Doctrine

On this subject only the points relevant to the matter in hand call for mention, however brief, but they are typical of Aristotle's critical treatment of Plato's philosophy.[1]

In his *Physics* Aristotle contends that what primarily imparts motion—the first movent—must itself be immovable. It must be characterized not as the self-moved but as the unmoved.[2] He maintains, further, that movement cannot be regarded as having a beginning or ending, since the existence of movement and process is bound up with the existence of time. Time is definable as the number or numbering of motion. But there cannot be a time when time was not or will not be, and if there is always time, motion must also be eternal or everlasting. Plato in the *Timaeus*,[3] he says, asserts the creation or origination of time together with the cosmos. But "since time cannot exist and is unthinkable apart from the moment, and the moment is a kind of middle-point, uniting as it does in itself both a beginning and an end, a beginning of future time and an end of past time, it follows that there must always be time."[4]

In the *De Anima* Aristotle says that Plato in the *Timaeus*[5] seeks to give a physical account of how the soul moves the body through being itself in motion.[6] But, since all movement proper is reducible to movement in space, this would imply that the soul is likewise in space.[7] The activity in the soul that originates movement is desire, while desire is moved by its object as a realizable good, which is itself unmoved. What is moved in space is the bodily organ, which is the instrument of desire producing motion in the body or the living being as a whole.[8] Moreover, while Plato takes the soul as the source of movement, he regards soul as originating, like time,

[1] A recent publication on the subject, which I have not had an opportunity of seeing, is H. Cherniss's *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy*, vol. i.

[2] *Physics*, VIII. 5, esp. 258b 4–10; cf. *Metaphysics*, 1012b 31.

[3] *Timaeus*, 38b.—In his *Metaphysics* (1071b 32) Aristotle says Plato holds that movement is eternal, but does not show why or how.

[4] *Physics*, VIII. 1, 251b 10–28. The passage is quoted from the Oxford translation.

[5] 35a ff.

[6] *De Anima*, I. 3, 406b 26.

[7] 406a 16.

[8] III. 10.

with the creation of the heavens, which implies the existence of some prior cause.[1]

In his historical survey in the first book of the *Metaphysics* Aristotle says that Plato took the ideas or forms, which he held to exist apart from sensible things, as the causes of things inasmuch as they are their essences, or express their essential natures, without which they have no existence at all.[2] But such formal essences can neither cause change or movement, which requires some efficient cause, nor indicate the end or final cause of anything. They cannot contribute towards either the knowledge or the existence of particular things without being themselves in the things.[3] This criticism is repeated and amplified in subsequent books.[4] Aristotle rejects in particular the conception of the ideas as models or exemplars, which are copied in the creation or production of anything: an agency or active cause, and that only, will suffice. The forms, he always insists, are, as such, inherently incapable of originating any movement.

Against any suggestion that the idea or universal is more real than the particular or exists apart from and independently of it Aristotle maintains that all existence is individual, that the universal is realized only in the particular, and taken by itself it is an abstraction from concrete individual being. It is a "such" (τοιόνδε), not a "this" (τόδε τι).[5] Even if it be granted that the universal idea is necessary for knowledge and can serve to make things intelligible by way of concepts and definitions, it is impossible ever to define the individual because of its unique difference from other individuals.[6]

Aristotle's criticisms of Platonic philosophy are notoriously difficult to comprehend and estimate. In the present connection the essential points are firstly, that Plato—implicitly if not explicitly—recognizes, as we have seen, that the ideas or forms are causes or originators of movement only as being aspects of the working of spirit upon and within particular things; and secondly, that such causation involves at once the power of attraction inherent in ideal ends and an impulse or aspiration toward the ideal resident in individual beings or souls.[7]

Aristotle's Argument for his own Position

Aristotle's doctrine and the main trend of his argument may be stated very briefly as follows.

[1] Cf. *Metaphysics*, 1072a 2.
[2] *Metaph.*, I. 6.
[3] I. 9.
[4] E.g. XIII. 5; cf. 1032b 23–34a 8.
[5] VII. 13.
[6] 1036a 2–6, 1039b 28–40a 7.
[7] Cornford (*op. cit.*) in commenting on the general purport of the *Timaeus* makes the same point, and notes the similarity to Aristotle's position in spite of all differences.

Matter and form = potentiality and actuality.—Being or existence (τὸ ὄν) exhibits both change and order. All change is process or movement from a certain possibility or potentiality to actualization. Such actualization is always the becoming determinate of what is, by contrast, relatively indeterminate. It consists in a matter or material of some kind taking a determinate, or rather a more determinate form.[1] Matter as distinct from form is nothing but the potential relatively to the actual. In short, matter is potentiality, form is actuality or actualization. For example, the acorn is potentially the oak, the bronze or marble is potentially the statue, feeling and disposition are potentially the volition or deed; and similarly the mind or soul is the form or actuality of the body. Whether in the products of nature or of art there is no matter without form, no form apart from matter. Each is alike an abstraction from the concrete existent (τὸ σύνολον). Likewise potentiality and actuality are in all cases distinguishable from but relative to each other.[2] The union of matter and form would be impossible if they were two quite distinct things that had to be externally brought together. But they only express in terms of static fact what is involved dynamically, or in terms of time and change, in all becoming as a process from the potential to the actual. This, then, is the logical implication of the fact or the concept of change, without which it cannot be made intelligible.

Further, being or existence cannot have a beginning in time. Since change or process is one of its aspects, it can have neither beginning nor ending in time, inasmuch as time and change are inseparable. Nor can time itself have a beginning or ending in time; for there can be no time before which time was not, nor time after which time will not be.[3] Moreover, change or process of any kind needs a cause of the change. Each particular change may in some degree be explained in terms of efficient causation or temporal antecedence and consequence. But this gives only an endless regress of causes with no first cause or ultimate explanation, no real origin of movement. Nor is anything explained by positing at the beginning of the world process a mere potentiality of existence, or again of

[1] The potential is never mere abstract or unlimited possibility, the possibility of anything whatever, but is always concrete possibility. It is the possibility of some definite actuality, and is indeterminate only relatively to further and more determinate actualization.

[2] *Metaphysics*, IX. 3, 6 and 7.

[3] 1071b 7; cf. the passage in the *Physics* quoted above.—This may not preclude the conception of time's being ultimately merged in eternity, though Aristotle says nothing to that effect. In Plato's statement in the *Timaeus* time (χρόνος) and eternity (αἰών) seem to be at once related to, and contrasted with, each other; and perhaps Aristotle's may be said to have the same implication.

order and development. Such a mere potentiality, whether as the existence of nothing or as a primordial chaos, cannot supply any origin of movement. For the potential always presupposes the actual in one form or another.

Priority of actuality.—In the last resort, then, actuality is prior to potentiality. The primacy of the actual is apparent whether it is considered with reference to thought or knowledge, or to existence in time, or to essential nature. For, in the first place, any potentiality can be known only through the actuality which it becomes; e.g. the capacity of seeing, or again of being seen, by the actual seeing or being seen. Further, although any particular potentiality precedes the corresponding actuality in time, it becomes actual only by means of some precedent actuality; e.g. the seed becomes the corn, but it comes from existing corn. Similarly, all coming to know by learning, instruction, or argument depends upon prior knowledge in some shape or other.[1] Lastly, the reality or essential nature of anything consists in its actualization or full development, since this is its completed form and the end for which it exists; e.g. the child exists to become the man, and the power of sight is for the sake of seeing, not seeing for the sake of having sight. Thus priority belongs essentially and necessarily to the actual.[2]

The ultimate *prius* of all change or process must, therefore, be an eternally complete actuality. This is the only possible first cause or prime mover. Such a cause—which moves without being moved, since it is itself the source of all movement—is not the first term in an infinite regress. Its action is not temporal, like that of finite or transient causes, but is eternal or timeless activity.[3]

Now what alone can move though it is itself unmoved is not merely a material or efficient cause but a final cause, or rather a cause that is both efficient and final.[4] Its action is not merely that of impulsion, but also that of attraction. For it moves as the end or ideal to be attained, and in this way causes the ceaseless change in things and their development from potentiality to actuality. "It is the object of desire and the object of thought that move without being moved."[5] They call forth the effort to realize and to apprehend. And what alone can and must move the thought and the desire of all beings is that which is truly intelligible and supremely desirable.

Such a cause, whose action is activity without change or movement—an "activity of immobility,"[6] as it has been named—is the

[1] Cf. *Anal. Post.*, I. 1.

[2] *Metaph.*, IX. 8.

[3] XII. 6; cf. 1072a 25.

[4] It is also formal cause as defining the nature of eternal being or ultimate reality; and indeed material cause too, for, as none of the four causes taken alone can explain the world process, so the true cause unites them all.

[5] XII. 7, 1072a 26; cf. the passage in the *De Anima* referred to above.

[6] *ἐνέργεια ἀκινησίας* (*Eth. Nic.*, VII. 14, 1154b 27).

eternal actuality which alone explains the whole process of becoming. It is the one perfect and fully determinate form that informs all things, each after its own kind and in its own degree. In such a being or reality there is no matter distinguishable from form, no potentiality without actuality, no distinction of thought and its object or intelligence and the intelligible,[1] but only eternal realization. This is God. In an almost hymnic passage[2] Aristotle defines the being and nature of God as consisting in a life of eternal and perfect activity and blessedness, everlastingly self-realizing and self-apprehending, and worthy of the fullest wonder and adoration. And so God moves the world or causes all things as the goal of all aspiration or the object of yearning love (*κινεῖ ὡς ἐρώμενον*).[3]

Value of the Principle Concerned

The concluding chapters of the culminating book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*[4] are, when taken as a whole, worthy of comparison with the greatest and best passages in Plato's *Timaeus*[5] and other dialogues. They are a marvel of concise and masterly statement, evincing a deep conviction of insight into truth, and expressing with the sureness born of long and laborious inquiry the significance of the principle asserted. They reaffirm his conception of the relation of his philosophy to the doctrines of his predecessors,[6] namely, as at once uniting and explaining, and thereby transcending them. Wherein, then, lies the value of Aristotle's ultimate principle?

The concept of final cause makes possible the interpretation of things in terms of their ends or their ultimate significance rather than, or as well as, of their means or conditions. As Aristotle always insists, anything is defined by its end or completed nature. Material or efficient causality by itself would mean explaining the higher or more developed by the lower or less developed. By bringing together, as Aristotle does, efficient and final causality it is possible, in principle at least, to provide—as Plato already desiderated in the *Phaedo* as well as the *Timaeus*—a cause that is also a reason because it signifies a goal and a purpose.[7] Thus God's causality is at once efficient and final causality. This is Aristotle's restatement or reinterpretation of the Idea of the Good.

The same explanatory principle is involved in Aristotle's doctrine of the primacy or priority of actuality. All change and development

[1] XII. 9, 1074b 35 (*νόησις νοήσεως*=the unity of knowing and known or subject and object).

[2] 1072b 14–30. [3] 1072b 3.

[4] XII. 6, 7, 9 and 10.—Ch. 8 may well be an insertion to deal with its special topic, though it is not altogether irrelevant to the general subject.

[5] E.g. 29d–30b, embodying, as it has been put, "the basal thought of Plato."

[6] Already stated in Book I and implied throughout.

[7] Cf. Whitehead: "All ultimate reasons are in terms of aim at value."

in things signify a transition or passage from the potential to the actual, a process in which a material of one kind or another takes on a further determinate form for which it already has a certain potentiality. In the universe as a whole the material as distinct from the formal factor or principle is expressed in the concept of primal or primordial matter (*πρώτη ὕλη, materia prima*). This principle has a definite value as a limitative concept denoting pure potentiality or pure passivity (formless matter) as a counterpart of pure activity, which is the nature ascribed to God. But it is a suppositional and not an actual substrate underlying all the changes of nature. What alone is real besides the process or movement itself is not an indeterminate matter or substance (*τὸ ὑποκείμενον*), but the complete actuality which the process presupposes. Thus, while all process or development in anything is ultimately determined by its end or goal, yet the end or completed form is already pre-existent in the individual agent or organism as the impulse to its realization, and in the whole universe of reality as the eternal actuality which is God.

That the primary movent or mover, which is the ultimate agent in all change and process, is itself unmoved, and that there can be only one such original source of movement (*τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον*, the *primum mobile*) means quite definitely that God is one and changeless. It is sometimes taken, along with Aristotle's characterization of God's activity as an "activity of immobility" and again as the "thinking of thought," to imply an impassive self-contemplation that is far removed from any concern or interest in the world of finite beings. But this is not really warrantable. No doubt Aristotle's statement is inadequate to the whole truth of the matter. For one thing thought, taken alone, is not adequate to the requirements of the nature of ultimate reality.[1] But the principle that the absolute reality is in one aspect the union of thought and existence or subject and object is indefeasible. Moreover, in his conception of God as eternal being Aristotle depicts, as we have seen, not only a goal or object of aspiration or an exemplar for finite effort and striving, but a life or activity that comprises all, and much more than all, that is best and highest in human experience. Such a God can be nothing else than an indwelling spirit whose presence in all things moves then to the realization of ideal values and whose nature consists in this very presence and self-communication. Thus God is neither only at the beginning nor only at the end of the world process, but is its life and soul—and its body too—all through.

In the last chapter of the book of the *Metaphysics* referred to Aristotle touches very briefly on the question of the immanence

[1] This has been shown conclusively by Bradley among other thinkers.

or transcendence of God.[1] He asks whether the presence of the good —the highest good—in the universe is to be conceived on the analogy of the general or leader of an army or of its order and discipline; and he answers that it seems necessary to regard it in both ways. In other words, God is at once transcendent and immanent—transcendent as the unconditioned ground of all existence and the ideal goal and standard of perfection for individual finite beings; immanent as the yearning in every creature for further fulfilment and fuller self-realization.

Aristotle's philosophy is expressed in different terms from that of Plato; but in its culminating principle the theology of the philosopher-scientist is not very different from that of the philosopher-poet. Rightly understood, the thought of the one as of the other can be definitely said to point toward, however far it falls short of clearly expressing, the great doctrine that God is Love. And their statement anticipates in no small measure the profound words of Spinoza: "He who loves God cannot desire that God should love him in return";[2] and again: "The intellectual love of the mind towards God is part of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself," with the corollary "The love of God towards men and the intellectual love of the mind towards God are one and the same."[3]

[1] XII. 10, 1075a 11–24.

[2] *Ethics*, V. 19.

[3] *Ibid.*, prop. 36 and cor.

IS *THE PRELUDE* A PHILOSOPHICAL POEM?[1]

W. B. GALLIE, B.A., B.Litt.

Is *The Prelude* a philosophical poem? It is, of course, many things besides: it is an autobiography; it contains profound reflections on psychology, education and politics; and there are passages of an almost purely lyrical character. Does it also contain *philosophical poetry*?

On this question, the critics of Wordsworth are divided. Coleridge and Raleigh answer Yes; Arnold, Bradley, Dr. Leaves, from their different points of view, agree in answering No. I believe that the first answer is right, although it has usually been supported by the wrong reasons. I believe the second answer to be wrong, although many of the arguments that are supposed to lead to it are in themselves sound enough. Those who say that *The Prelude* is not a philosophical poem, usually mean that it does not offer a coherent system of philosophy—that it expresses an original outlook and a personal wisdom, but that the only systematic philosophy in it comes at second-hand from Hartley or Coleridge and contributes not at all to the poem. And this is largely true. But the mistake is, to identify philosophy with system, philosophizing with "a philosophy." This is a mistake that has been repudiated again and again by many of the greatest philosophers, from Socrates and Plato to Locke and Kant and others.

I shall argue that *The Prelude* achieves philosophical poetry, because in it Wordsworth grapples with philosophical problems—problems which arise out of the story of his own early life—which are actually forced upon him by the poem itself; and because he tries to answer these problems in a way which would be possible only in poetry.

I shall not try to show that the peculiar greatness of *The Prelude* lies in its philosophical achievement. On the contrary, I believe that its greatness lies, like that of all Wordsworth's successful poetry, in its passion, its humanity, its conscientious realism. But these very qualities led Wordsworth, whenever his thought reached a certain level of generality, to feel the inadequacies of certain of our categories—both metaphysical and moral—as commonly used. He had not the ingenuity to replace these categories by a new system. But the impact of his poetry made them shake, and he is a philo-

[1] Throughout this article I am much indebted to the criticisms and suggestions of my friend, Karl Britton.

sophical poet because he makes us feel them shake and because he himself well knew that they were shaking, and was able to make some suggestions as to the form that the new categories might take. It would be idle to claim that in the last task Wordsworth was uniformly successful. But success in philosophy is always a relative matter, and a philosopher may have done a great deal if he has made us think even a little differently, not by presenting new facts to our notice, but by inducing us to shift the emphasis and orientation of some of the basic notions we use in everyday life. And this much can, I think, be claimed for the philosophy of *The Prelude*.

This is the claim, I believe, which Coleridge and Raleigh made for Wordsworth. But they expressed it in terms which left them open to important criticisms from the other side. I shall try to state the claim in a different way and shall consider what I believe to be the philosophical element in *The Prelude* under the following heads: (1) How the central philosophical problem of *The Prelude* arises from its autobiographical theme; (2) The analogy by which Wordsworth develops his answer to the problem; (3) The originality of his answer; (4) The part played by poetry in achieving his answer; (5) Its verification and its applicability to other problems.

(1) *How does the central philosophical problem of* The Prelude *arise from its autobiographical theme?*

The Prelude, Wordsworth tells us, was intended as a stock-taking of his poetic powers, an interim task to aid him in selecting the subject of his main work as poet. His initial question was, quite simply, how could he give of his best as a poet? Unable to answer the question thus posed, he turns back in a kind of despair to some of his earliest memories, and these by the intensity of delight and wonder they awaken in him, renew his confidence and brace his mind for further efforts. But Wordsworth finds something puzzling, paradoxical even, in this experience.[1] His present renewed confidence in his powers lies in a "calm existence," a tranquility of mind and steady direction of purpose which enable him to range, disinterestedly, gratefully, in the appropriate artistic sense conscientiously, over the whole field of his experience. But the intense, spontaneous responses of his childhood stood in complete contrast to this "calm existence"; they were a succession of impressions, gathered accidentally, enjoyed without reflection, by-products of the muscular zest and petty selfish aims of childish consciousness. Further, his recollections were made up of "discordant elements," a confusion of delight in beauty, pride in energy, awe before the unknown, terror, pain. The contrast of past and present puzzled him and led him to a second problem. There appeared to be two opposing

[1] See *The Prelude*, Bk. I, lines 340–56.

elements in poetic inspiration; on the one hand the spontaneous receptivity and response characteristic of childhood and on the other hand the self-mastery, the calm of mind, the conscientiousness of the mature artist. How could these be brought together into a satisfying and productive harmony? This is perhaps the central problem in every artist's self-discipline, and it is one on which Wordsworth had some profound and original things to say. But no sooner is it posed than it is seen to be but one case of a wider problem, that of the active happiness, responsive and responsible, of every good man. For this ideal, no less than that of poetic activity, requires a discipline which can reconcile and harmonize the discords of spontaneous impulse and response. It is not of himself only or of other poets and artists that Wordsworth writes,

> Ah, is there one who ever has been young,
> Nor needs a warning voice to tame the pride
> Of intellect and virtue's self esteem?
> One is there, though the wisest and the best
> Of all mankind, who covets not at times
> Union that cannot be—who would not give,
> If so he might, to duty and to truth
> The eagerness of infantine desire?[1]

Such perfect union of spontaneity and discipline may be impossible, but Wordsworth knew from his own experience—from his own happiness quite as much as from his achievements as a poet—that in his life something like it had taken place. This led him to look for the external, as well as the internal, conditions in his own life, which had made this possible. Inspired by his own glimpses, he asks:

> Why is this glorious creature to be found
> One in ten thousand only? What one is,
> Why should not millions be?[2]

But, recalling the circumstances that had specially favoured his own happy development, he sees part of the reason:

> . . . Were it otherwise,
> And we found evil fast as we find good
> In our first years, or think that it is found,
> How could the innocent heart bear up and live?[3]

And this line of thought is supported by many darker musings on the actual lot of humanity, on the stultification of its powers under the tendency,

> Of use and custom to bow down the soul
> Under a growing weight of vulgar sense,
> And substitute a universe of death
> For that which moves with light and life inspired,
> Actual, divine and true.[4] . . .

[1] See *The Prelude*, Bk. II, lines 19–26.
[2] *Ibid.*, Bk. XIII, lines 88–89.
[3] *Ibid.*, Bk. VIII, lines 308–11.
[4] *Ibid.*, Bk. XIV, lines 158–62.

and on the effects of poverty and labour in excess which

> From day to day pre-occupy the ground
> Of the affections and to Nature's self
> Oppose a deeper nature. . . .[1]

This last sentence is of particular interest. In its curious antithesis between Nature with a capital and a "deeper nature" not so dignified we have one of Wordsworth's most striking attempts to effect that kind of shift in our categories which he believed was necessary for an adequate statement of the *possibility* of happiness. Nature with a capital is that "eternal nature" of which he writes in the letter to John Wilson: to render men's feelings more consonant to "eternal nature" is the supreme moral function of poetry, and to live our lives in consonance with it is Wordsworth's conception of happiness. The other, "deeper nature," the universe of death, the use and custom that bow down the soul, are Wordsworth's version of the problem of evil. Now when philosophers face this problem they all too often give us answers which "dispose of it"—e.g. by showing how the amount or the prospects or the possibilities of happiness far outweigh in a final balance those of misery. Such a final balance is of course highly problematical. In *The Prelude*, with his thoughts guided by the thing he knew most about—his own job and duty as a poet—Wordsworth gives an answer of a more modest and useful kind. As a poet, his most pressing interest was not in the justification of his work, but in its method; and as a moralist drawing his wisdom from the discipline of his art, he was interested primarily not in any transcendental assurance of happiness (or justification of misery) but in the *way* of happiness (to use a religious phrase) or (if the phrase be preferred) the *art* of it. In particular, he wanted to discover what part, on the one hand, men can contribute from their own inward resources towards finding and holding that way ("to what point and how, the mind is lord and master") and, on the other hand, what men must receive in aid, stimulation, infection, "grace" from sources outside themselves—from other human beings and from nature.

Here is the central philosophical problem of *The Prelude*:—Wordsworth's version of the problem of "the true end of man." His answer to it is at once normative and interpretative; it is an attempt to show the reality of certain "may-bes" in human experience with a view to convincing us that these are, in the ethical sense, "must-bes." The central "may-be" is the possibility of human happiness conceived in terms of a certain discipline or way. ("What one is, why may not millions be?") The central "must-be" is not issued in an imperative. Wordsworth had this much in common with Plato as a moralist, that he makes the essential moment of

[1] See *The Prelude*, Bk. XIII, lines 198–201.

morality one of recognition—in Wordsworth's case the recognition "that from thyself it comes, that thou must give, else never canst receive."[1] And he believed that to *show* this truth was the only way to make men better.

(2) *The analogy by which Wordsworth develops his answer*

Throughout *The Prelude* Wordsworth's thought moves freely between the three planes I have distinguished. He uses his own personal problem to raise the general problem of artistic self-discipline; and his insights into this second problem provide him with an analogy which he applies to the problems of moral happiness. But on each and all of these planes his thought never leaves the world of common day. His findings, even when relating to the subtleties of poetic creation, are expressed always in intelligible, too often in banal, language. In general, the terms of his problem are familiar to ordinary reflection; and for verification of his conclusions Wordsworth can appeal to "that knowledge which all men carry about with them."[2] The only apparent exceptions to this rule are the celebrated descriptions of "visiting of imaginative power."[3] What relation, it may reasonably be asked, have these strange experiences to anything that conduces to the happiness of ordinary men? To this Wordsworth could have answered as follows. These "visitings of imaginative power" were the experiences of a poet, and were of a quite unusual intensity, depth and suggestive power. They were therefore untypical of ordinary experience. It may nevertheless be possible for the ordinary reader to have some inkling of what they were like; and Wordsworth supplies some very revealing details of their perceptual and motor backgrounds. And secondly, for his main purpose in *The Prelude*, Wordsworth is not so much concerned with the operation of imagination—the way it works on its object—as with the felt effects of its visitings and the moral power and influence they leave behind. Now, from this point of view, it matters little whether imaginative experience be original and creative, as with the poet, or received from others, as with the rest of us. It is not therefore necessary to enter here into a full account of Wordsworth's theory—or rather his various sketches of a theory—of the imagination as an original power. It is enough to notice that Wordsworth was interested in the imagination as a *revealing* power, rather than as a shaping and creative power. Its peculiar virtue (he suggests) does not lie precisely in what it reveals,

[1] See *The Prelude*, Bk. XII, lines 276–277.

[2] This phrase is taken from Wordsworth's Preface to the 1802 Edition of his poems.

[3] See, in particular, *The Prelude*, Bk. II, lines 294–322; Bk. VI, lines 592–640; Bk. VII, lines 619–49; Bk. XII, lines 208–335; Bk. XIV, lines 28–111.

but in the fact that the insights given are always incomplete and so leave us with a sense of "something to pursue," of "something evermore about to be," and a sense of how little "we know both of ourselves and of the universe." Thus the chief moral effect of such visitations is to give our minds renewed appetite and vigour, to call up our powers for further exploration and verification.

So much by the way of defence of one part—and that the most easily misunderstood—of the analogy by which Wordsworth develops his answer to his main philosophical problem. But precisely what part do imaginative experiences play in achieving and maintaining that artistic self-discipline which will foster, control and reconcile the wayward, irresponsible element in inspiration? Wordsworth saw clearly that these two elements in his own inspiration required one another. But he also had very definite views as to the kinds of experiences and sentiments which, in his own case, had been most effective in bringing them together. These were, first, the sentiment of gratitude—a generalized gratitude towards the past which kept him constantly aware of the debt he owed and of the return due from him for the unusually lively sensibility, the enthusiasm, and the tenderness which it was his privilege as a poet to enjoy. Secondly, there were those rare, unpredictable "spots of time" in which imagination reveals "the hiding-places of man's power," challenges us to recognize "our destiny, our being's heart and home," convinces us "that whatsoever point we gain, we yet have something to pursue," and yet leaves us "as if admonished from another world." The cultivation of the habit of gratitude and the habitual re-living in memory of such spots of time give us the essence of Wordsworth's poetic method; they are the factors which energize "recollection in tranquility." And they interpenetrate and re-enforce one another in various ways. Thus gratitude to the past not only gave rise to Wordsworth's admiration of the "mystery of man" as revealed in childhood, it contributed a great deal to his imaginative interpretation of Nature as "leader-on," as inviter and educator, and it also helped him to see (as in the experience described at the close of Bk. XII) the first germs of the integrating activity of imagination in a moment of childish terror and in a child's "trite reflections of morality." But the two factors can best be understood by considering the distinct contribution which each makes. Thus the felt effects of imaginative visitations inspire the creative, ambitious side of the required self-discipline; they provide a challenge to further effort, a realization of the apparently infinite possibilities of human experience and of the sorry little we usually make of these. Gratitude, on the other hand, provides the conscientious aspect of artistic self-discipline, its filial sense of debt to the experienced past and to received tradition and its almost parental sense of respon-

sibility for the spontaneous, wayward, in themselves vulnerable and even self-destructive elements of poetic inspiration.

Wordsworth showed unusual artistic wisdom in preferring his "cult of memory" to a more direct quest of inspiration. His cult of memory is only one form of artistic self-discipline; but its two principles of gratitude to the past and habitual re-living of imaginative visitations could be generalized, I think, to provide maxims relevant to most of the arts. Certainly, his cult of memory provided Wordsworth with the discipline *he* needed, and his originality as a moralist—the way he shakes and alters our general conception of morality—lies in his application of its two principles of gratitude and imagination to the whole moral life of man.

But before considering how Wordsworth deals with his wider problem, we must examine the part he ascribes to Nature in the achievement of his own poetic self-discipline. For he was to carry his conclusions on this point also into his wider moral philosophy. Let us put the question quite bluntly. What did Nature mean to Wordsworth? In many of his poems Nature stands simply for whatever he perceived and loved in the external, extra-human world. But when Wordsworth wrote of Nature in relation to the general problem of human happiness and morality he often meant something very different. He meant by it the fact that certain extra-human objects can give us that

> . . . . prepossession, without which the soul
> Receives no knowledge that can bring forth good,
> No genuine insight ever comes to her.[1]

Nature, so conceived, is a moral agency. Sometimes it seems as if Wordsworth is ready to identify Nature with a local tradition—the simple and rustic life of the Lakes. But this identification is premature and in many other passages it is clear that his notion has a far wider generality. Sometimes it seems as if Wordsworth were really speaking of the influence of actual human beings—parents, friends, teachers. But again, what is intended is not an identification but an analogy, and an analogy of which Wordsworth was particularly fond. It is significant that the famous passage on the mother's influence on her child ("Blest the infant Babe . . .")[2] occurs in the middle of a series of descriptions of how Nature surrounds the infant with invitations, encouragements, challenges and admonishments. And the similarity Wordsworth found between "Nature's gifts" and the effects of human love at its strongest and purest is by no means a far-fetched or sentimental one. For the response of a child (and not of a child only) to each of these, is seen in a disposition to look

[1] See *The Prelude*, Bk. VIII, lines 325–27.
[2] *Ibid.*, Bk. II, lines 232–65.

for further beauty, to move out into the world confidently and hopefully, to feel generously, to think and plan with courage. Both Nature and the mother enable the child to feel himself "an inmate of this active universe":

> For him, in one dear Presence, there exists
> A virtue which irradiates and exalts
> Objects through widest intercourse of sense.

It is in this passage that Wordsworth describes how the child "drinks in the feelings of his mother's eye"—as though there were a direct communication of feeling. Is it any more fanciful to claim that there is similar communication from external nature to the child? At all events, it is an obvious fact that we can come to love a place because its beauties lead us to look for further beauties, to acknowledge those we see with gratitude, and to feel at home amongst them. In describing in great detail the moral effects of such experiences, Wordsworth was only retelling more fully what every poet, indeed every man of feeling, has known since humanity began.

Nature, then, for Wordsworth when he is philosophising, means the fact that the extra-human world can have an incalculable moral effect on man. What is original in Wordsworth's thought is the notion that human happiness at its best arises out of a peculiar co-operation of this external nature and man's own inner nature; out of Nature's gift and man's response.

(3) *The originality of Wordsworth's answer*

Wordsworth's conception of the availability of Nature's gifts provides in one respect an interesting parallel to the Christian doctrine of the availability of grace. On either doctrine man must give—must make an original, peculiarly human response—if he is to receive. The required response, on Wordsworth's theory, must be made in terms of gratitude and imagination; on the Christian theory in terms of repentance, obedience and love of God. A striking difference between the two theories is seen, however, when we pass from the availability of Nature's gifts or of grace to the accounts of how men actually receive them. Here Wordsworth might be described as a "naturalistic predestinarian." He felt himself specially *chosen* because Nature's gifts had been made available to him in quite an untypical way. And in so far as he thought of himself as a "dedicated spirit" this was because of a "bond" which he *himself* had not chosen to embrace. Still less does the infant choose to "drink in the feelings of his mother's eye" and thus experience "the filial bond of nature that connects him with the world." On Wordsworth's view the *moral person*, the subject to whom we can significantly apply moral predicates, the subject who can choose, is a result of that

"prepossession" which is brought about by the *actual* impact of Nature's gifts on a human being. Unless they arise out of that prepossession, what we commonly think of as moral predicates are something else—legal predicates for instance. Morality for Wordsworth presupposes the *actual experience* of happiness; and this on the one hand is a natural occurrence since it derives from causes and conditions which are not in man's power to choose or control, and on the other hand is "Nature's Invitation"; for once these conditions have been realized, men can feel Nature as something to follow, to cultivate, as something demanding a self-giving in return, a moral response that is *genuine* because it has a self-accepted standard. These causes and conditions which are beyond man's power to choose or control Wordsworth finds partly in "external nature"—in the actual, sensible presence of beauty and grandeur—and partly in that "prime and vital" principle which lies, Wordsworth tells man,

> In the recesses of thy nature, far
> From any reach of outward fellowship,
> Else is not thine at all.[1]

This is his version of "From him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he seemeth to have." But on Wordsworth's view "the prime and vital principle" is never called out at all in many human beings, and that through no fault of their own; their lives, from birth, are harnessed to "the mean and vulgar works of man." In others it is crushed out by the weight of custom and routine. It is only those who have known true happiness who can be judged morally.

Wordsworth's claim that moral categories apply only within certain conditions which are realized (we must suppose) comparatively rarely in human life can be considered either a revolutionary or a retrograde one. It appears to cancel that universality—that recognition of moral personality in every human life—which was the signal contribution of Christian ethics. Wordsworth by contrast seems nearer to the "aristocratic" realism—the blunt acceptance of fundamental moral differences between men—which we find in most Greek philosophy. But Wordsworth's intention was, of course, the exact opposite of this. His aim was to show (to apply a fine saying of Meredith's) how men are kept from having souls in *this* world. Seen in this light his conception of Nature's gifts, which at first seems so much narrower and more exclusive than the Christian notion of grace, turns out perhaps to be a more just, generous, compassionate and practical one. If there is anything harsh in Wordsworth's moral attitude (at any rate as expressed in *The Prelude*) it lies in his refusal to identify his feelings with those of

[1] See *The Prelude*, Bk. XIV, lines 216–18.

the "lost," to slide from a recognition of the *fact* of suffering to some kind of exaltation or justification of it. This was an issue Wordsworth had faced in life. Had he returned to France during the terror, he tells us,

> Doubtless, I should have then made common cause
> With some who perished; haply perished too,
> A poor mistaken and bewildered offering—
> Should to the breast of Nature have gone back,
> With all my resolutions, all my hopes,
> A poet only to myself, to men
> Useless.[1] . . .

A strangely original prophet of duty, Wordsworth set his face in the opposite direction—to explore and enjoy and make known to men (in language all men might understand) the way of happiness.

What then is Wordsworth's conception of happiness, and how do his two principles of gratitude and imagination contribute to it? In the first place (as I have suggested) he does not think of happiness as something to be achieved only with the full insight, the final revelation. He thinks of it as something essentially incomplete and yet at the same time self-justifying. It contains its own self-renewing inspiration and its own discipline and admonishments. Secondly, this happiness is to be found in the very world that is the world of all of us. It originates in the filial bond that connects us with this active universe: it arises out of that grand elementary principle of pleasure in which all creatures share.

Yet such happiness is not complacency, either moral or intellectual. It gives rise to the active compassion of The Wanderer who "could *afford* to suffer with those whom he saw suffer"; and it is the happiness of the man who wrote the Ode to Duty. Wordsworth, of course, does not put forward his "theory" of happiness systematically. But its effectiveness as a moral principle can, I think, readily be seen in Wordsworth's applications of its two main components—gratitude and imagination. Gratitude, in itself a pleasurable emotion, provides, on Wordsworth's view, a constant nursing-ground for a good will; not only because it keeps us in mind of all that we owe in so far as we have become moral beings, but because it conduces both consciously and—perhaps with even greater effect—unconsciously to automatic habits of right moral action. Wordsworth wrote of his sister ("And yet I knew a Maid . . .") as one whose "*life* was gratitude." But a life so conceived lacks something, lacks something morally—a bracing element which Wordsworth claims only imagination can contribute to the moral life. Parts of this contribution we have already considered in connection with artistic self-discipline—the challenge to intellectual effort, the sense of an

[1] See *The Prelude*, Bk. X, lines 229–35.

unlimited field awaiting human exploration, and a humbling recognition of how feebly we respond to this challenge and opportunity.

But the exercise of imagination has other more direct and obvious bearings on the moral life. For imagination alone can reveal, and when revealed keep constantly real in our minds,

> Those mysteries of being which have made,
> And shall continue evermore to make
> Of the whole human race one brotherhood.[1]

In the same way only imagination can reveal those usually unsuspected beauties, harmonies—and we might add problems—in Nature which engage artists, poets, scientists, but which, when most strikingly manifested,

> men least sensitive see, hear, perceive,
> And cannot choose but feel: . . .[2]

In general Wordsworth would claim that imagination reveals man's highest good, incompletely in respect of its objects (for these are inexhaustible) but in its exercise as completely as we can conceive.

But does Wordsworth claim that gratitude and imagination together comprise his "way of happiness" and together give us a moral principle under which all other moral principles, sentiments, duties, can be subsumed? Or does he simply claim that they are moral principles of the first importance whose characteristic operations have generally been misunderstood or ignored? To judge from the summing up we find in Bk. XIV Wordsworth makes the former —wilder—claim. And this is, I think, a sheer mistake on his part; for, to take but one example, how can insight into fairness (surely an essential ingredient in morality) be subsumed under either gratitude or imagination? This mistake, however, which would be damaging to a "systematizing" thinker, is not really important in an original thinker who is trying to shift, or re-orientate, some of the basic categories of our thought. Had Wordsworth contented himself simply with emphasizing his two great principles, he would still, I claim, have made a revolutionary contribution both to morals and to the metaphysics of the mind.

(4) *The part played by poetry in Wordsworth's answer:*

Could not Wordsworth's conclusions as to happiness and morality have been reached by ordinary philosophic reflection? I do not know. What I do know, and what we can all see if we read *The Prelude* as it is written, as a whole and not as a series of reflective

[1] See *The Prelude*, Bk. XII, lines 85–87.
[2] *Ibid.*, Bk. XIV, lines 84–85.

lyrics linked by skipable commentary, is that poetry—the actual occurrence of unmistakable, sometimes incomparable poetry—plays an all-important role at every stage of its argument. We have seen how Wordsworth *uses* poetry to raise his initial problem as to his own calling and duty as a poet. In illustrating his own poetic method (*The Prelude* illustrates rather than explains or defends his cult of memory) Wordsworth again makes use of poetry in a yet more obviously necessary way. Similarly, without the poems of gratitude with which *The Prelude* abounds it would be hard to grasp all that Wordsworth means by the word gratitude and almost impossible to understand how his feelings for Nature related to his feeling for traditional life. And is it conceivable that any abstract description of the lasting effects "imaginative visitations" could compare with Wordsworth's account of what he "saw" in the Simplon Pass or with the passage on the imagination which precedes it? In applying the lessons of his own poetic self-discipline to the wider moral field, Wordsworth is, admittedly, often very prosy; but in describing his sister as one whose life was gratitude, and in his best accounts of the monstrous confusions of city life and of the individual dignities of men and households he gives us something which probably only poetry could give.

Once it is granted, therefore, that in intention (however inadequately conceived) and in effect (however incomplete) *The Prelude* is philosophical poetry, it is easy to see how its poetry helps to make, not simply to express, its philosophy. But I think that something more than this can be claimed for *The Prelude*. I would claim that it contains masterpieces of argument. The posing of its initial problem in Bk. I is an example. The central passage of the Retrospect (Bk. VIII, lines 293–339) is another. But quite the most remarkable is the conclusion of Bk. XII. What do these amazing paragraphs tell us? How does their argument proceed? Their formal structure could, I think, quite easily be traced out—and we should find some gaps in it. But we should find also, in some hundred and eighty lines of the most moving poetry ever written, a condensed statement of Wordsworth's view of how imaginative experience contributes to the foundation of morality. In the marshalling of arguments, the selection of terms, and in the judgement as to what consequences shall be drawn and what premises made explicit, it is an incomparable intellectual achievement. Can we see what factors in Wordsworth's poetic technique and vocabulary were of special assistance to him here? In broad outline, I think we can.

We may begin by considering how difficult it is to handle argument, especially abstract argument, in poetry. The poet lacks (or the exigencies of verse prevent him from using) many "logical words"

which would help in delimiting his field of discourse and in summing up conclusions and condensing them for the next step forward, and so on. Because of this, Wordsworth is twice compelled to confess the inadequacy of his statements;

> I see by glimpses now . . .
>
> and I would give,
> While yet we may, so far as words can give. . . .

And these confessions, while logically adding nothing to the argument, add a great deal to the intensity with which we are made to feel its hesitating, jerky, but superbly dramatic advance. For somewhat similar reasons Wordsworth has to resort to repetition. The beacon and the naked pool, for example, are referred to three times in this passage; but they re-enter the argument each time with a distinguishable purpose and effect. They are first presented as features in a scene that was naturally fitted to call out imaginative experience; they are next considered as elements in a typical imaginative experience, and they are considered lastly as instances of, or carriers of, that power which such visitations leave behind. This repetition is not simply for illustrative purposes. The purpose of the passage is to make us feel the peculiarly integrating effect of every imaginative experience. The abstract words by which we try to describe or analyse this effect are, inevitably, very inadequate. They lack precision, and precision is wanted here. But by his trick of repetition Wordsworth makes his whole concern with the moorland scene work in our thought, and work at three different levels of generality; he makes us feel it on the move and catch it on the rebound. And in this way an apparent defect in the poet's vocabulary is turned into a surprising asset.

In arguments of this order Wordsworth's use of abstract words is unequalled by any other English poet. How often do not the nouns —nature, man, society, life, joy, power, base, object, influence, sense, thing, sight, and the adjectives—common, general, individual, ordinary, abstract, single, greatest, least, occur with a quite transfiguring wealth of meaning in *The Prelude*! Another aspect of this verbal mastery which contributes so much to Wordsworth's philosophical achievement is his use of verbs which possess both a practical (manipulative or motor) and a logical meaning: work, hang, unite, build, dispose, lead, follow, substitute, annul. Of course not all Wordsworth's uses of abstractions are equally happy. But an inspection of this part of Wordsworth's poetic armoury makes it hard to doubt that he possessed something of "the genius of a great philosophic poet."

(5) *The verification of Wordsworth's answer and its applicability to other problems*

How are the statements of an *original* moralist (i.e. one who attempts to shift our use of certain moral and metaphysical categories) to be tested and verified? I do not know; and although it seems to me perhaps the most important philosophical question that exists (as important for philosophy and for understanding what philosophy is as for practical life) I do not know of a single contemporary philosopher who has seriously considered it or at least has offered a helpful answer.

In this situation I shall consider only two points, which are certainly relevant to such verification although they by no means comprise it. First, then, an original moralist—a Plato, a Spinoza, a Wordsworth, a Nietsche, a Bergson, a Schweitzer—must express his view *forcibly*; he must, as it were, screw our moral vision round in the direction he wants us to look even if he does not persuade us that we ought to keep looking in that direction. Wordsworth, through his use of his own poetry, seems to me to succeed in this first task better than any of the thinkers I have just mentioned, Plato alone excepted. But, secondly, we must feel in any moralist who asks us to re-orientate our whole moral outlook, that he is thus far being "reasonable" in that, in Cartesian phrase, he has made the widest possible reviews of all relevant moral issues and that his own original view takes cognisance of these. It is in this respect that Spinoza, Bergson, and Schweitzer are such impressively persuasive moralists. They write as men of profound and masterful culture—moral, artistic, intellectual. And here Wordsworth, by contrast, falls short. He seems narrow and provincial. But it seems to me that it was not Wordsworth's moral experience and sympathies that were narrow, nor the range of his moral insights (glimpses), but his powers of generalization and of re-applying generalized results. Within his own chosen range Wordsworth's generalizing power was both bold and exact, and his power of producing "individual forms in which are embodied universal ideals and abstractions" perhaps unrivalled. The trouble was that he did not apply his results widely enough. But there are, I think, a number of moral and metaphysical issues to which Wordsworth's conception of the true end of man could be applied with immense benefit to-day: notably the problem of evil, the problem of how moral ideals can become (and remain) operative in political institutions, and the moral problems involved in the acceptance of scientific standards of truth. Wordsworth, of course, said some illuminating things on each of these issues, but his thoughts on them never went far enough. It was not, as Dr. Leavis has suggested, "lack of material" which kept Wordsworth from developing his philosophical poetry; it was the fact that his

philosophical powers were determined by—and worked only when fed by—his own personal poetic interests, compulsions, intuitions.

This defect is perhaps inevitable in a philosophical poet: but it is matched in Wordsworth's case by an asset which is of more than compensating value. The best philosophical poetry of *The Prelude* not only expresses philosophical thinking, but in an uniquely intimate way embodies it—creates the struggle of thought, raises its problems and antitheses, focusses the struggle of thought, and advances it to original conclusions. More than this, Wordsworth's characteristic method of thinking makes us aware of a corresponding defect in familiar philosophical methods when these are applied in morals or the metaphysics of the mind. For these methods almost inevitably fail to show us mind "on the move" or happiness and morality "in the making." In as much as it indicates a way of overcoming this defect *The Prelude* deserves, I think, the description which Coleridge applied (in anticipation) to *The Recluse* as a whole —"the *first* and *only* philosophical poem."

DESCARTES' "SIMPLE NATURES"[1]

JOHN HARTLAND-SWANN, B.A., Ph.D.

It is one of the unfortunate habits of great philosophers to leave behind them unclarified points of doctrine which give headaches to those anxious to view their systems as coherent wholes, and often lead to considerable confusion, or even contradiction, in attempts at critical exposition. An outstanding example of this is furnished by Descartes' treatment of "simple natures."

To interpret what Descartes really meant by simple natures as described in the *Regulae ad directionem ingenii*,[2] and to integrate this with what he said in his published works (where they are not mentioned as such) is by no means an easy task—as the differing views of various critics clearly indicate. One has only to compare, say, the expositions of Chevalier, Boyce Gibson and Keeling to see that there is little unanimity of opinion as to the actual connotation of simple natures, their proper role in the Cartesian metaphysic, their terminological equivalents in the *Meditations* and *Principles*, and their ontological as opposed to epistemological status. Many critics, as Dr. Keeling complains, have seen fit "to discuss them when treating of his (Descartes') method, and omit all reference to them thereafter."[3] To make any comprehensive attempt to sort out this critical *Verwirrung*, however, would require considerable space. What I shall do here, therefore, will be to state the problem as simply as I can and then offer a solution in the light of the evidence available—although I admit that short of recalling Descartes from his grave there can *be* no final solution.

I may remark at the outset that I am of the opinion that one of the reasons why simple natures were never mentioned after the

[1] Paper read to the Jowett Society, Oxford, May 22, 1946.

[2] *Reg.* vi, AT. x, 381–4 (epistemological aspect); *Reg.* xii, *ibid.*, 418–27 (ontological aspect). This division into "epistemological" and "ontological" aspects is merely an exegetical expedient, since the original texts do not permit of an exact correlation in the sense implied by this modern description. It is indeed no easy task to decide exactly how "absolute" terms, each of which "in se continet naturam puram et simplicem" (*Reg.* vi), are to be related to the simple natures described in *Reg.* xii. It is dubious whether, on Descartes' own premisses, what is epistemologically absolute can be univocally correlated to what is ontologically simple, and what is epistemologically relative to what is ontologically complex. But unless such a correlation is achieved there is little coherence between the simple natures of *Reg.* vi and those of *Reg.* xii. (The abbreviation "AT." refers to the 12-volume edition of Descartes' correspondence and works edited by MM. Adam and Tannery.)

[3] *Descartes*, p. 236.

Regulae is that Descartes considered they would not bear the weight of the structure of his innatism (which, strictly speaking, should have been erected on them exclusively), and this conclusion seems to be reinforced by consideration of his intuition of the idea of God—a point to which I shall revert later. At all events, after the *Regulae* "simple" natures are no longer discussed; instead we are asked to attend to "true and immutable" natures, which are in some cases undisguisedly complex.[1] Further, some of these true and immutable natures or *essences* (which in theory should be, and according to the methodological presuppositions of the *Regulae must be*, reducible to *simpler* elements) have to be regarded as *basal units* to enable the epistemological processes, leading to valid metaphysical conclusions, to take their proper course. Let us endeavour, however, to tackle the problem from its commencement.

From a general philosophical aspect there are two main points of interest in regard to the simple natures of the *Regulae*:[2] (1) the method of their cognition; (2) their ontological status. The first point involves the troublesome question of "innate" ideas, and I do not think that it can now be seriously questioned that the Cartesian position (especially as finally laid down in the *Notae in programma quoddam*) implied falling back on some sort of mystical illumination of the intellect in order to avoid the "contamination" of sensory aid in the origination of the many concepts requisite to cope with experience. The following is to be noted, however. In 1628—the assumed date of the *Regulae*—Descartes' doctrine of innatism was but at the beginning of its long and somewhat erratic career, and at this period there is still room for the "understanding" to abstract from sense-data in its pursuit of truth. "Ad rerum cognitionem duo tantum spectanda sunt, nos scilicet qui cognoscimus, et res ipsae cogno-

[1] Cf. Letter of June 16, 1641, to Mersenne. "Par le mot *Idea*, j'entends tout ce qui peut être en notre pensée, et . . . j'en ai distingué trois sortes: à savoir *quaedam sunt adventitiae*, comme l'idée qu'on a vulgairement du Soleil; *aliae factae vel factitiae*, au rang desquelles on peut mettre celle que les Astronomes font du Soleil par leur raisonnement; *et aliae innatae, ut Idea Dei, Mentis, Corporis, Trianguli, et generaliter omnes quae aliquas Essentias Veras, Immutabiles et Aeternas repraesentant*" (AT. iii, 383). Commenting on this passage M. Gilson remarks: "L'idée innée proprement dite . . . nous livre une 'vraie et immuable nature,' c'est-à-dire une essence dont la définition s'impose nécessairement à notré pensée" (*Commentaire*, p. 328).

[2] I shall be dealing more or less exclusively with the simple natures *per se* of *Reg.* xii, and for reasons which will become, I hope, progressively apparent. The so-called epistemological characteristics of simple natures, of which examples are given in *Reg.* vi and which are called "absolute terms" ("ut . . . independens, causa, simplex, universale, unum, aequale, simile, rectum . . ."—AT. x, 381)—these present little difficulty if viewed as "ultimate limits to formal analysis" (Keeling), that is, in the context of Descartes' methodology. The philosopher himself, in the same rule, makes it quite clear how an "absolute" term can become a "relative" one, and *vice versa*.

scendae. In nobis quatuor sunt facultates tantum, quibus ad hoc uti possimus: nempe intellectus, imaginatio, sensus, et memoria. Solus intellectus equidem percipiendae veritatis est capax, qui tamen juvandus est ab imaginatione, sensu, et memoria, ne quid forte, quod in nostra industria positum sit, omittamus" (*Reg.* xii, AT. x, 411). When, in the same rule, the intuiting of simple natures comes to be discussed this preliminary methodological directive comes into play. These "entities," it will be remembered, are divided into three groups—those that are purely intellectual, those that are purely material, and those common both to intellect and matter—and within the last group are included the common notions or *vincula* for relating the other simple natures to each other (*ibid.*, 419). Now while the first group (e.g. knowing, doubt, ignorance, volition) is apprehended by a direct intuition of the intellect, unaided by any corporeal image, the second group (e.g. figure, extension, motion) appears to require sensory aid for its apprehension, while the third group (e.g. existence, unity, duration *plus* the common notions) may be apprehended either by the intellect alone or with sensory aid (*ibid.*, 419–20). This point is important to bear in mind since most critics, arguing in the context of Descartes' later theory of innatism, tend to treat simple natures as all on a par, not only ontologically (which may be correct) but from the point of view of their cognition too, which is only justifiable if the doctrine of the *Meditations* (where the ideal "equivalents" of the simple natures of the second and third groups are declared innate as well—*Med.* iii. AT. vii, 44–5) is openly recognized as replacing the more "primitive" teaching of the *Regulae.* Unless that doctrinal modification is signalled and accepted as transforming the cognitional status of the simple natures of the second (and also the third) group, then no critic is justified in treating all simple natures on the same epistemic level (i.e. as corresponding to representative innate ideas). So much for the first point.

I come now to the second point of interest concerning simple natures—namely their ontological status (if indeed they have any). And it is precisely here that critics fall out or talk at cross purposes. Dr. Boyce Gibson, for instance, devotes some attention, in his comprehensive volume on Descartes' philosophy, to the status of simple natures, but almost entirely in the context of theory of knowledge, and without bothering once to cite or discuss the examples furnished by Descartes himself. For him the problem appears to be: is a simple nature a concept or a proposition? And to this, after a well-reasoned analysis of the relationship between intuition and deduction in Cartesian method, he replies: a simple nature is really a concept, but it can only be affirmed as simple by means of a proposition.[1] Dr. Keeling, on the other hand, makes a sustained (though not I fear

[1] *The Philosophy of Descartes*, p. 162. Cf. the whole discussion, pp. 154–63.

wholly satisfactory) endeavour to get to grips with the ontological status proper of simple natures. Acting specifically as Descartes' interpreter (in the context of the *Regulae*) he writes: "All these natures (i.e. every nature in any of the three groups) are indispensable for knowledge. For our knowledge is to be of this *actual* world, and the actual world is made up of complex unities composed of these ultimate natures, and these unities would not exhibit the various characters they do if there were no simple natures of just these kinds. This seems to be what Descartes particularly desires to emphasize."[1] Later on, when developing his own viewpoint, Keeling maintains that simple natures are "ontal elements," "actually constitutive of extra-mental reality," and that there is an exact "correspondence between the *a priori* innate principles and concepts that give form to our knowledge" and these ontal elements.[2] In short, although Descartes' "standard" world consists purely in spirit-substance and body-substance and their modes (e.g. knowing, willing, doubting are but modes of *res cogitans*—*Princ.*, i, 48), Keeling appears to opt for an entification of simple natures in an extra-mental world which can only consist of diversified and configured (but essentially homogeneous) extended substance. But apart from the difficulties of reconciling this entification with Descartes' fundamental ontology, we have still to account for the simple natures of the *first* group which cannot, by their very definition, belong to "extra-mental reality" since they are *only* found in minds or mental operations! Are we to assume then that what Keeling really means is that simple natures are constitutive of both mental *and* extra-mental reality, according to their classification? This alternative, as we shall see, still raises serious difficulties, and, equally with the former, invites the attention of Occam's razor. Another view—which might "save the appearances" of simple natures as ontal elements—is to assume that they are indeed all extra-mental but inhabit some world of subsistents, analogous perhaps to that world of the modern realist where universals and their kin have their sublime if somewhat mysterious habitation.[3] This third alternative, savouring of Neo-Platonism, is not unattractive in view of Descartes' inherently realist and at times semi-mystical orientation, and seems at first sight to interpret the original doctrine of *Reg.* xii tolerably well. I say "at first sight" deliberately. For when the catalogue (unfortunately somewhat

[1] *The Philosophy of Descartes*, p. 70.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 236 n. 1, 264 n. 4. It is of course possible that I have failed to grasp what Dr. Keeling really means to imply—but I have felt compelled to take the terminology he uses at its face value.

[3] I must not be taken to insinuate that Dr. Keeling *himself* envisages simple natures as inhabiting some subsistent world. I am merely trying to examine any hypothesis under which it may be possible to pin down their ontological status.

abbreviated) of simple natures is perused carefully and we find that "common notions"—the *vincula* of knowledge—equally with figure, extension, motion, existence, unity, duration, etc., are simple natures, it looks as if entification on this basis becomes extraordinarily precarious, and as if "ontal element" is not the happiest term to employ—at any rate if it is to designate *all* simple natures indiscriminately. For what are these "common notions" in actual fact? Dr. Keeling likes to describe them as "relations," paraphrasing Descartes' own description of them[1] into neat terms such as "likeness" and "diversity." But later on, when the same critic is analysing simple natures out of the *cogito*-situation, these *vincula* or relations become *principles* (such as those of causation, sufficient reason, and non-contradiction). And indeed these "principles" not only tie up with the "eternal truths" of *Princ.* i, 48–9 (as we shall see in a moment), but also seem correctly to express the meaning of Descartes' own words in *Reg.* xii.[2] But when all is said and done, have we not—at least so far as these *vincula* are concerned—moved out of the sphere of ontological essences and back to mere concepts or logical principles, either furnished to or abstracted by the mind that it may therewith order experience? We may go further. *Every* simple nature cited by Descartes himself—whether of the first, second, or third group—is surely in point of fact a *universal*, an empirical or *a priori* concept—either abstracted by the mind from sensuous data, innately in the mind, or, to approach Kant's position, imposed by the mind on the facts of experience to give them rational interpretation. Now it is quite true, as more than one critic has stressed, that we have no right to assimilate Descartes' doctrine to that of Kant; the father of modern philosophy was *not* an idealist: that seems clear enough. But are we justified in pressing simple natures into the realist scheme of Descartes' published philosophy? Dr. Keeling thinks we are. "Descartes' 'innate ideas,' " he writes, "are so far preparatory of Kant's 'Categories of the Understanding.' But whereas Kant's 'Copernican hypothesis' effectively prevents us ever from knowing whether our cognition represents the structure of ultimate fact (and cannot therefore be taken as being a knowledge of extra-mental reality), it is of the very essence of Cartesian epistemology (viz. of the theory of representative perception, enforced by God's certification of what is 'clear and distinct') to maintain a correspondence between the *a priori* innate principles and concepts

[1] ". . . communes illae notiones, quae sunt veluti vincula quaedam ad alias naturas simplices inter se conjugendas, et quaram evidentia nititur quidquid ratiocinando concludimus. Hae scilicet: quae sunt eadem uni tertio, sunt eadem inter se; item, quae ad idem tertium eodem modo referri non possunt, aliquid etiam inter se habent diversum, etc." (*Reg.* xii, AT. x, 419).

[2] *Vide supra*, n. 1.

that give form to our knowledge, and the simple natures actually constitutive of extra-mental reality."[1] If this claim be studied in the context of the *Meditations* and *Principles*, difficulties spring up on every side. In these works the ontological ultimates are: (1) God or absolute substance; (2) spirit-substance with its plurality of selves and their modes; (3) body-substance with its various modes. Nothing else. The articles in the first book of the *Principles* which may be said to refer to simple natures in their new garb point the issue for us. In *article* 58 Descartes' anti-scholastic bias compelled him to declare that universals (*cf.* the second and third group of simple natures in *Reg.* xii) have no existence outside our thought. "De même le nombre que nous considérons en général, sans faire réflexion sur aucune chose créée, n'est point hors de notre pensée, non plus que toutes ces autres idées *générales* que *dans l'école* on comprend sous le nom d'universaux." In *articles* 48 and 49 he had definitely stated that "common notions" or "axioms"[2] (*cf.* the *vincula* of *Reg.* xii) were merely "eternal truths" having their seat in our minds but no existence outside our thought, i.e. (presumably) *no extra-mental reality*.[3] In the former article (48), however, curiously enough (and in apparent contradiction to arts. 58–9) the more general "categories" (of which *substance*, *duration*, *order* and *number* are cited as examples and which would formerly have belonged to the third group of simple natures in *Reg.* xii) are declared to be "res" (or to have "quelque existence"—French version) and to "range through all classes of real things."[4] Nevertheless, as the article goes on to make clear, only two ultimate classes of real things are recognized—namely, intellectual

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 264 n. 4. This passage should be compared with a former statement relative to "Awareness of Sensible appearances," e.g. "Complexes of sense-ideas (are) analysable into simpler ideas or sensa (but never into simple natures, for these are purely conceptual and non-sensory)" (*ibid.*, p. 162). If complexes of sense-ideas are not to *some* extent analysable into the simple natures which they represent, how, one may ask, is the "correspondence" referred to above to be maintained? Cf. Descartes' own remarks on this very point: "... si judicem aliquam figuram non moveri, dicam meam cogitationem esse aliquo modo compositam ex figura et quiete; et sic de caeteris" (*Reg.* xii, AT. x, 420). If this be taken in conjunction with the methodological directives of *Reg.* xii already referred to, I do not see how it is possible to maintain that simple natures are "*purely* conceptual and non-sensory" *unless* we concentrate exclusively on Descartes' later doctrine of innatism. But there, as I said, simple natures as such are never mentioned at all.

[2] "Cum autem agnoscimus fieri non posse, ut ex nihilo aliquid fiat, tunc propositio haec: *Ex nihilo nihil fit*, non tanquam res aliqua existens, neque etiam ut rei modus consideratur, sed ut veritas quaedam aeterna, quae in mente nostra sedem habet, vocaturque communis notio, sive axioma" (*Princ.* i, 49. (AT. viii (i), 23)).

[3] Always saving of course their possible inherence in the mind of God.

[4] Haldane and Ross thus happily translate "ad omnia genera rerum se extendunt."

and material—and *perception*, *volition*, etc., on the one hand, and *extension*, *figure*, etc., on the other (previously cited as simple natures of the first and second groups in *Reg.* xii) are declared to be *modes* of the two ultimate substances respectively. Further, what we just called the more general "categories"—namely substance, duration, order and number (the common natures of *Reg.* xii)—are in *art.* 55 themselves too, with the exception of substance, called *modes* of thinking or extended things. That is to say, duration, order and number are merely convenient concepts for giving verbal expression to the various aspects of the two ultimate types of reality, and in no way differ from things that endure, are ordered or numbered, i.e. do not represent separate entities. Ignoring the categorial confusion in Descartes' handling of the term "substance,"[1] it looks that, if we are to accept Keeling's hypothesis, we must equate ontal "element" with "mode," which it seems scarcely justifiable to do since the two fundamental Cartesian substances are themselves irreducible ontological ultimates (except in so far as there is a plurality of selves in the spiritual world)—and when we come to consider "relations," "common notions" or "axioms"—all packed into the third group of simple natures in *Reg.* xii—it is, as I have already said, harder still to give elemental being to these abstract principles. On the other hand, it is only fair to recognize that Descartes' own inconsistent exposition allows of more than one interpretation of his views on concepts and universals—and quite apart from the *Regulae*. For instance, his discussion of essence, in the context of his ontological argument for the existence of God, leads him to insist in *Med.* v

[1] Substance, the only "genuine" category mentioned, should not, strictly speaking, have been lumped together with duration, order and number, since the latter are all modes of substance. On the other hand, it is perfectly consistent to maintain that all four are (or can be) equally concretely exemplified in things that (spiritually or materially) are substantial, endure, are ordered or numbered. In point of fact, *art.* 48 and the articles immediately subsequent to it are compact of terminological confusions, which are heightened rather than reduced by any attempt to correlate them (the articles) with the doctrine of the *Regulae*. Dr. Keeling tries manfully to interpret *art.* 48 in terms of simple natures (*op. cit.*, p. 100), but admits that Descartes has got confused about "common notions," and himself somewhat inconsistently declares (*contra* Descartes) that existence, duration, diversity and unity are common *notions*, when what he should have said (to be consistent with *Reg.* xii and his own original interpretation of it) was that existence, unity and duration were common *natures* of the third group (i.e. common to both intellect and matter) and that "diversity" was a common notion proper (i.e. a relation or *vinculum*), even though of course it also belonged to the same group. Of course, all this sort of criticism, it may be asserted, is mere hair-splitting. True enough! But unfortunately the very attempt that has been made (and vainly made in the present writer's opinion) to fit simple natures into the scheme of Descartes published works compels one to a somewhat pettifogging analysis if the incompatibilities of the case (viewed in an ontological context) are to be made clear.

that the "true and immutable nature" of a triangle cannot be reduced to my thought, for the simple reason that it "resists" thought—remains the same whether I think it or not. Between this statement and the implications of *Princ.* i, 58–9 there is obviously a discrepancy (of which he himself seemed unaware) deriving from a clash between his desire to establish a stable and hence non-mentally dependent real structure in the universe, and his simultaneous preoccupation to discard the naïve realism of scholasticism with its otiose entification in the realm of universals. And overshadowing both these tendencies was his doctrine of the eternal verities, which, though eternal and having their seat in human minds, did not exist on account of any inherent necessity, but merely because God so willed. . . .

From this analysis it is, I hope, obvious what difficulties beset any attempt either to define accurately the ontological status of simple natures, or to co-ordinate what, from one aspect or another, appears to be their ontological status in the *Regulae* with the reality-structure of Descartes' published works—without sliding back into mere epistemological distinctions. Boyce Gibson's somewhat elliptical treatment, therefore—unsatisfactory as it may seem to the student desirous of receiving a detailed explanation of everything he can find in Descartes' writings—seems pragmatically justified in view of the insuperable difficulties encountered if simple natures be considered outside the formal structure of knowledge and the method of scientific analysis. The truth of the matter is, I think, that Descartes himself, owing to epistemological preoccupations (themselves coloured at times by a semi-mysticism), never achieved full mental clarity as to the ontological status of the various components of his knowledge-structure. The "ideas" of the *Meditations*, unlike the intuitions of the *Regulae*, were not all suited to discrimination into absolute terms representative of simple atomic elements, and any attempt to effect such a discrimination would have meant compiling utterly useless catalogues of every cognitional facet of perceived objects. Descartes therefore, understandably enough, exercised himself primarily with the causal explanation of ideas—what they represented or misrepresented—rather than with their analysis into irreducible elements, and seemed satisfied if he had shown that, due to being clear and distinct, their natures were "true and immutable," quite irrespective of their primitive simplicity. So soon as we start trying to fit simple natures into the scheme of the *Discourse* or *Meditations* we involve ourselves in confused speculation. Thus the self, Boyce Gibson claims, is *not* a simple nature;[1] the self, M. Cheva-

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 135. Boyce Gibson reaches this conclusion in the context of considering the original intuition of the self which (as Descartes himself was to insist to Burman (AT. v, 153)) contained implicitly the intuition of God. In point of fact the self *does* appear in isolation at first "due to the defensive

lier maintains, *is* a simple nature.[1] Dr. Keeling, consistently enough I suppose,[2] breaks down the *cogito* into a plethora of simple natures (all presumably "ontal elements") which include the "relations" that are equivalent to the fundamental principles required for the Cartesian proofs of the existence of God and material bodies.[3] Descartes himself, with commendable discretion, makes no attempt to indulge in any such analysis, even though he admitted that the fundamental axioms of logic could not be given metaphysical validity prior to the *cogito*-intuition.[4] He is, in point of fact, wholly preoccupied with ideas as such, complex though some of them are. The mind has received its furniture from God and the cataloguing of that furniture and the dissecting of it into its irreducible elements seems no longer greatly to concern him once the guiding principle of clearness and distinctness has been laid down; what is necessary is to establish the linkage between mental content and what it represents in the world of spirit, or misrepresents in the world of matter. "Simple natures" yield to the more comprehensive term "true and immutable natures," and these represent the essences of things—even if, as in the case of the triangle, the exact ontological status of that essence is never clearly explained, and is indeed confused by the doctrine of universals in the *Principles*.[5] The epistemological approach to exist-

and sceptical attitude which the method of doubt has compelled us to adopt in the face of a possibly alien universe"; but by leaning on what this critic calls the "method of expanding implications" we are able to transcend the (mere) self-intuition and thus attain God. "The finite is driven by the logic of its own being into the infinite." This procedure, however, as Boyce Gibson admits, "plays havoc with the theory of the self as substance" (*ibid.*, p. 105); and it also, I may add (despite the justificatory evidence for it in Descartes' own writings) complicates still further any attempt to interpret the self in terms of simple natures.

[1] *Descartes*, p. 214, e.g. "Cette première vérité (sc. le *Cogito*) répond exactement aux exigences de nos règles formelles et elle leur fournit un contenu réel: en effet, nous avons là précisément une connaissance immédiate, c'est-à-dire intuitive, d'une nature simple (le *je* comme sujet pensant) . . ."

[2] I.e. consistently with the passage in *Reg.* xii dealing with necessary and contingent relationship (AT. x, 421–2).

[3] These are, first, "the thing" which is "I," "existence," "thinking"; second, the various *vincula* of knowledge expressed in the form of four principles, namely (*a*) necessary relation of attribute to substance, (*b*) causation, (*c*) sufficient reason, (*d*) non-contradiction. These principles, Keeling contends, are "extracted" from the *Cogito*-situation, and at the same time give the latter its structure (*op cit.*, pp. 100–2).

[4] Letter of June or July, 1646, to to Clerselier (AT. iv, 444).

[5] The only satisfactory explanation of triangularity, on the basis of Descartes' own declarations, would be that God, on whom its essence depends, somehow holds it in equilibrium (1) in his own mind (as the Neo-Platonists held), or (2) in some timeless and spaceless aspect of the created universe, or (3) merely in all human minds whether or not those minds were capable of making the necessary effort within themselves to grasp its essence.

ence *via* essence—utilized (albeit in different ways) in both the ontological proof of God's existence and the proof for the existence of the external world—might have availed itself, one would imagine, of a reference to simple natures if they would have really been a help rather than a hindrance to the processes involved. But if we examine Descartes' explanatory remarks concerning the first proof in the Second Replies and the "geometrical" appendix thereto, we find that it is in fundament the *concept*[1] of a supreme Being that contains within itself the idea of necessary existence, and in the next line he talks of "nature or concept" as if the two terms were interchangeable. In effect, it is a necessity of thought which compels existence to be contained within the concept of a supreme Being. If, on the other hand, we accept the hypothesis of M. Koyré and others who (in order to subvert Kant) insist on a relation of entailment ("convenance") between God's essence and existence we have still to ask by what device one conglomeration of simple natures (that is, if the defining attributes of Deity can properly be called such) can entail the presence of another simple nature: existence. The problem obviously bristles with difficulties, quite apart from any consideration of Kantian criticism. Indeed, whenever the idea of God is at stake Descartes feels compelled to insist on its absolute *simplicity* and *indivisibility*,[2] and precisely to overcome the objections of those who would derive it from finite ideas, analyse it away into its constituent parts, and then claim with Gassendi[3] that these parts were anthropomorphically extracted from the sensuous world. A consideration of the (first) *a posteriori* proof illuminates the question from another angle. Its cogency depends again on the unicity and irreducibility of the idea which God himself has imprinted on my mind, and although now the *existence* of God depends on a fundamental causal principle, it seems clear that the (to us) complicated idea of God would tend to lose its internal stability if one started to dissect it into its component parts on any other basis than their being the qualifying attributes of the supreme Being.[4] Lastly (while we are still on the question of the true and immutable nature of God), if we accept Boyce Gibson's theory

[1] *II*[æ] *Resp. Rationes etc. more geometrico dispositae* (AT. x, AT. vii, 166).

[2] Cf. *Med.* iii: "Unitas, simplicitas, sive inseparabilitas eorum omnium quae in Deo sunt, una est ex praecipuis perfectionibus quas in eo esse intelligo" (AT. vii, 50); *II*[æ] *Resp.* "Sed praeterea in Deo intelligimus absolutam immensitatem, simplicitatem, unitatem omnia alia attributa complectentem . . ." (AT. vii, 137).

[3] *Objj. Vae*, AT. vii, 286–7.

[4] It would, I think, have savoured of irreverence if someone had suggested to Descartes that God's nature or essence was composed of a series of "ontal elements" in necessary relationship. The various qualities or attributes predicated of him (Descartes might have retorted) are merely modes of his infinite Being through which our finite minds apprehend him.

concerning the logic of expanding implications[1] and agree that, somehow or other, the idea of God is intuited simultaneously with (or "expands" from) the idea of the self, we are still apt to lose our footing if we turn off from the epistemological path and try to describe the situation in terms of simple natures as ontological ultimates. At all events, the fact remains that all mention of simple natures was consistently avoided in any and every presentation of the various proofs for God's existence.

The same avoidance was practised in the second essence-existence problem cited—namely, the argument for the ontological reality of the external world. In this case there was no question (as there was in the theistic ontological argument) of existence being contained among or entailed by the defining attributes of extension; existence was proved to have application due to the involuntary nature of sensation which God, through his veracity, guaranteed to be caused by external existent objects. Further, extension itself, though quoted as a simple nature of the second group in *Reg.* xii, might equally well, in accordance with the epistemological presuppositions of *Reg.* vi, be regarded as a relative term *vis-à-vis* length, and its defining components (length, breadth, depth) could rightly also be called simple natures. But all such dissection would have merely complicated further an already complex proof. Far easier was the passage from the true and immutable *essence* of extension to its actual God-guaranteed *existence*. But, over and above the manifest difficulties inherent in fitting simple natures into the fabric of the *Meditations* and *Principles*, there is also the question of contemporary terminological confusion to be considered which Descartes, after his study of Bacon's use of the term *natura simplex*, may well have appreciated.[2] Bacon, despite his attempts to shake free, got entangled in scholasticism, and precisely on account of *ontological* preoccupations. It may perhaps not be irrelevant—despite the very different senses in which Descartes and Bacon used the term *natura simplex*—to indicate briefly the latter's confused treatment of this question.

Bacon commences the exposition of his doctrine of "forms" with a somewhat left-handed compliment to Plato. The great Athenian

[1] Cf. note (i) to p. 146 *supra*.

[2] Descartes seems definitely to have read some of Bacon's works (notably the *De Augmentis scientiarum*) and to have been impressed by the Lord Chancellor's inductive method (AT. i, 195, 251). On the other hand, a letter of January 1630 to Mersenne indicates that Bacon's "simple natures" or "forms" will meet the same fate as those of Aristotle, i.e. will be "explained away." Here is the passage in point: "Je vous remercie des qualités que vous avez tirées d'Aristote; j'en avais déjà fait une autre plus grande liste, partie tirée de Verulamio, partie de ma tête, et c'est une des premières choses que je tâcherai d'expliquer, et cela ne sera pas si difficile qu'on pourrait croire; car les fondements étant posés, elles suivent d'elles-mêmes" (AT. i, 109).

is to be commended for having grasped that "forms are the true object of knowledge," but is to be censured for having tried to deal with them as "absolutely abstracted from matter." Thus, to investigate "the form of a lion, of an oak or of gold" is nugatory; but to inquire "the forms of sense, of voluntary motion, of vegetation, of colours, of gravity and levity, of density, of tenuity, of heat, of cold, and all other natures and qualities"—all this is the proper function of metaphysic or science (*Adv. of Learn.* ii, vii, 5). The Lord Chancellor, however, could not, it appears, decide whether these forms, equivalent to the "simple natures" analysed out of the complex natures exhibited by the sensible bodies of the natural world, were Scotist essences and ontological ultimates, or merely the explanatory *laws* of the *behaviour* of phenomena. Dr. Höffding has summed up this confusion very clearly for us in the context of Bacon's main doctrine of Nature. "If we seek to draw logical conclusions from the doctrine of the hidden process [of Nature], we discover that Bacon's two meanings of the concept of 'form' contradict one another. According to the first meaning (form = simple nature = quality, which constitutes the essence of the thing) we start from the assumption that the qualities presented through perception belong also to the things themselves. According to the second meaning (form = law of the process by which things arise) it is evident that things really consist of atoms and are produced by minute changes which cannot, when taken separately, be perceived. The subjectivity of the sense-qualities agrees with the latter meaning (since heat either in itself or *in ordine ad universum* is motion), while it is in contradiction to the first meaning (where heat, like colour, etc., is *natura simplex*). As Bacon's first meaning reminds us of Plato and the Scholastics, so his second reminds us of Democritus, without, however, being exactly atomistic. It is characteristic of him that the passage . . . to the effect that 'forms' are inventions and *idola tribus*, if by 'form' we do not mean law, occurs immediately after his commendation of Democritus for his exhortation to dissolve Nature into its elements, rather than to set about making abstractions. Here again it is the relation between quality and quantity at which Bacon stops short. Entangled in Platonic and scholastic presuppositions, he could not consistently carry out what was contained in his notion of a continuous process, by which qualitative differences are dissolved into quantitative."[1]

It is possible, then, that Descartes may have taken Bacon's treatment of simple natures as a warning, and decided—even though his own examples of simple natures (*cf.* p. 141 *supra*) had little in common with those of Bacon—to drop all mention of them in his published works, all the more in view of his own anti-scholastic bias. Even motion, which might well qualify as an "ontal element," has to become

[1] *A History of Modern Philosophy*, vol. i, p. 202.

a mere *mode* of extension, however difficult it may be to conceive it as such and yet reconcile this with its lack of fundamental relationship *to* extension. The fact is, not only are simple natures too simple to support the metaphysic eventually propounded, but their ontological status is allowed to lapse entirely and they actually tend to become indistinguishable from ideas or concepts. Dr. Keeling tries (vainly it seems) to stress that simple natures are *not* ideas[1]—yet is forced to admit that later they are "rather confusingly called 'primitive *notions*' "[2] (i.e. in a letter of May 1643 to Princess Elizabeth) and in point of fact this deviation is equally implicit in the *Meditations* and *Principles*. Indeed it seems clear that the more compendious, if less clearly definable entity, the idea has taken over the assets of the *Regulae* and *telescoped*, as it were, in some cases at least, *the mental intuition and the object intuited*. The extent to which divine veracity guaranteed, and divine grace beneficently provided all kinds of ideas—even those of the sensible order necessary for the apprehension of the complex phenomena of the external world and the union of body and soul—precluded the restriction of the objects intuited to a mere assortment of simple natures or complex natures analysable without remainder into simple natures, themselves all clear and distinct. Further, the doctrine of the three distinctions—real, modal and rational (*Princ.* i, 60–2)—and particularly that of the modal distinction, makes the division of *a priori* concepts into three classes of simple natures corresponding thereto, entirely superfluous. The ontological implications of *Reg.* xii have faded, as I said, into purely epistemological distinctions, since the only *real* distinctions now allowed are between spirit-substance and body-substance in the sub-lunar world, and between absolute substance or God and the "secondary" substances thought and extension in the universe as a whole.

I shall now endeavour to sum up this discussion which has tended, I fear, to become somewhat diffuse. The failure of Descartes "to carry simple natures explicitly right through his metaphysics and to work out his theory of them in sufficient fulness" may be, as Dr. Keeling claims, in the main "due to his later interest being dominated by difficulties of an epistemological rather than an ontological character," but if these difficulties be analysed in the context of his doctrine of ideas (with their semi-mystical innate background) and likewise his fundamental ontological distinctions, it seems fairly clear that simple natures would not readily integrate themselves with the completed metaphysic. Their atomic simplicity, in any but a purely epistemological context, was unnecessary, indeed encumbrant, to a metaphysical structure which based itself on *essences* that, complex as they might appear to us to-day, must themselves be irreducible if

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 236, n. 1.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 143 n. 1, *sub fin.*

unwelcome complications were to be avoided and the movement of arguments not compromised. And as Descartes' preoccupation with epistemological explanation increases it becomes more and more difficult to dispose the background of the now supreme ideas into ontologically atomistic elements. The weight of our philosopher's ingenuity is thrown on to accounting for the various key-ideas possessed by the mind. Through the medium of ideas, all in some sense innate, the whole world is interpretable, and ultimately all ideas, or at least our capacity for thinking them, are dependent on God: he is their unique direct cause. Thus it is that—as the *Notae* emphasize—no part of the external world can operate directly on mind, by transeunt action; the scope of sensa reaches only as far as the phantasia, where these sensa (particles of matter in motion) call forth or "occasion" a suitable (purely mental) idea which must have been placed there originally by God as part of the mind's furniture. Thus simple natures, it seems, their ontological status slurred over, become merely concepts (in some cases logical principles), kept stable and immutable by God's will, and are designed to enable man correctly (and in accordance with the law of parsimony) to interpret Nature in her most comprehensive aspect.

When we turn to Cartesian physics, which deals exclusively with matter in motion, we realize that it must of necessity look with suspicion on any "natures" that have ontological reference, in view of its fundamental rejection of the scholastico-Aristotelian system. Bacon's simple natures (or "forms") had a *causal* aspect which Descartes most certainly could not have accepted, since the behaviour of phenomena was solely attributable to the immutable kinetic laws established by God, and even motion, although injected into the universe by God in the beginning, must still, as I have already remarked, only be considered a mode of *res extensa*, the immutable essence of which the physical world was composed.

The policy to be recommended, therefore, is not to attempt to correlate the so-called simple natures of *Reg.* vi with those of *Reg.* xii, but rather to reduce, so far as is possible, the simple natures *per se* of *Reg.* xii to the status of innate ideas which may take the form of universals, categories, or principles of logic. Even this policy, however, does not enable these entities to fit unambiguously into the epistemology and ontology of the *Meditations* and *Principles*, and we can hardly escape the conclusion that there is quite a lot to be said for giving simple natures a wide berth!

DISCUSSION

R. G. COLLINGWOOD'S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

PHILOSOPHY of history is not a subject which has hitherto attracted much attention in this country. Preoccupation with the methods and achievements of the natural sciences, and distaste for the sort of rationale of history as a whole which Hegel and others offered under the title in the early nineteenth century, have served to make most British philosophers accord its problems only the most casual recognition. It is therefore all the more interesting to find an English writer of unusual powers both of argument and expression, who was himself an historian of distinction in his special field, devoting a large part of his philosophical thinking to the problems of historical knowledge and their wider implications. Unfortunately, R. G. Collingwood was not able to begin the major work on philosophy of history, to writing which, as we are told in the introduction to the present book,[1] he had looked forward for twenty-five years, until his powers were seriously affected by bad health, and he did not live to complete it. But though the full results of his thinking on the subject are lost, we are now able, thanks to the skilful work of his friend Professor T. M. Knox, to study what is in effect an extensive interim report on it. Professor Knox has produced *The Idea of History* largely on the basis of lectures which Collingwood prepared in 1936, supplemented by two essays already published which date from the same period and a certain amount of material from the unfinished *Principles of History* written in 1939. That the result is as smooth and finished as it is—that it reads more like a book prepared for the press by its author than one put together posthumously from his papers—is a tribute not only to Collingwood's powers of writing, but also to the care and good judgment of his editor.

Collingwood was interested in two main questions about history, one wider and one narrower. The wider was the general question of the relations of history to other studies and activities. This was a matter which had exercised him at least since the writing of *Speculum Mentis* (1924), and in which he continued to be interested to the end. As Professor Knox points out in the introduction to the present book, his views on it were by no means the same at all stages of his philosophical career. In his later writings, especially the *Autobiography* (1939) and the *Essay on Metaphysics* (1940), he advocated the view that all knowledge (including scientific knowledge in the narrow sense) has an historical basis, and that all philosophical questions are really historical. This form of historicism, as Professor Knox says (p. xiii), was oddly combined with a polemic against positivism, for its exclusive reliance on history as the type of all knowledge is the exact counterpart of the positivist reliance on natural science, and is open to much the same objections. Again, it was somewhat strange in a philosopher who accused his opponents, in the most downright way, of fostering the cause of irrationalism; for it precluded any enquiry into the ultimate justification of our beliefs. Once we had answered the historical question what had actually been thought at any given period, there was no more to be done: we could only accept the verdict of history with folded arms. This seems to imply that there is nothing to choose between one set of fundamental beliefs and another: a remarkable

[1] *The Idea of History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946. Pp. xxiv + 339. Price 20s.).

conclusion for one who called himself a rationalist to come to. But Collingwood had not always thought on these lines. In his *Essay on Philosophical Method* (1933), which Professor Knox describes as his ablest work and which he himself considered his most finished, he distinguished clearly between historical and philosophical thinking; and though the philosophy of that book was considerably influenced by the notion of historical process (it was, in fact, a restatement of some well-known theses of Hegel's), it was not infected with the historicism which characterized his later writings and which, Professor Knox suggests (p. xvii), may have led him to abandon *The Principles of History* on the ground that no independent (non-historical) enquiry into the nature of historical thinking was possible. There is a strong case here for saying that Collingwood's earlier views were sounder than those he eventually adopted.

An analytically-minded philosopher might well complain that Collingwood devoted too much attention to this issue of the relation of history to other studies, to the detriment of the more generally interesting though narrower question of the nature of historical knowledge itself. To this Collingwood would certainly have replied that the two enquiries cannot be separated; yet it is perhaps legitimate, in a context like the present, to concentrate attention on the one rather than the other. In the rest of this discussion the main subject I shall consider will accordingly be Collingwood's theory of historical knowledge and historical judgment; for his historicism I must be content to refer to Professor Knox's introduction. There is the more justification for this procedure in that it is the theory of history, rather than the historicism, on which *The Idea of History* throws fresh light. Part V (the last third) of the book consists of a series of essays on such problems as the nature of historical evidence and the subject-matter of history; and from this explicit discussion and the comments made in the first four parts of the book (which make up a most entertaining history, written in Collingwood's best manner, of the idea of history itself) his general position can be arrived at quite satisfactorily.

Collingwood was convinced from an early age that history is a form of knowledge which is *sui generis*, and the doctrine he was perhaps most anxious to combat was the positivist theory that historical knowledge could be reduced to scientific knowledge in the narrower sense of the term. Certainly, as Bury had said, history was "a science, no more and no less," if we understood by science a study with principles, methods and a subject-matter of its own. But the historian did not aim either at formulating general laws about human behaviour or at predicting the future course of events. His task was rather to describe and understand past events as they individually happened. And he could achieve this object thanks to the peculiar nature of the subject-matter with which he dealt. The proper material of history was the actions of human beings, and actions could always be regarded from a dual point of view: as events occurring in the physical world, and as the expression of thoughts and purposes. It was this thought side in human actions, according to Collingwood, which made historical knowledge possible. What the historian did was to re-think the thoughts which the subjects of his enquiry had thought, and in so doing to come to understand why they acted as they did. This process was, in Collingwood's view (and this is the most important part of his theory), a single one: it could most certainly not be divided, as has often been suggested, into the two distinct steps of finding out what happened and then accounting for it by reference to general principles. For, in the first place, every historical situation was unique and had to be understood in itself; and, secondly, the very act of re-thinking a thought was one which answered the question "why?" as well as the question "what?" If I knew what Nelson thought at the battle

of Trafalgar, I also knew why he thought it, since to attain the knowledge I must reconstruct the situation in which he acted and put myself in his place. Having reconstructed the situation, I should find the whole train of thought which Nelson went through self-explanatory. And I should do this, apparently, without bringing to bear any *general* knowledge of how admirals behave in sea-battles or of how human beings react to situations of certain types. My ability to carry out this remarkable feat could be ascribed to the fact that the Nelson I sought to understand was not Nelson as a physical object but Nelson as a mind: Collingwood seems to have believed, much as Dilthey did, that minds can understand each other in a peculiarly intimate way. History was properly described as the self-knowledge of mind, and its advantage over the natural sciences as a means of dealing with human beings lay precisely in the fact that it afforded knowledge of the individual. It was because human beings had to be understood as individuals, and because history alone could, he thought, provide such understanding, that Collingwood said in his British Academy lecture on "Human Nature and Human History" (pp. 205–31 of the present volume) that the Science of Human Nature to which Hume and Mill had looked forward must either resolve itself into history or be given up as wholly impossible of accomplishment.

This theory of history can be criticised from various points of view. A Marxist, for example, would probably dismiss it as nothing more than a vain attempt to resuscitate an already discredited idealism. All history, Collingwood says, is the history of thought; and what could be more absurd? But here Collingwood has his answer. He is not saying that human beings act without being affected by the natural conditions in which they live: the thought the historian studies is thought embodied in action, and actions themselves are, from one point of view, events happening in the physical world. What he is doing is denying that the natural background to men's actions has a constant or inevitable effect on them. To maintain that it has, and to try to formulate the laws according to which different physical factors determine what men do, is to acquiesce in historical naturalism; and this, in Collingwood's view, is radically misconceived. Certainly human beings are affected by the material conditions in which they live; but what is important in considering this situation is not so much the external conditions themselves as the attitudes men take up to them. These vary from case to case, and so we cannot speak (as historical materialists, despite their parade of dialectical terminology, in fact do) of a causal determination which is simple and constant.

This is a sound point; but one is left in some doubt as to what exactly it is that Collingwood is trying to express. Is it just that, as Toynbee would say, the fundamental idea with which the historian must work is not cause-and-effect but challenge-and-response? Toynbee's view is certainly anti-materialist, but it is not so clearly anti-naturalist, and one cannot see Collingwood readily acquiescing in the quasi-biological interpretation of human action which it presupposes. But if he does not agree with Toynbee and wants to maintain, as he apparently does, that human action is autonomous in some further sense, that history is what it is because men deliberately make it such, the difficulty is to find a plausible interpretation of this most unplausible thesis. No doubt we should all like to believe that men do in some sense make their own history, and no doubt it is instructive that even Marx thought they would once the communist society was achieved; but to hold that *all* actions are the autonomous product of human reason is scarcely plausible. To say that every action has a thought-side, and thus that all history can be read in terms of purposes, is one thing; to say that it is therefore all rational, in the sense of the result of deliberate thinking, is quite another.

A criticism of a more technical nature might be developed if we asked what account Collingwood has to give of the objectivity of historical judgments. This is (I suspect) the central problem of philosophy of history, and one merit of Collingwood's work is that he brings it well and truly into the foreground. It cannot be said, however, that he anywhere succeeds in offering a plausible solution of it. At times, indeed, he appears to have underestimated its difficulty in a way which is most surprising in one who worked on so obscure a subject as the history of Roman Britain. Thus we are told more than once in the course of the present book that to say that the historian can never reach certain but only probable conclusions, is false; the implication being that Collingwood himself, or any other competent historian, was in possession of historical knowledge which was entirely beyond doubt or question. On p. 262 the following remarkable passage occurs:

> "Many of the present writer's generation, brought up at a time when this proverb [that historical thinking leads to conclusions which are probable only] was accepted by the general opinion of educated persons . . . must be able to recollect their excitement on first discovering that it was wholly untrue, and that they were actually holding in their hands an historical argument which left nothing to caprice, but proved its point as conclusively as a demonstration in mathematics."

This certainly makes one rub one's eyes, for even if one accepts the general position that the business of history is in some way to re-think the thoughts of persons in the past, the difficulties of carrying out the undertaking must surely be admitted to be formidable. A glance at the adjacent problem of knowing what contemporaries are thinking will suffice to make this clear. No doubt it is true that there are occasions on which I can know precisely what someone else is thinking; that there should be is a condition of there being any intelligent understanding by one mind of another. But these occasions arise, normally at least, only when a deliberate effort is made by one mind to convey its thoughts to another: when, as it were, a speaker or writer puts all his cards on the table and attempts to make his presuppositions clear. Academic persons concerned in the pursuit of knowledge, and anxious to detach their thoughts from the emotional background in which they arise, no doubt fulfil these conditions fairly often; but it cannot be said that politicians, or even men in the street, do so with comparable frequency. Thus to discover what Stalin, for instance, is thinking now—to discover even the general line of his thought—is by no means easy; it is a matter of weighing evidence, balancing hypotheses, etc., from which it is hard to see a *certain* conclusion emerging. But if knowledge of the minds of contemporaries can be thus difficult, how much more is historical knowledge, where evidence is often defective and where we are apt to work with preconceptions of which we are quite unaware?

Collingwood himself was not unfamiliar with objections of this sort, and he made several attempts to deal with them. One of these occurs in a particularly interesting section of the present book, devoted to an analysis of the process of re-thinking a thought (part V, § 4, pp. 282 ff.). Here it is argued that though an act of thought cannot be repeated *in its context*, it can all the same be repeated: the same piece of thinking which Julius Caesar did can be done by me, the same act of thought can occur in two different mental series. If these contentions can be made out, they clearly go some way towards solving the problem of historical objectivity. In support of them Collingwood asks what is meant when we speak of a single act of thought. How long does one act of thought last? If I think about something for five seconds, turn my

attention elsewhere for another three, and then turn back to the first thing, is that one act of thought or two? If I say one (as I might well do if confronted by suitably chosen examples) and thus allow that an act of thought can be *revived* after an interval, Collingwood thinks his case complete, since he can see no difference of principle between a situation in which I revive an act of thought from my own past (as when I try to write my autobiography) and one in which I revive one from somebody else's (as when I try to write the history of Julius Caesar). "There is no tenable theory of personal identity" preventing my reviving someone else's thought (p. 287), though of course the act I revive, whether it belong to my own past or another's, will not have the same background of emotion and feeling which it originally had. But acts of thought can be detached from their felt background with perfect legitimacy, and it is because they can that history is possible and is properly described as a re-enactment of past experience.

The whole passage in which this argument occurs deserves close study, if only as an example of the author's powers of careful and lucid analysis. An examination of it throws light on various aspects of his theory of history. It illuminates, for instance, his belief that the historian is and must be concerned with what people in the past thought, as opposed to what they felt and experienced emotionally. Feelings and emotions cannot be revived, because they represent experience in its immediacy; I can have similar feelings now to what I had in the past, but not the very same feelings I had then. But thought proper is different from feeling, since though it always occurs in a context of immediacy, it is in its own nature mediate: it transcends the immediate flow of experience, and can accordingly be detached from its background. Collingwood is emphatic that it is not enough to say, as many philosophers would, that whilst I can think the same thought in the sense of the same *thought-content* as Julius Caesar, I cannot revive his actual *act* of thinking; and this is indeed the starting-point of his whole theory. He asks how, if we refuse to agree that acts of thinking can be revived and say only that I can think a thought like Caesar's, we are to avoid the general difficulties of a representative theory of knowledge. But it is not clear that he is right about this. When philosophers speak of thought as mediate, what they are drawing attention to is its universality; and surely what is universal in an act of thinking is not its character as act but its content. And if it is agreed that the content of my thinking can be, not just like, but precisely the same, as someone else's, is not the problem with which Collingwood is dealing solved in principle?

Whether it is or not, I doubt myself whether on either view the problem of historical objectivity is fully cleared up. For there is all the difficulty, in any case, of knowing how I am to get at the actual thought of past ages, to put myself in a position to re-think precisely the same contents as were thought by persons in the past or to revive precisely the same acts. How far, to ask a hackneyed question, do we view the past through spectacles coloured by the present? Collingwood recognized at times that some sort of bridge between past and present was needed; there were ages which any particular historian, or generation of historians, was temperamentally unfitted to understand. But he never quite grappled with the question of principle behind this difficulty. His most direct attempt to deal with it was in his inaugural lecture at Oxford in 1935, reprinted here as § 2 of Part V. There he commends Bradley for having seen that we need to formulate a principle by which to judge of historical testimony, but condemns him for making it what he did. Bradley said that we could accept as fact only that which bore some analogy to what we know in our own experience. Collingwood argued that this was unduly subjective and unduly empiricist as a criterion (it was in fact remarkably like

the one adopted by Hume in his essay on miracles), but the substitute he proposed for it was scarcely satisfactory. It was to the historical imagination itself, conceived not as arbitrary fancy but in Kantian fashion as an *a priori* faculty, that we must appeal in the making of historical judgments. And the matter was more or less left at that, without much elucidation either at the time or in subsequent writings.[1]

One cannot but think that the historical imagination here is only another name for the historical judgment, and that nothing is solved by the change of terminology. Certainly the ideal historian might be expected to appeal to criteria which were *a priori* in the sense of being valid for "consciousness in general," not just for the person who appealed to them or the generation to which he belonged; but the question is how far actual historians conform (or indeed can conform) to this ideal standard. It is much to be regretted that Collingwood, who was so acutely conscious of the extent to which thinking generally is historically conditioned, did not devote more attention to the question of the extent to which *historical* thinking is historically conditioned. When Collingwood the historian tried to reconstruct the history of Roman Britain, how far could he claim universal validity for the result? His failure to give this problem the attention it deserves arises, I suspect, from an error in his conception of historical judgment. As I have already pointed out, the central thing in the historian's experience, according to Collingwood, was the fact that one mind came into contact with another; he held that the sort of understanding one mind could have of another was unique and self-intelligible, though not to be attained by any easy means, but only after a laborious scrutiny of evidence of all kinds. But though this account of historical thinking perhaps has more to be said for it than at first sight appears, I cannot myself believe it to be finally satisfactory. Whatever Collingwood says, it is hard to think that the historian does not bring to the understanding of the past some general propositions; and it is precisely with regard to these that the trouble about historical conditioning arises in its most acute form.

To elaborate the point, let us return to the theory of Bradley's to which reference has already been made. Bradley says that we ought to accept as historical fact only what bears some analogy to what we have known in our own experience. The problem he himself had in mind was that of the credibility of accounts of the miraculous, and when he spoke in this context of "experience" he was thinking primarily of the laws of physical nature. But the matter can (and must) be viewed in a wider light. When we try to understand an account of human actions in the past, surely we bring to the task not just a knowledge of the laws of physical nature, but a certain conception of *human* nature too; and that fact is of vital importance if we are considering the question of historical objectivity. Why it is so can be seen if we reflect that such a conception at once ought to be free of historical conditioning if history is to yield valid knowledge, and yet is in many cases demonstrably not so free. Thus we say of this distinguished historian or that that his work is marred by personal prejudices or preconceptions common to his time; we censure Gibbon, for instance, for his attitude to religion. What we are objecting to here is Gibbon's defective appreciation of the possibilities of human nature. Gibbon judged the past in the light of his own conception of how a reasonable man would behave; but that conception was not sufficiently broad to enable him to see that a man might be intelligent and still think religion something more than outworn superstition or useful make-believe.

Now it might be said that the subjectivity displayed by Gibbon here (if

[1] Collingwood's critique of Bradley is elaborated further in pp. 134–41 of the present volume; but the passage throws no fresh light on the historical imagination.

the charge is well made) is one which just cannot be corrected. We think ourselves in a better position to arrive at the truth about the Roman empire than Gibbon; and no doubt we have the advantage of him both in the volume of evidence available to us and in historical technique. But as regards the conception of human nature we bring to the work, we can claim no improvement on him; we can only say our view of it is different from his. This sceptical judgment is one to which Collingwood strongly inclined, no doubt under the influence of his historicism; though how the view is to be squared with what he says about the certainty of historical judgments is not apparent.[1] In a passage Professor Knox quotes (p. xii) from a manuscript written in 1936 we read:

> "St. Augustine looked at Roman history from the point of view of an early Christian; Tillemont, from that of a seventeenth-century Frenchman; Gibbon, from that of an eighteenth-century Englishman; Mommsen, from that of a nineteenth-century German. There is no point in asking which was the right point of view. Each was the only possible one for the man who adopted it."

But is this conclusion really defensible? Before we accept it I think we should at least consider what it is to which we are committing ourselves. It seems to me that the conception of human nature of which I have spoken, the notion of the possibilities inherent in human beings and of the sort of ways in which (to speak roughly) their minds work, is presupposed not just in history but in the understanding of literature too. And if this is the case, to say that it is in all cases historically conditioned and therefore subjective will rule out literary as well as historical understanding.

Let me try to make the point clear. Suppose I say, as I well may, that *Anna Karenina* is a good novel because it is in some sense remarkably true to life. What I mean when I make this judgment is that I think Tolstoy had a wonderful sense of the possibilities of human nature; that he was able to grasp those possibilities and that I myself can appreciate his skill in doing it. Now would all this be possible if my conception of human nature and Tolstoy's were both nothing but the product of historical circumstances? Should I even be able to appreciate Tolstoy's point of view and use it to enlarge my own ideas? It might be replied that I could, just because Tolstoy stands near to me in time, and because the preconceptions of the nineteenth century are not markedly different from those of the twentieth century. But if this reply were made I could abandon the case of Tolstoy and consider that of some other more remote writer: Milton, or the author of *Beowulf*, or Homer, for example. In all these cases I should claim to find a conception of human nature which had some identity with my own, and I should say that their work was interesting just because of that fact; though I should not, of course, claim to be able to understand the minds, and allow for the idiosyncracies, of each of them to precisely the same extent.

All this seems to show that there is a case for saying that the conception of human nature presupposed in literary appreciation is to some extent free of historical conditioning; and if it is there, it may well be in history too. But that is not to say that the subject is altogether free from difficulties. The paradox about it, I think, is this: that we both bring to the understanding of history and literature a conception of human nature of the kind of which I

[1] Collingwood seems to have oscillated between two views: (1) that history is a genuine re-enactment of past experience, made possible by the power one mind has to grasp and understand the thought of another; (2) that all historical knowledge is historically conditioned, but that this is of no account, since what history illuminates is not the past but the present. The second is I think the later view.

have spoken, and improve our knowledge of human nature in pursuing those studies. Thus when I set out to read *Wuthering Heights*, for example, I start with certain ideas about how human beings behave in certain situations; but in the course of reading my ideas are widened, and indeed it is just in this that the greatness of the novel consists: we are made to feel that there might be creatures like Heathcliff and Catherine, however different they may be from anyone we have met ourselves. And the same applies, in principle, to the reading of history. If I take up Thucydides, I find I am able to understand what he describes from the first because his conception of human nature has much in common with my own; but I also learn something of human nature in the process—from the description of the events at Corcyra, for instance, or from such passages as the Melian dialogue.

So far as this is true, we can say with Collingwood that history does give us an understanding of what human beings are and can do. But it is questionable, all the same, whether we ought to see it as *the* science of human nature (or all that that science can be). The judgments of history, as Collingwood rightly insists, are individual judgments; but unless I am greatly mistaken, there are presupposed in the making of them certain universal judgments, and it is these, only part of the raw material of which is provided by history, which constitute the science in question. In this connection the view held at one time by Dilthey[1] is of considerable interest, that behind all the human studies (history, literary appreciation, sociology, etc.) there lies a more fundamental study concerned with human nature. Dilthey himself called this psychology, but made it clear that it was quite different from psychology as normally understood. In fact it seems that the possibilities of such a psychology or anthropology, as it might more properly be called, must be very seriously considered by anyone who deals with the problem of historical knowledge.

[1] See H. A. Hodges, *Wilhelm Dilthey*, Chapter III.

W. H. Walsh.

PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY

PHILOSOPHY IN FRANCE

THE last survey of philosophy in France to appear in this journal was published in July 1939. Although the circumstances of the war do not seem to have prevented the publication of philosophical books in France to the extent that they have done so in this country, they have pretty effectively limited their transmission across the Channel until the last year or two. In consequence it is by no means easy to re-establish continuity between the publications of the pre-war period and the rather random trickle of new books now being received by the editor of *Philosophy*. Some useful information on the intervening period is contained in an article by Professor Lalande in the *Philosophical Review* for January 1946 (Vol. LV, No. 1). Readers of this article or of the files of the *Revue Philosophique* will find that in 1940 occurred the deaths of Abel Rey, known for his work on science in the ancient world, and of the philosopher and sociologist Célestin Bouglé. In 1941 Bergson died. 1944 saw the death of Léon Brunschvicg, whose *Descartes et Pascal lecteurs de Montaigne* appeared that same year. Jean Cavaillès, a logician known for his works published in 1938 on the axiomatic method and the theory of groups, was shot by the Germans for his part in the resistance movement. Maurice Halbwachs, for many years associated with the *Année Sociologique* died in Buchenwald in 1945. As for books that appeared during the war, I have not seen Professor Le Senne's *Traité de Morale Générale*, which appeared in 1942. I have seen new books by Professor Léon Robin, one on Aristotle and one on Pyrrho and Greek Scepticism. Those interested in the history of modern thought should not miss Dr. Robert Lenoble's *Mersenne ou la Naissance du Méchanisme* (Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Paris, 1943). Dr. Lenoble shows how Mersenne was a leading member of a group of thinkers (which included Hobbes and Gassendi) who were endeavouring to create a natural science of mechanics in opposition to the magical and astrological views of leading anti-Aristotelians of the Renaissance. Descartes was with them on this point, and expressed, with a clarity which Mersenne was incapable of attaining, views which, according to Dr. Lenoble, Mersenne had already arrived at. But when Descartes turned from Mechanics to Metaphysics Mersenne hardly understood him, and the other members of the group deliberately refused to go beyond the positive scientific ground which they regarded as their own. Mersenne and his friends were, according to Dr. Lenoble, conscious empiricists, while Descartes, in developing the thought of the *Discourse on Method* and *Meditations*, was deliberately going beyond an empiricism which he clearly understood. Dr. Lenoble makes no extravagant claims on behalf of Mersenne, but in describing his contributions to the thought of his time, he throws a good deal of light on the history of European thought as a whole.

However, it is not works of scholarship like Dr. Lenoble's that have provoked the current interest in French philosophy. Both inside and outside France it is Existentialism that the public want to know about, and it is appropriate that a survey of this character should provide some information on that subject. Existentialism is a philosophical movement that originated in Germany, where its best-known representatives are Heidegger and Jaspers. These two philosophers, in rather different ways, have claimed to exhibit man as he really is rather than as he appears to be under the categories of common sense and science which, they hold, are inadequate to the singularity and concrete-

ness of what is. In their accounts of what man is, they have made use of a vocabulary borrowed in part from the writings of the Danish religious thinker and mystic Sören Kierkegaard (1813–55). In his protests against the superficiality of ecclesiastical Christianity and what he considered to be the slickness and smugness of the official Hegelian philosophy that was so influential in the universities of his time, Kierkegaard called upon men to look honestly within themselves. "There comes a midnight hour" he wrote, "when all men must unmask." If they are honest they will find within themselves a basic dread, giving rise to a sense of despair and sin which can only be overcome, if at all, by the sinner's free choice of Christ. This free choice is non-rational, and is described by Kierkegaard as "paradoxical" and as a "leap in the dark." "To become a believer" he wrote in his Journals, "everyone must be alone with the absurd." Heidegger's metaphysics is largely a development of the notions of dread and despair without the hope provided by the Christian faith, while some of Jaspers' most interesting observations concern the way in which men reveal themselves by the deeds they perform at moments of crisis. French translations of some of Kierkegaard's works began appearing in the thirties. The year 1939 was notable, as regards the spread of interest in these ideas, for the publication of M. Jean Wahl's *Études Kierkegaardiennes* and of a translation of some of Heidegger's shorter writings under the title of *Qu'est-ce que la Métaphysique?* Since then there has been a growth of interest in Existentialism among French philosophers and literary men. M. Sartre's well-known plays, novels and philosophical works have appeared since 1938, as have those of Mademoiselle Simone de Beauvoir, of M. Georges Bataille, and of M. Albert Camus. It should not be overlooked, however, that M. Gabriel Marcel, who is a Catholic, has, in books and plays from as far back as his *Journal Métaphysique* in 1930, been developing ideas which have important affinities with those of Kierkegaard. By far the best short introduction to French Existentialism as a whole that I know of is M. Paul Foulquié's *L'Existentialisme* in the series *Que sais-je?* published by the Presses Universitaires de France and costing about three shillings in this country.

It is the Existentialism of M. Jean-Paul Sartre that has caused the greatest stir. His strictly philosophical writings are: *L'Imagination* (Presses Universitaires de France, 1938): *Esquisse d'une théorie de l'émotion* (Hermann, 1939); *L'Imaginaire* (Gallimard, 1940); *L'Être et le Néant* (Gallimard, 1943); *L'Existentialisme est un humanisme* (Nagel, 1946); and his introduction to some selections from the writings of Descartes in a series entitled *Classiques de la Liberté* published by Editions des Trois Collines in 1946. Some of his plays and one of his novels have already been translated into English. Like Heidegger, and like some of the Greek philosophers, Sartre holds that there are different sorts of being, and he distinguishes between being in-itself and being for-itself. The former is fundamental and is free from all relation and negativity. It is described as "opaque" and "massive," and in so far as there can be no reason *why* it is, it just *is*, and is thus "de trop," or absurd. When there is consciousness, there is being for-itself, and it is in consciousness that negation arises. "L'homme est l'être par qui le néant vient au monde." The being of conscious beings i.e. of selves is, as M. Sartre describes it, extremely precarious. In the first place, selves are dependent on their bodies. In the second place, any reality that conscious beings have is in the objects they are conscious of, not in themselves. Consciousness is essentially related to that of which it is consciousness, and the nature of selves is inseparable from the world in which they arise. I never succeed in seizing myself, but always something other than the self I sought to seize. If I succeeded in becoming a being in-itself I should cease to be conscious and should cease to possess the relational and negative characteristics of what is for-itself. I am constantly

aiming at becoming what I cannot be without destroying myself. Therefore "La réalité humaine est souffrante dans son être."

M. Sartre has a good deal to say about how each one of us lives in a private world the contents of which depend in large part upon our personal aims. Other people, however, inevitably disturb our privacy, and we cannot help regarding them as trespassers on our domain bringing danger with them. It is from the eyes of others that we come to such knowledge as we can obtain of ourselves, but we learn in this way much that we should prefer not to know, and in any case others know us through our bodies as objects in *their* world. This causes us shame. This situation infects even the love of one person for another. It is a condition of selfhood that we can never love without conflict. "Ma chute originelle, c'est l'existence de l'autre." Tied as we are to our bodies and to the objects that form our world, and sunk in the original sin of being other than—and so in conflict with—those we love, we are capable, it might be thought, of little that is positive. According to M. Sartre, however, to be human is to be free. He tries to show that this follows from the very nature of consciousness. The arguments are not easy to follow, but rest upon the nature of what is for-itself as a type of being that is not, like what is in-itself, cut and dried and just what it is and nothing else. M. Sartre talks about "self-transcendence" in a way which is reminiscent of Bosanquet, and which probably betokens their common interest in Hegel. He also argues that however limited we may be by our situation, it always depends upon us ourselves how we react to it. Not to make a choice is a form of choosing, and it is impossible for anyone to escape from choosing by any lapse into inactivity or habit. The lapse or habit will be his choice. Our consciousness of the inevitability of choice M. Sartre, following Kierkegaard, calls anguish. There is no one or nothing that can save us from this anguish, since it is we alone that must make the choice, though we sometimes try to evade consciousness of our lonely anguish by following fashion or by supporting our choice on the commands of a deity or on the demands of an ideal system of values. The state of thus endeavouring to shut our eyes on our freedom M. Sartre calls "bad faith." He holds that there is no God, but even if there were, it is still the worshippers who decide that he is worthy of worship. Similarly, moral codes have no power to impose themselves on men. It is men who choose whatever code it is that they acknowledge. The argument here is reminiscent of Jeremy Taylor's observation in the *Liberty of Prophesying* that a man cannot escape from his duty of acting in accordance with his individual conscience by resting on authority, since he must choose the authority to rest on. M. Sartre further maintains that, since man is free, there is no such thing as human nature. Man is what he does. As an artist, by employing his techniques, creates a picture or poem, so any man, by the series of his choices, creates his life. Indeed, M. Sartre goes so far as to say that a man is responsible for his sentiments and emotions, since it is through his acts that they are built up and brought into play. Talk about being driven this way and that by conflicting desires is just one of the manifestations of "bad faith." "Quand je délibère" he writes, "les jeux sont faits."

Does each man, then, make his own morality? This, I feel sure, is M. Sartre's view. But, as I understand him, he endeavours to overcome the anarchism that would seem to be involved in such a theory by pointing out that men are aware of other men in as primary a way as they are aware of themselves, and that in choosing and acting each man is, whether he admits it or not, affirming an ideal of what a man should be and do. "In making his choice," says M. Sartre, "a man is choosing mankind."

It is not possible in a survey such as this to offer reasoned criticisms of M. Sartre's theories. Criticism worth the name must follow a much more adequate exposition than I have been able to put forward here. But I should

like to make a number of rather dogmatic comments. M. Sartre, in my opinion, writes carefully and well. His whole range of technical terms, however, derives from Hegel, from Kierkegaard, and from contemporary German philosophy, and he shows no acquaintance with the methods of conceptual sanitation introduced by the logical analysts. It may well be that in consequence there is much profundity that remains unenlightened, but it is certain that M. Sartre shows a rather alarming lack of linguistic sophistication. Professor A. J. Ayer, in his articles in *Horizon* in July and August 1945, has dealt very drastically with these shortcomings, and there is no need for me to pursue this aspect further. But I hope that the brief summary that I have given of M. Sartre's leading ideas makes it clear that they cannot all be dismissed as nonsense, in any non-technical sense of that fashionable word. For one thing, his writings raise important questions about the relation of epistemology to ethics—questions hardly touched on in this country since Wollaston wrote in the eighteenth century. Furthermore, since belief in God and in fixed moral standards has certainly much diminished in recent years, what more important topic can there be than the consequences that the unbeliever should draw from his unbelief? Again, M. Sartre discusses individual moral action as distinct from moral rules with a pertinacity I do not find in other writers on ethics. He also makes many striking observations on emotions, motives and the will. In an interview recorded in *Paru* (December 1945, No. 13) he said: "J'avais à coeur de dissiper les malentendus que les gens qui lisent mal répandent parmi ceux qui ne lisent pas." We should be careful not to allow the literary claptrap that has resulted from misunderstandings of his works to conceal from us the things of importance he has to say.

The books I have received since traffic with France resumed are extremely diverse in character. First there is M. Matila C. Ghyka's *Tour d'Horizon Philosophique* (Gallimard, 1946). This is intended for those who wish to consider in fairly general terms the main philosophical outlooks of our time. Philosophy, according to M. Ghyka, is concerned with the questions whence? whither? why? and science with the question how? He divides philosophical questions into a group about knowledge, with the idealist and realist types of answer; into a group about attitudes towards life, which may be individualist, social and collective, totalitarian, or mystical; and into a group about "systems of the world," which may be religious (like Christianity) or philosophical (like Idealism) or both (like Buddhism). M. Ghyka himself is an idealist with a liking for Buddhism and Pythagoreanism. He is much impressed by Eddington, and considers that modern physics has made materialism untenable. He is quite right, I think, in saying that dialectical materialism, as upheld in Soviet Russia, has a vitalist tendency, but he fails to observe that M. Deborin, whom he quotes to this effect, was taken to task for going too far in that direction. M. Ghyka's book is impressionistic rather than ratiocinative. It is, however, very readable, as the following passage may indicate. "Here arises the problem of Siamese twins or monsters of the 'two-headed calf' type. The latter, of course, seldom survive birth. The New York Zoo, however, had a two-headed snake for quite a long time. The authorities had to separate the heads to keep them from fighting, and to feed them separately to prevent the alimentary canal from being choked. In spite of these precautions, the two heads one day fought one another so savagely that one swallowed the other and the monster expired. There were in this case two personalities from the point of view of volition, but one common physiological personality as regards appetite for food and sex (the shocking complications can be imagined)."

M. Charles Mayer, in his *L'Homme ne vaut que par le Progrès* (Éditions de la Maison Française, New York, 1945), is a metaphysical materialist and an

upholder of the values inherent in a well-managed industrial capitalism. He is aware that the fact of evolution is in itself no explanation of morality, and he endeavours to escape the pitfalls into which Spencer and Huxley have fallen, by the argument that the basis of morality must be that which is peculiar to the human race, viz. the ability to improve or progress. By this I think he means the human achievement in handing on a culture. If, however, cultures may be judged good or bad, M. Mayer appears to have fallen into another pit very like the one he managed to skirt round, but even so, he may well say there are advantages, since the company to be found in it, including as it does Aristotle, is so much better than what is in the other.

M. Brice Parain's *L'Embarras du Choix* (Gallimard, 1946), is the first of the philosophical works to appear in a series entitled *Espoir* under the editorship of M. Albert Camus, an existentialist novelist and philosopher whose novel *The Outsider* is fairly well known in this country. According to the brief advertisement which explains the purpose of the series "nous sommes dans le nihilisme," whence we can only hope to emerge by refusing to close our eyes to the difficulties that produce it. Contributors are to be free to stick in the pin and turn it round as much as they like even if they don't think anything will come of it. M. Parain certainly takes his chance. He believes that in France (as well as elsewhere) there is too much talking and teaching that is fundamentally idle in the sense that the talkers and teachers do not really believe that there is any truth that can be stated or transmitted. He therefore proposes a drastic reform of the French educational system. He would cut out what he calls "culture générale" from the secondary schools and confine teaching there to the French and a foreign language and to mathematics, along with gymnastics, sport and technical training. The products of such a system, thinks M. Parain, would be healthier, both physically and mentally, than the products of the present system, and less inclined to worry about the meaning of life at an age when they have not the equipment to consider the matter with profit to themselves or others. He also thinks that the present system produces more "intellectuals" than the country can carry. It seems to me that M. Parain is too easily inclined to make a contrast between life and literature and that he insufficiently stresses the positive advantages of literary and historical training. It may well be, however, that more people receive such training than are capable of profiting from it.

Another new series published by Gallimard and entitled *La Jeune Philosophie*, is designed to publish the work of young authors attempting their first philosophical essays. How it is that a French publisher can undertake such an admirable plan and publish five new books in quite a short period at a time when English publishers increasingly insist on established names and popular subjects, I do not know. Of this series I have received Jean Pouillon's *Temps et Roman*, Michel Sora's *Du Dialogue Intérieur*, and Jacques Havet's *Kant et le Problème du Temps*. M. Pouillon's interesting book deals with the definition of the novel as a work of art and with the analysis of its types. This involves him in discussions of consciousness, imagination and of time. By way of illustration, he analyses the procedure of a number of French, American and English novelists. I was particularly interested by his discussion of the different relations which novelists may take up to the characters they depict: "vision avec," in which the novelist takes the position of the character as he lives; "vision par derrière," in which the novelist looks at the life of the character as something complete and finished (as a thing "en soi," in Sartre's terminology); and "vision de dehors," in which the character is looked at as far as possible as an object in the physical world, in the manner of so-called realist novelists. M. Sora's book, so far as I can understand it, is about how we can reconcile the adequacy of a morality that demands our recognition

with our freedom of choice. "The saint," he writes (p. 98), "is the man who has found the solution of the problem of man, this problem being: 'how to live like a tree, without ceasing to be a man.' " M. Havet's careful discussion of Kant's theories of time is particularly noteworthy for the attention given to their ethical relevance. M. Havet considers that the common criticism that moral acts, on Kant's showing, must be non-temporal, is invalid, since Kant in effect held that there is, besides the time of phenomena, another time in which the activities of the transcendental self take place.

There are a number of rather important books on the history of philosophy. The one I have found most interesting is M. Georges Friedmann's *Leibniz et Spinoza* (Gallimard, 1946). It is well known that Leibniz corresponded with Spinoza on some occasions between 1671 and 1676, and actually met and discussed with him during his stay in Holland in this latter year. According to Ludwig Stein, Leibniz's ideas had not been formed before this meeting, but developed thereafter under Spinoza's influence until in the eighties Leibniz came to be severely critical of Spinoza. There is very little polemic in M. Friemann's book, but he shows, by a detailed and intelligent use of the texts, that prior to 1676 Leibniz had already sketched in outline the views which subsequently became those of the Monadology, particularly the theory of the universal harmony. Leibniz admired the subtlety of Spinoza's thought and read and annotated the *Ethics* in detail. But he disagreed with that even more than with the *Tractatus Theologico-politicus*, and in the course of his disputes with the Cartesians was quite prepared to use the argument that Cartesianism must be bad because it was a step on the road to Spinozism. M. Friedmann thinks that it was mainly if not only on psychological matters that Leibniz was really influenced by Spinoza. He also thinks that Russell and Couturat have exaggerated the extent to which logical considerations led to the formation of Leibniz's system. Another work of value for the study of seventeenth-century thought is Volume XVI. Cahier II of the *Archives de Philosophie* (Beauchesne et ses fils, Paris, 1946), which consists of Father Joseph de Finance's *Cogito Cartésien et Réflexion Thomiste*. This book is especially interesting for an acute discussion of the "Cartesian Circle." Before his death, Professor Abel Rey had completed, though he had not finally revised, volumes 4 and 5 of his *La Science dans l'Antiquité*. Volume 4, *L'Apogée de la Science Technique Grecque* (Éditions Albin Michel, Paris 1946, 190 francs), has now appeared. Besides chapters on acoustics, optics and physics, it contains an extremely useful chapter on Hippocrates and a history of Greek mathematics from Hippocrates to Plato. This is a useful book, but purchasers should make sure that pp. 309–12 (part of the index and part of the table of contents) are not missing from their copy as they are from mine. In *Le Dualisme dans l'Histoire de la Philosophie et des Religions* (Gallimard, 1946, 85 francs), Mademoiselle Simone Pétrement endeavours to show that both in religion and in philosophy monism and dualism are a matter of degree, but that there is a tendency for religious and philosophical innovators to be dualistic and for their followers to move towards monism. This is a well documented little book likely to be of most interest to those with theological interests.

In conclusion I must mention that I have received No. 1 of a new periodical called *Deucalion*, edited by M. Jean Wahl (Éditions de la Revue Fontaine, 250 francs each number). It is very well printed and produced. This number contains some articles on Existentialism and suchlike, an extract from a book by the late Jean Cavaillès on Bolzano's *Wissenschaftslehre* (the whole book is to be published before long), an article on microphysics by Louis de Broglie, and translations of writings by Hamann and Giordano Bruno. It is to be the policy of the journal to print articles by writers who are not philosophical specialists as well as by those who are.

H. B. Acton.

NEW BOOKS

A Philosophy of Poetry (based on Thomistic principles). By the Rev. John Duffy, C.S.S.R., M.A. (The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 1945. Pp. XI + 258. Price, $2.75.)

A phrase that occurs towards the close of this book gives the best impression of its purpose—"a tentative exposition of what we think St. Thomas might have said on the nature of poetry" (p. 195). The author has been very successful in correlating the rare and scattered pronouncements of St. Thomas about poetry with the general principles of the Thomist system, and he combines with his close acquaintance with medieval thought (the book is extremely well documented) a lively interest in the main problems of art and philosophy today. But the book would have been improved if the author had allowed his mind to play more freely about the principles of Thomist philosophy. More attention might have been paid to some outstanding difficulties, such as those which beset the attempt to convert an essentially subjectivist view ("goodness is what all things seek"—p. 23) into a realist one by regarding existence as a perfection ("in the degree that everything is actual, however, to that degree it is perfect"—p. 24). The theory that "every being is one true and good" (p. 25) is accepted too uncritically; so is the distinction between "logical" and "ontological truth."

The view of poetry that emerges from this study of St. Thomas naturally lays the main emphasis on intellect. It is, indeed, admitted that in art (distinguished from other forms of goodness because it turns on "love of the knowledge of the thing rather than love of the thing," p. 39), there must be "deep knowledge of individual things as individual" (p. 134), the poetic presentation of individuality being sharply opposed to "the clarity of demonstration, which deals in the essences of things" (p. 233). But the author has a highly rationalized view of the individual, and, in consequence, the process of artistic creation is conceived, not as a symbolic presentation of reality in that aspect of it which the mind is least able to exhaust, but in terms which barely distinguish it from the more discursive processes of thought. Much that is eminently sensible is said about meaning in general, and the discussion of "words" in Chapter VIII is excellent so far as it goes. But the author will have none of the view that art involves some special intuition, and is very bewildered (Chapter III) by adoption of that view by another recent Catholic writer on aesthetics, Maritain. He comes thus to regard all art as a process of making more specific and determinate "what is already known in a general way," and of doing so in conformity with a "complexus of rules in the universal reason" (p. 162). "A universal scheme of values" is in this way "contracted to the individual experience" (p. 161), and the "searching intellect," after many "gropings", is able to discover the ideas and images which will give final embodiment to an earlier "indistinct precontaining of possible beauty" (p. 171). When completed, the "poetic artefact" "principles delight in others," but its "primary end," and "the most distinctive mark of aesthetic experience (is) the resting of the will, or fruition" (p. 52) in contemplation of a work completed "in correspondence with the mind" (p. 139).

In this process, described in elaborate detail in the text, there can be discerned undeniable features of artistic experience, but they are altogether distorted, the "groping" and "searching" of the artist being in fact an effort to achieve, in far less deliberate and systematic ways than Dr. Duffy envisages,

the progressive illumination of a reality apprehended, not in any abstract way, but as concrete and particular from the start.

This general misconception of the nature of art, and assimilation of it to the "phenomenon of 'problem-solving'" (p. 171) which is best typified by science, leads to some very doubtful views. Among these are the suggestion that inspiration is most effective when deliberately sought, the presentation of the poet as searching the dictionary for the right word (that must surely be very rare in the case of good poetry), and the denial that the best of a poem can ever come first or spring fully formed into the mind of the poet. There is also a hankering after a moral criterion of art, and it is insisted, in true Platonic style, that the more we draw away from sensible reality the higher we rise in the hierarchy of genuine beauty (pp. 149–151). Most astonishing of all is the belief that the sounds of words have not much to do with the worth of a poem (pp. 206–210), or that, at best, they add some "accidental beauty" to the beauty of the poem as meaning—"the reader can entirely prescind from this external physical beauty, and the poem is not essentially affected" (p. 207). What the author seems most anxious to avoid is the positivist view of art as mere exclamation or evocation of feeling. But surely the actual or imagined sounds of words can be thought to give meaning in a special way. In combination with overt meaning they symbolize something that could not be otherwise expressed. One wonders here what account the author would give of music. Dr. Duffy also argues, apparently in support of the view that rhythm is not among the essential features of poetry, that the rhythm of poetry is in any case the same as the rhythm of prose, and that the only important distinction to draw is that between artistic literature (in effect poetry) and "useful verbal artefacts" whose end is to give, not "fruition" or delight, but information. There is much to query here. But it must suffice to note that where the symbolic nature of art is fairly discerned there can be seen to be a most important difference, even if ultimately a difference of degree, between poetry and fine prose, the former being supreme artistically because it is more completely symbolical.

These matters are brought to a head in the treatment of "obscure poetry"—Chapter X. It is reluctantly admitted that there may be something in Eliot's dictum that there is "a logic of the imagination as well as a logic of concepts." But little heed is paid to it. And, while admiration is not withheld from Eliot's obscure poetry, the writer "wonders, however, whether the meaning could not be given with equal splendour in another way, and with less exasperation to the reader" (p. 240). A poem which fails to present "a unitary meaning to the intellect" (p. 239) can only have "fragmentary" beauty, and it tends to degenerate into "frivolous dissipation," yielding at best some pleasure akin "to that which children find in the incantation of rhythmical and dimly-understood verses" (p. 241). But the latter is not so unimportant artistically as is assumed by the author. He appears to miss altogether the special significance of recent "obscure" poetry, and the failure may well be thought symptomatic of the general inability of the Neo-Thomist philosophy to lay hold on the more creative factors in the spiritual crisis of our times.

But while the book appears thus to be wide of the mark in respect to its main contentions, the author manages to say a great deal incidentally that is of considerable interest to students of aesthetics. This is said concisely and sometimes with distinction of style. The book will have a special appeal to those who still think that art can be rationalized. For these reasons it is all the more unfortunate that the proofs should have been very carelessly corrected. There is a quite extraordinary number of misprints.

H. D. Lewis.

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume XIX. "Analysis and Metaphysics." (London: Harrison & Sons, Ltd. 1945. Pp. 288. Price, 15s. net.)

This volume contains the Symposia read at the first Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and Mind Association held since before the war. Professor Price's Inaugural Address "Clarity is not enough?" gives us something in the way of a stocktaking. He makes a brilliant defence of "clarificatory philosophers" (from Socrates onwards), but acknowledges a certain narrowness in the pre-occupations of the clarificatory philosophers in the years before the last war. We are faced with a consumers' demand for a reasoned "world-outlook." Once disabused of the idea that a "world-outlook" must be an attempt to establish existential conclusions from wholly *a priori* premises, we may turn again to consider the possibility of constructing one. The Symposium on the "Causal Argument for Physical Objects" deals hardly, if at all, with the "causal argument," but with a view of Dr. Ewing's which might be called the "Argument from Successful Prediction." Dr. Ewing argues that there is a high degree of probability for the existence of physical objects, since successful predictions of future experience are based on the belief. But as the other symposiasts show that such successful prediction would work equally well on phenomenalist, idealist and realist assumptions, we are not much further on. Dr. Ewing holds that physical objects are groups of unsensed sensibilia. Professor Price points out that this means that the physical world must be immensely complicated. Such complication doesn't deter Professor Price; on the contrary, he rather likes it. But he shows that the description of a group of sensed sensibilia must include the *place from where* appearances appear. Phenomenalists must therefore reckon with a spatially ordered system of points of view.

In the Symposium on "Verifiability" Mr. Mackinnon asks whether there must not be certain presuppositions which give the context within which empirical verification is possible. Dr. Waismann shows that he does not substantiate the claim that these are the Kantian categories; but I take Mr. Mackinnon to have been simply maintaining the Kantian principle, that we make *some* demands on any phenomenon which is to be considered "objective." Mr. Kneale makes the suggestion (which he recognizes may appear "reactionary, not to say Fascist") that the Subject-Predicate form (in a highly generalized sense) may prove necessary for any statement of empirical fact. Dr. Waismann's paper shows that the "principle of verification" is becoming more flexible than it appeared to be in pre-war discussions. The paper contains most interesting discussions of the "open texture" of certain empirical concepts (necessitating an infinite number of sense datum statements for their conclusive verification); of the context of language as helping to determine what we see as a "fact"; and of the way in which different kinds of statements belong to different strata, each stratum having its own kind of logic. We should like to hear more about these "strata" and their "logics" from Dr. Waismann.

In the Symposium on "The Alleged Metaphysics in Plato's *Republic*" Mr. Brown claims that the distinction between the Forms and sensible things is not a metaphysical distinction, but merely a distinction between concepts clearly and less clearly understood. Professor Field and Mr. Orr have little difficulty in showing that, wherever metaphysics may be in contemporary philosophy, they are there all right in the *Republic*. In the ethics Symposium, "Intention, Motive, and Responsibility," Professor Barnes and Dr. Falk between them make clearer the sense in which a motive enters into an intention, and Dr. Falk has some good things to say on how far we can be held responsible

for our motives. The discussion of "responsibility," particularly in Professor Barnes' and Dr. Duncan Jones' papers, is somewhat hampered by holding too tightly to the etymological association of the word with "answering questions."

DOROTHY M. EMMET.

Iqbal. His Art and Thought. By SYED 'ABDUL VAHID, B.Sc., B.A. (Oxon). Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf. Kashmiri Bazar, Lahore. (Agents: Luzac & Co., 46, Great Russell Street, London.) Pp. xv + 265. 14s.

Except to students of Philosophy, the name of Iqbal, the Muslim poet and philosopher (1873 to 1938) is scarcely known in this country, though he studied under McTaggart at Cambridge (1905 to 1908) and in 1922 received a Knighthood from the Indian Government in recognition of his great eminence and popularity among his co-religionists, both as a poet and a thinker. But in the rapprochement between Eastern and Western thought in Religion and Philosophy, which has taken place during the last fifty years, Iqbal is a significant figure; and while the cult of Theosophy was drawing many minds on this side of the world eastward, Iqbal, without renouncing the Muslim basis of his earlier training, turned, as his mind matured, decisively toward such Western thinkers as Fichte, Bergson, and Einstein.

Fundamentally a pragmatist, and basing his philosophy on the belief that life is real and not merely an illusion, he opposed the doctrine of Unityism, which he characterized as escapism, and even attributed to this doctrine the decadence which has infected Eastern civilization in general, and brought about the subjugation of its peoples to European domination. He taught that the Ego is an eternal principle; that the source of creation is an individual existence with definite powers of perception and volition; that for the operation of those powers this source of all life has divided itself, in the world of phenomena, into Self and unself: and that through a process dependent on this division, every individual self is capable of evolving into a state of perfection which is full freedom; having reached which state, it finds union with God, who is Himself the one perfect freedom embracing all.

The writer of this life of Iqbal considers him the greatest of all Muslim philosophers, and that his like has not been seen for a thousand years. If a study of Iqbal's philosophy, presented in verse and prose, can substantiate such an estimate, this book, which gives a pleasantly discursive résumé of his life and teaching, is an important one for English readers.

LAURENCE HOUSMAN.

The Timeless Moment. By WARNER ALLEN. (Faber & Faber. Pp. 247. 10s. 6d.)

Mr. Warner Allen is the most versatile of our men of letters. A good classical scholar, a proficient in French, Spanish and Italian, an Acting Wing-Commander, high up in the Ministry of Information, Foreign Editor of the *Morning Post*, Chevalier of the Legion of Honour, an expert on wine, author of two excellent detective novels and of *Italy from End to End*. And now he comes before the public with a learned and very interesting book on the philosophy and psychology of mysticism.

The philosophy of his book is Neoplatonic. But its readers will be more interested in Mr. Allen's psychology than in his metaphysics. For he writes of a personal experience. At the age of about fifty he had a sudden and vivid spiritual illumination which has had a permanent influence upon his inner life. The experience came as a flash of light. This is quite normal. We remember

Plato's "leaping spark"; St. Paul's vision on the road to Damascus; St. Augustine's record of his illumination, and the *funkelein* of the German mystics. We are apt to think that this sudden irruption into consciousness must have been prepared for by anxious searchings of heart. Sometimes this is plainly true; but St. Paul, for example, does not tell us that the heroic death of Stephen, which he witnessed, prepared him for a complete change in his view of Christianity. These stirrings of the soul are partly subconscious. It does not seem to be common for the mystical vision to appear for the first time in middle life to a man who is fully occupied in strenuous external activities. This gives an additional interest to Mr. Allen's experience.

The author is fully convinced that the vision of God belongs to the spiritual not to the psychical plane of experience. But he is keenly interested in occult psychology. After reading Dunne's *An Experiment with Time* he is half inclined to believe in precognition, and to think that some curious dreams which he describes may possibly have had a more than accidental resemblance to events which happened later. Like our psychoanalysts, he is disposed to take dreams seriously. For my own part I entirely refuse to believe in precognition, and I do not think that my dreams throw any light on my character. Those who are struck by what look like anticipations of future events seldom count the frequent misses as well as the rare hits. I once dreamed that the winner of the Derby had been revealed to me. Not being a betting man I did not avail myself of the knowledge; the horse, like the Portuguese in the Great War, "also ran." I have read a pathetic farewell letter which my mother, as a young girl, wrote to her parents. She dreamed that she saw her tombstone with a date upon it, and the date was approaching. She lived to be eighty-three. However, my incredulity is ceasing to be fashionable.

These doubts do not affect the value of the book. We are grateful to the author for describing so fully his experience of the "inner light." He has given us one more proof that mysticism is not mere *schwärmerei*, and that those who have had this experience are not seldom men and women of unquestionable sanity and practical ability, who have shown themselves well qualified to take a prominent part in active life.

W. R. Ingb.

The Three Spheres of Society. By Charles Waterman. (London: Faber and Faber. 1946. Pp. 294. Price 12s. 6d.)

The Liberal Tradition. A Study of the Social and Spiritual Conditions of Freedom. By William Aylott Orton. (New Haven: Yale University Press; London: Oxford University Press. 1945. Pp. xiv+317. Price $3.50.)

The first of these books is in the main a discussion of the changes in the organization of our own society which the author thinks should be made in order to secure the benefits that Anthroposophy has to offer. Anthroposophy is a system of ideas formulated by Rudolf Steiner about the beginning of the present century. According to Steiner mankind, in developing scientific knowledge and becoming individualized, have lost much of the spiritual wisdom of the past and most of the fellow feeling with which less individualized primitive peoples are endowed. It is the aim of Anthroposophy to revive the languishing spiritual wisdom and to reinvigorate the human sympathies without either abandoning the benefits provided by natural science or encroaching on the rights of individuals.

Whatever doubts may be held about the existence of some specially profound Ancient Wisdom, there can be none as to the sickness into which industrial civilization has lapsed, and it is now pretty clear that the techno-

logical excellence of a society does not necessarily connote excellences of other kinds. Mr. Waterman's book is therefore timely. Following Steiner, he holds that the three distinct spheres of society are the economic, the political and the spiritual, and that moral confusion must arise if conduct appropriate to one only of these spheres is practised in the others. The proper function of the political power is not to operate economic enterprises nor to organize churches and schools, but to secure justice for workmen, managers and consumers, for parents, children and teachers. This involves the maintenance by the state of minimum standards of nutrition and housing and the protection of human rights generally. Mr. Waterman thinks it possible for an economy to be developed in which private ownership is retained in appropriate fields but rendered legally conditional upon satisfactory performance of social functions. Should the basic industries come under public control, any attempt to operate them by political methods would be unlikely to succeed and would be undesirable in any case. Industry can be most efficiently and humanely run by those who spend their lives in the actual process and should therefore be controlled by the managers, workmen and consumers subject to a freely negotiated national plan. The spiritual life of our society depends upon the free efforts of individuals and will decay if subjected to economic or political control. It is thus desirable for cultural organizations to spring from and be financed through the free choice of their members. Thus Mr. Waterman thinks that state controlled education is dangerous to freedom and suggests that a more active system might be promoted if the state paid to those parents who so wished a capitation fee that would enable them to contract out of the state system and contribute towards a style of school which they considered more adequate.

It will be seen from this summary that Mr. Waterman has endeavoured to look at our society without prejudice and that his suggestions cut across the party alignments. He suggests, rightly, I think, that the present schemes of nationalization are susceptible of development in widely differing ways, and he urges the importance of preventing bureaucracy and promoting flexibility. He considers that in the future trades unions will have to play a less defensive and more positive role in the running of industry. He also suggests that the time has come for the influence of consumers to be more closely organized than it has been hitherto. On all these topics he makes concrete and frequently ingenious proposals. I do not suppose that all of them are practicable, but none of them is silly. Most politicians and civil servants are too absorbed in necessary drudgery to have time to read books like this. I hope that any of their friends who read Mr. Westerman's book will find opportunities of imparting its contents to them, omitting or stressing Anthroposophy as strategy requires. The result should be a loosening of prejudice and some release of imagination.

Whereas Mr. Waterman directs his principal efforts to showing how the aims he believes in might be achieved, Professor Orton gives his main attention to an analysis and historical sketch of the liberal philosophy which he approves. The core of liberalism, he holds, is the search for a form of society in which men can be free, since freedom is essential for mental health and is in any case desirable for its own sake. Freedom is threatened whenever the state power, becoming too ambitious, claims to judge all the activities of society. Hence liberals, while they accept the need for an organized secular coercive power, hold that its sphere of justifiable activity is limited by natural law, and that the good of mankind is best served by the constant endeavour to keep state power to a minimum. Professor Orton holds, as did Lord Acton, that a tyrannical democracy is worse than a tyrannical individual or oligarchy,

and he obviously expects little good from the rule of the masses unless they can be restrained by reason and religion. This, of course, does not detract from his liberalism, since the enfranchisement of the whole population is quite a different thing from the liberal belief that each individual has natural and inalienable rights which no government ought to interfere with. Professor Orton holds that all men are created equal but that this proposition is only true in a religious sense "which sees in each individual the embodiment of a purpose that goes beyond all secular objectives" (p. 56). He is much impressed by nineteenth and twentieth century Papal formulations of the natural rights of family and property, and considers that the Roman Church is a genuinely liberal influence. But here, surely, his judgment is at fault, since the Roman Church advocates and would endeavour to enforce a special form of family organization irrespective of the directions in which freely thinking individuals may wish to transform it, while St. Thomas borrowed from Plato's *Laws* (Professor Orton regards the *Republic* as "one of the most horrible books ever written") not only part of his natural theology but also the illiberal advocacy of religious persecution which he displays in the *Summa Theologica*. As to property, when Professor Orton is criticizing Professor Laski he writes: "Indiscriminate talk of property or ownership is now practically meaningless" (p. 112). This dictum, if true, applies equally to Pius XII.

Consistently with his general position, Professor Orton is an opponent of nationalism and imperialism and an advocate of free trade. "The role of liberalism," he says, "is to forestall the catastrophic phase of change" (p. 305), and he therefore urges the advantages of changes secured by compromise. He stresses the value to a liberal society of an effective conservative party. "To flatter the masses by indiscriminate abuse of conservatism and all its works is no true service to liberalism" (p. 34). Like Mr. Waterman, he thinks that the interests of consumers need fuller protection than they are getting, but unlike him he does not seek for ways of achieving freedom for the operatives of industry during their working time. Indeed, I feel bound to say that Professor Orton is more vigorous in denouncing the faults of mass democracy in general and President Roosevelt in particular than persuasive or specific in proposals for developing liberal practice. It is true that all fanatics are fools and some are dangerous, but Professor Orton's gracefully written and learned book would have been better had it provided a more specific prescription for the nervelessness into which liberalism seems in danger of degenerating.

H. B. Acton.

Problems of Men. By John Dewey. (New York: Philosophical Library. 1946. Pp. 424. Price $5.)

"There is probably no better way," says Professor Dewey, "to realize what philosophy is about when it is living, not antiquarian, than to ask ourselves what criteria and what aims and ideals should control our educational policies and undertakings" (p. 143).

For education is, as he says in another paper, "*the* outstanding means by which union of knowledge and the values that actually work in actual conduct is brought about" (p. 165). Philosophy of education is thus "ultimately the most significant phase of philosophy."

To say that this has been his conviction throughout his long and active career is not just to say that he has always been more interested in education than in philosophy. The point is that he believes that philosophers ought to be concerned with the vital issues and problems of their age. Hence the

title of this collection of essays, most of them written during the last ten years, *Problems of Men*. Problems of living men in the age in which they are living. From this point of view it is misleading to speak of "the perennial problems of philosophy." There are important connexions between the issues of today and those of other periods in the past; but this does not mean that the issues of today are those of the past. Our issues arise out of our situation, and must be studied in our situation. Light from the past no doubt we can get; but we shall not get it by assuming that our issues and problems are just those which men have always faced.

The first thing philosophers have to do then, in Professor Dewey's view, is to see the problems of the present age under the conditions of the present, and to tackle them from the point of view of the present. And he complains that many philosophers fail to do this, and busy themselves instead with traditional problems which have lost their urgency and vitality.

The central issue, according to him, concerns the place and function of scientific method in modern society. During the last three hundred years, that method has been used with increasing range and success, over a field wide but essentially limited. It took its rise when certain inquirers broke down the barriers that had been erected between theoretical studies and mechanical pursuits, between interest in ends or final purposes and the study of material processes; and it has been to an increasing extent technological, so that today the possibility of some piece of scientific research often depends on the possibility of constructing some complicated piece of apparatus. Science has become thoroughly contemporary; and while it would be untrue to say that no research would be entered on by a scientist unless it promised some direct practical outcome of use to modern society, it would be true to say that new researches result in the transformation of the old problems, that inventing and handling apparatus forms an essential part of the technique of research, and that at every stage an essential part of the reports of progress takes the form of statements that if you do so and so with such and such a piece of apparatus you will get such and such result. It is true also that this characteristic of scientific research has led to a closer partnership between scientists engaged in research and technicians seeking new devices for producing effects in the workaday world.

In this way science has contributed greatly to social change. Many of the changes brought about through science have been beneficial. Many have been harmful. We are no longer tempted to speak enthusiastically, as Henry More did in the seventeenth century, of the great goodness of God for giving man the blessing of being able to fight with modern weapons, instead of leaving him, like an ignorant savage, to "be at it with fisticuffs"; though we should recognize that the processes which made the use of modern weapons possible have also made possible a life very largely free from insecurity, pain and drudgery, and opened out possibilities of a fuller and wider life. No one is more clear than the thoughtful scientific worker, about what science and technology could do for society, in contrast with the use society has actually made of them.

As Professor Dewey sees the situation, the objectionable features of the whole development are due just to the limitations of the field over which the new methods have been applied. "Many of the remediable evils of the present time are due to the unbalanced, one-sided application of the methods of inquiry and test that constitute everything that has a right to the name 'science' " (p. 11). They have not been applied with any degree of fullness to the institutions and processes of society itself, or to the determination of ends and values. "Scientific method affects the conditions of life only

through the medium of institutions to which scientific inquiry is *not* applied" (p. 7).

For him, then, this is the vital issue of the present day. How is it that this new method, so fruitful in results in certain fields, with effects at once so beneficial and, through its one-sided application, so harmful in society, has not been extended, modified and adapted to a study and a transformation of social values and social processes? What might be the consequences if this extension were made?

These are the basic questions which his philosophy seeks to answer. In the papers in this volume he deals with different aspects of them, now in relation to school and university education, now in relation to the working of democratic processes and to social planning, now in relation to the determination of values, now in relation to the notion of subjectivity in experience.

The views he has to controvert are views to the effect that scientific method is by its very nature inadequate for certain types of problem. There are e.g., people who make a sharp separation between matter and mind, and in consequence between material things and interests on the one hand and spiritual interests on the other, and hold that scientific method is adequate only to a study of the former. They hold that science is competent to deal with the temporal and changing, with facts, but that values are eternal and cannot be discovered by experimenting with them or by collecting facts about them. These people are apt to view with dismay the prospect of technology providing more and more for the material interests of human beings, and so inciting to a blurring and a forgetting of spiritual interests. In the evil effects of technology on society they see the natural result of an overstress of material interests. They are apt to assert that our material progress is outstripping our moral and spiritual discipline, and to endeavour to call a halt to the former, while men are brought back to the latter. Some wish to strengthen the authority of an authoritative church, the divine instrument for the revelation of values to men; some, like President Hutchins of Chicago University, contrast science and technology with liberal and humane studies, and some would even go so far as to relegate vocational training to special schools, cutting them off from any contact with what is liberating (p. 32). Mechanical and utilitarian pursuits are here once more held to be lower and less worthy of spiritual beings than liberal studies.

All this for Professor Dewey is retrograde. It represents a viewpoint which had to be rejected by the early scientists, before they could make progress with their studies; and, he holds, it will have to be rejected today, if we are to make progress with the study of society, and to hope to solve our social problems. To say that the evils arise because our material and technological progress has outrun our moral discipline is to put the emphasis on the wrong place. What has to be dealt with is not technology in the abstract, but technology "as it operates under existing political-economic-cultural conditions" (p. 163). It would thus be more correct to say that the evils arise because our scientific and technological progress has outrun our social institutions. And, comments Professor Dewey, "here, and not in science, whether pure or abstract, is where materialism as the enemy of the humane is to be found, and here, not elsewhere, is where attacks should be directed." Let the humanists attack the habits and institutions which cause the technological applications of science to work with harshness on such vast portions of the population, and we shall believe "their concern for humane values is honest, instead of a device, deliberate or innocent, for maintaining

some form of institutionalized class interest. *Human is as human does"* (p. 163).

Associated with this view of his opponents is a separation between means and ends, and stress on ends-in-themselves that are not also means. The determination of ends-in-themselves is here cut off from the processes by which the adequacy of means to ends is determined. But if there are no ends which are not also means, as Professor Dewey holds, then there is only one type of determination of ends; and "there vanish all . . . grounds . . . for holding that moral ends are not, in theory, capable of the same kind of 'objective' factual determination as are technological ends" (p. 15). It is this view which has led him to be charged with having a philosophy of "progress without a goal"; but the charge is emotional rather than based on an intelligent understanding of what he is contending for. He certainly does not stand for the slogan, "Let's go somewhere," without any idea of where. He stands for the application of scientific method, developed and transformed in the process, to the determination of moral and social ends that are also openers up of and means to further ends; and this means that the progress he is seeking is a controlled and directed progress, each new achievement making possible and pointing the way to further steps beyond. It is precisely *not* "progress without a goal"; but the goal is of a much more complex kind, much more related to the actual conditions of life, than the goals, often indeed Utopian, of the upholders of absolute and eternal values.

A third view which Professor Dewey finds prominent in modern thought is the view that values are not capable of any kind of intelligent discussion and determination, since they are an expression of purely subjective attitudes. This view, he says, is bound to cause many people to turn to the authoritarian theological view which agrees that ultimate ends cannot be discovered by men, but asserts that they are determined by supernatural authority (p. 10). He speaks (in 1944) of "the discouragement I have experienced lately in connexion with discussion of value" (p. 273). He feels that "little headway is being made in determining the questions or issues fundamentally involved." And I think that the fundamental point lies in this doctrine of subjectivity, together with the contrast between propositions about values and propositions about facts as being different sorts of propositions, and not merely propositions about different sorts of facts. He would like someone to defend this view. "I can think of nothing more likely to be clarifying in the present confused state of the subject than an explicit statement of the *grounds* upon which it is assumed that propositions about values are *not* propositions about space-time facts, together with explicit discussion of the *consequences* of that position. If a question were raised about the relation of geological propositions to astronomical propositions, or of meteor-propositions to comet-propositions, it would not occur to anyone that the 'problem' was other than that of the connexion between two sets of facts. It is my conviction that nothing would better clarify the present unsatisfactory state of discussion of value than definite and explicit statement of the reasons why the case is supposed to be otherwise in respect to value" (p. 279).

This raises the whole question of the distinction between subjective and objective in experience, and of the concept of something intrinsically private. If man is essentially a part of the world, then his processes of inquiry and of forming conclusions, and his evaluations, are as capable of scientific study as any other processes occurring in the world.

I have said enough to indicate the range of Professor Dewey's articles, and the kind of view for which he is contending. The articles were all

written in the last ten years, with the exception of the one on "Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality," written, he says, "half a century ago." They are arranged into four parts, not chronologically, but within each part each leads naturally to the next. The parts are entitled respectively "Democracy and Education," "Human Nature and Scholarship," "Value and Thought," and "About Thinkers." The thinkers dealt with in the last part are James Marsh, William James, and A. N. Whitehead. The articles in the third part, except the old one just mentioned, are all reprinted from the American *Journal of Philosophy*. These articles are more technical than those in the first two parts, and involve points raised by other contributors to the journal. The first two parts are of most topical and general interest. They show Professor Dewey at his best as a writer. They are clear, direct and incisive. The whole volume is to be welcomed, as an important contribution to the discussion of modern problems. It is a live volume, dealing with live issues.

L. J. Russell.

Nature and Values. By Edgar Sheffield Brightman. (Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, New York, 1945. Pp. 171. Price $1.50.)

In this short book we are offered a new discussion of a very old subject the issue between materialism and idealism, or, as the author prefers to express it, between naturalism and personalism. All human experience is marked by a sense of conflict and division: when we survey the situation in which we stand we are confronted immediately by the apparent dualisms on the one hand of matter and mind, on the other of fact and value. How are we to deal with this conflict? Should we declare, as some do, that the dualisms are unreal, the product of nothing more than verbal misunderstanding? Should we, alternatively, regard them as ultimate, insisting, as Descartes did, on a two-substance theory of reality? Or should we attempt to reduce the two worlds to one, claiming either that mind and values can be understood in terms of nature, or that nature itself can be interpreted as a manifestation of mind?

Dr. Brightman is an unrepentant metaphysician and a convinced idealist. With the positivist thesis that the clash between naturalism and personalism is a sham battle he will have nothing to do. The positivist, he argues, is not an impartial spectator in this conflict but very definitely a fighter on one side: positivism is itself a form of naturalism. And here I cannot help thinking that Dr. Brightman is right. What the positivist asserts, in effect, is that the criteria of knowledge and reality accepted by natural scientists should be regarded as having universal validity. But this is precisely what is in question between naturalism and anti-naturalism. What worries most of us is just the point whether the scientist can be regarded as having the last word to say on all topics. And it is distrust of the omnicompetance of science, the feeling that human actions in particular cannot be satisfactorily accounted for by the use of scientific methods, which lead us to consider alternatives to naturalism, such as the theory which Dr. Brightman advocates. But if we are to find a philosophy of this type superior to that which the naturalist offers, we must be shown that it does justice to the strength as well as the weaknesses of its opponents. The defect of the present book, which certainly has its merits as an introduction to the subject, is that the author does not state and answer the case for a nature independent of mind in the way he should. He defines personalism as "the belief that the universe is a society of conscious beings, that the energy which physicists describe is God's will in action, and that

there is no wholly unconscious or impersonal being" (p. 114), relying mainly on Berkeleian arguments to establish the position. But he does not seem aware of the serious paradox involved in the statement (p. 123) that nature *is* mind. As Hegel saw, even if we are to assert ultimately that nature and mind are one, we must recognise immediately that they are opposites: that so far from being identical with mind, nature is its antithesis or "other." No idealism which fails to allow a relative independence to the world of nature is likely to carry conviction. And the question whether we can make sense of this notion of the relative independence of nature is the question whether idealism is in the last resort a tenable philosophy.

W. H. WALSH.

Philosophical Incursions into English Literature. By the late JOHN LAIRD, F.B.A., M.A., D.Lit. Ll.d. (Cambridge, at the University Press, 1946. Pp. 223. Price 12s. 6d.)

When a philosopher makes incursions into literary criticism any one of four things may be expected. The philosopher may try to show how, working in their own way with imaginative material, certain poets, dramatists and novelists have expressed attitudes to or valuations of life similar to those reached, through more abstract and systematic reflection, by himself or by other philosophers. Some of Santayana's writings are obvious examples. Or, having settled his own opinions on the principles of artistic criticism, the philosopher may turn back to certain works of literature to exercise the canons and principles involved in his general aesthetic: Croce's studies of Shakespeare, Ariosto, etc. seem to me examples. Thirdly, we may expect from a philosopher criticism that specially stresses the background factors—historical, social, ideological—in a literary artist's work: for example J. S. Mill's excellent study of De Vigny. Lastly, we may expect a philosopher to concentrate on the explicitly philosophical arguments or presuppositions in certain works of literature, to examine and appraise these and suggest their relevance or irrelevance to the artistic value of these works. The late Professor Laird's volume of literary essays falls into the fourth of these classes. The preface tells us with engaging modesty that the author, in spite of having had "some experience in writing and lecturing on philosophy" is "in matters of literature only an amateur." Very naturally, therefore, in writing on (among others) Sterne, Wordsworth, Hardy, Bridges, Professor Laird is chiefly interested in their "philosophy"; and in this way he has utilized his great professional competence as a philosopher to make a real though limited contribution to literary criticism. Such a contribution can be judged from two standpoints. Does it add anything of value to the *principles* of literary criticism—to those parts of literary criticism which overlap with the philosophy of art? Does it help the "common reader" to appreciate better *as works of art* the works selected for criticism? In the case of Professor Laird's volume the answer to the first question is: only a little, and that chiefly by suggestions that are never carried very far. The answer to the second question is a most emphatic Yes.

Three of the essays deal with the philosophy to be found in certain novels; in *Robinson Crusoe*, *Tristram Shandy*, and the novels of Dickens. The thesis that Crusoe is "a highly philosophical romance," a "*tractatus theologico-politicus*," is racily and convincingly expounded; and, as in other essays in the volume, Professor Laird brings out very clearly the degree to which in eighteenth-century England a popular author could not only possess, but expound at length, "a philosophy." Usually the philosophy was Locke's, with a few individual adornments; but it was Locke genuinely assimilated and

intelligently applied to the multifarious problems and interests of daily life. This point is illustrated again in *The Shandean Philosophy*, one of the most delightful essays in the book. Sterne was so great a humorist that he could create humour of a kind one would naturally consider the preserve of professional philosophers, since it arises from the oddities of philosophical uses and intentions. "It was a constant vexation to my father that my mother never asked the meaning of a thing she did not understand. That she is not a woman of science, my father would say, is her misfortune—But she *might* ask a question." By contrast with Sterne, Dickens was a very unsubtle humorist. But he had a capacity to reproduce, exaggerate, distort (and at times beautify) the English language as used in streets and homes and pubs and prisons, which is unequalled in any other writer. That such a master of language should have been attracted by the would-be-logical illogicalities of much "low" discourse was inevitable; and Professor Laird begins by giving us some interesting suggestions for the Weller-Gamp-Curdle-Bailey junior anthology of logical and philosophical solecisms. Dissatisfied, however, with this approach to *Philosophy in the Work of Dickens*, Professor Laird breaks off to examine, very usefully, what Dickens meant by the word "metaphysical" (he usually meant psychological) and who it was that Dickens attacked so furiously under the title of "philosophers" (he meant popular expounders of "Manchester" political economy). But why, the reader may wonder, this presupposition that there is a "philosophy" to be found in the works of Dickens? Professor Laird explains that his quest arose from a remark thrown out by G. F. Stout, that "there was a great deal of excellent philosophy in Dickens and that it would be well worth while examining it seriously and in detail." And at the end of Professor Laird's essay the reader may well ask himself: what *could* Stout have meant? My suggestion, though it may be quite off the mark, is as follows: that Dickens illustrates, better than any other writer, the wide variety of ways in which our "verbal behaviour" can be logically at odds with the rest of our behaviour, and yet (in the novelist's vision) be seen to "fit in" with the rest of our behaviour perfectly well. This kind of insight into the varieties of human inconsistency is obviously a main source of Dickens's strength as a portrayer of characters; and it is by means of it, I think, that, in spite of the crudeness of his explicit moralizing, he has a "philosophy of man" to impart.

Two of his studies in English poetry, *Pope's Essay on Man* and *Hardy's The Dynasts*, show Professor Laird as an incisive, indeed a somewhat severe, philosophic critic. The philosophical content of the *Essay on Man* proves to be flimsy and vague (for the most part clumsy borrowings from Bolingbroke) and, in spite of the unfailing radiance and crispness of the couplets, weakly—even sloppily—stitched together. The philosophical content of *The Dynasts* is more serious: Professor Laird evidently believed that the philosophy expressed in this poem was not only a muddle but a dangerously pretentious muddle. By applying to it some quite simple distinctions—between determinism, fatalism and predestination—and by pursuing these (and the unfortunate Hardy) unwaveringly, Professor Laird produces a model of what I should call "popular philosophy," i.e. real philosophy expressed through examples that are certain to interest, and are likely to have baffled and confused, a wide circle of intelligent *non*-philosophers. On the other hand, Professor Laird's very success in this essay may leave some readers wishing that he had gone further. The "mechanistic monism" implied in *The Dynasts* may well be a philosophical muddle; but surely it contributed something quite essential to a work that has great artistic value. (One might compare the way Hardy used more limited scientific conceptions in some of his novels;

e.g. that of the interaction of man and his environment in *The Return of the Native*, or that of a biological stock's decline in *Tess*.) Surely there is a very important problem here, and one on which we might expect a philosopher to throw some light: namely, in what way or in what sense can a "background" philosophical or scientific idea be said to be essential to the *subject* of a poem or novel, and hence, presumably, to the peculiar success of the artist's expression of that subject?

Four of Professor Laird's essays deal with poets who were evidently among his favourites: Wordsworth, Shelley, Browning and Bridges. Professor Laird brings out very clearly why Shelley *had* to think out a metaphysics, and why in reading him we should try to remember what that metaphysics was; but from the elucidation offered of Shelley's conception of "the constant pattern or eternity of measured motion" I, for one, formed a far higher opinion of Professor Laird's powers of intellectual sympathy and patience than of Shelley's gifts as a metaphysician. Professor Laird's examination of Browning's theistic beliefs, queries and quandaries seemed to me more rewarding, whilst his discussion of Browning's philosophy of love, especially as illustrated in Fifine at the Fair, I found excellent. (In this connection a small error should be corrected in any future edition: On p. 169 a stanza from *By the Fire-side* is wrongly attributed to *Any Wife to Any Husband*.) Professor Laird discusses the main arguments of *The Testament of Beauty* carefully, unsparingly, but with a just and friendly respect. He puts his finger on the weakness of Bridges's philosophy: it is too bookish, and in particular too bookish to give life to a philosophical poem. The essay on *Wordsworth and Natural Piety* is somewhat disappointing. It opens most promisingly with a close examination of the three passages in which the phrase "natural piety" occurs, and with the suggestion that in these Wordsworth meant by it something very different from that "reverent joy in nature" with which Alexander equated it. Had this line of thought been developed, it might have led to a useful discussion of Wordsworth's philosophy of the *will*, and in particular of the self-dedication of the will ("I made no vows, but vows were then made for me," etc.). But Professor Laird rejected this promising starting-point, and was content to anatomize the various strands in Wordsworth's poetic response to nature. In so far as this can be done without reference to Wordsworth's central moral beliefs, it is well done; but something better could have been expected.

Two essays stand somewhat apart from those I have discussed. The first in the book, *Shakespeare on the Wars of England*, is a rather shapeless anthology of Shakespeare's dicta on the moral issues and problems peculiar to war. The other, *Concerning Dr. Isaac Watts*, is a really excellent monograph; for sheer literary interest it seems to me the best essay in the volume. The great hymn writer is shown to have been in his youth a considerable lyric poet. There are interesting indications of how "O God our help in ages past" evolved from a clumsy paraphrase of the first five verses of the 90th Psalm, and how, in general, Watts regarded his craft as a hymn writer and paraphraser. Professor Laird remarks shrewdly that "even in an unchurchly age like the present, the hymn is the form of verse most familiar to the public, and does more than any other form to shape the public taste." But Watts was more than a poet and hymn writer; in his later years he produced moral and metaphysical essays, a useful text-book of logic and a volume of sermons many of which, Professor Laird surmises, must have been heard since from many pulpits. His metaphysics took the form of a revised Catesianism, and from his defence of Descartes' account of the soul Professor Laird cites the following gem. "A poor young creature in the lowest rank of life being once

asked what she supposed her soul to be, after a little musing replied, 'My soul is my think,' whereby it is plain she meant her power of thinking." The choice of this sentence—itself so beautifully revealing of eighteenth century social and philosophical manners—seems to me to typify Professor Laird's merits as a literary critic: deep love of his subject, wide learning, constant good sense, a kindly and kindling humour—qualities, the combination of which is as rare among philosophers as among literary critics, but which are found together on almost every page of this delightful volume.

W. B. GALLIE.

Science and the Idea of God. By WM. ERNEST HOCKING. (Humphrey Milford. 1945. Pp. ix + 124. Price 9/6d.)

The skeleton outline of Professor Hocking's book is this. If science rules that God must not interfere in the working of the world it investigates, that is equal to surrendering the whole realm of nature and history to the undivine forces which contend there. On the other hand, to admit divine control seems to carry us back to the realm of miracle. Hence we get the incompatible demands that God must not intrude and yet must act. To assess the situation Professor Hocking examines what he calls the experiment of getting on without God, in the spheres of psychology, sociology and astro-physics. With regard to the first of these, the discussion is mainly upon the merits of the cure of souls from the purely psychological and from the religious standpoints. As concerns the second, the issue is the adequacy of a humanistic sociology. In both cases the weakness of the lack of the religious standpoint is indicated. It is in the third sphere that the true place of God is clearly indicated. Curiously too, it was here that men first sought to banish God. How God enters may be explained by "an imperfect analogy." Professor Hocking says: "Light projects a motion picture on the screen. The activity of the figures and objects on the screen is causal. The light does not interfere with that action; it does not contend with any of the powers there active. It sustains the whole panorama of events. If it ceases, there are no causes and no agents at all on the screen. They all depend on it, and it is not one of them."

The depth and often brilliance of the argument is ill served by such a summary as the above. It is reminiscent of Whitehead's view that the physical world is transformed by the "consequent" nature of God. In Whitehead's words God "saves the world as it passes into the immediacy of his own life. It is the judgment of a tenderness which loses nothing which can be saved. . . . He is the poet of the world, with tender patience leading it by his vision of truth, beauty and goodness."

The first conflict of science and religion, which followed the Renaissance, ended in science taking the physical, religion the spiritual world. This compromise lasted till first the geologists and then Darwinism, reached conclusions incompatible with the theology of the day. The bitter wrangling of the latter half of the nineteenth century led to a belief that science and religion were opposed. With the twentieth century the compromise was renewed by the recognition that Genesis was not Christianity and, on the part of the scientists, by a readiness to see that religion was not simply dogma. It was held that religion was no more opposed to science than was art. Each could work out its conclusions in its own sphere. That is the state of things which Professor Hocking thinks cannot now remain. The solution he suggests is to enable us to envisage a world-view in which religion and science can share. If both sides are willing, that should be possible. It may be, however, that many scientists will

be content to remain mentally as well as actually in their laboratories, and show interest only in what lies in the recognized sphere of cause and effect. It may also be that many religious people will still demand that God manifests himself in miraculous intervention. In that case the deadlock remains. If, as religions of all kinds hold, God is the ground of reality, there is no reason why God should be required not to intrude in the causal sphere. But Newton, himself a deeply religious man, gave the rule that no more causes of natural things are to be accepted than such as are true and sufficient to explain these things. It would seem, then, bad method, to invoke supernatural causes when natural causes are sufficient. Moreover, experience shows us that there are uniformities and regularities in the universe which are constant. Even those who pray for certain kinds of weather, would hardly pray for a snowfall in the heat of midsummer! The religious man may therefore assume that the sphere of cause and effect is settled by the conditions of creation and that it is not for him to ask for its reversal, any more then he would ask to be physically immortal. The idea of a God who does not intrude in nature does not mean necessarily that God is banned from his own handiwork, but that he has, one might almost say "contracted out"; in other words having chosen his equation, he abides by it in working it out.

The notion that science orders God out of Nature which he created, is as needless as is the idea that God, having laid down his own ways of working, is to be persuaded by our petitions to revise them. If science is content to pursue its course, recognizing that the method it adopts neither affirms or denies divine purpose in the world science explains, and if religion is content to respect the rights of science in its own sphere, there is no need for controversy. Yet this is a bifurcation of experience which can hardly be final, even though it may be a working compromise. The merit of Professor Hocking's book is that it makes an honest and practical attempt to suggest a more permanent solution. If we seek, as in the end we must, a world view in which science, art, morality and religion can share, we must look for something which will serve, as Professor Hocking's suggestions serve, to indicate a more synoptic standpoint and a more general harmony.

E. S. WATERHOUSE.

Personality and Religion. By WILLIAM BROWN, M.D., D.Sc. (University of London Press. 1946. Pp. 195. Price 9s. 6d.)

This book forms a revised and abbreviated edition of the writer's *Mind and Personality* published in 1926 and out of print. He has incorporated in it some chapters from that book and also from his *Science and Personality*, published in 1929 and out of print. In both cases, however, the matter has been revised. The title does not limit the contents, though it does indicate that religion is more in evidence here than in the preceding volumes.

Dr. Brown defines psychology as the science which studies the sequence of the mental processes in the individual, a definition on the lines of that of James Ward. It is, however, surprising that Dr. Brown apparently adheres still to McDougall's list of fourteen instincts and corresponding emotions. He refers to the latter as an important theory as to the relation between instinct and emotion. Mention is made of McDougall's *Social Psychology* and his *Outline of Psychology*, but not of the *Energies of Man* in which McDougall dropped the specific connexion between instinct and emotion and modified his general treatment of the subject. Moreover, the whole instinct psychology has suffered a sharp set-back since the days of McDougall's earlier books. Under the circumstances, it seems strange that in re-writing this

chapter from the former book, the author did not take advantage of the opportunity of embodying the changes in the judgment of most psychologists regarding McDougall's doctrine of instinct, but reprints the whole list exactly as before.

Suggestion is defined as "the acceptance of an idea by the mind especially by the so-called subconscious mind, independently of adequate logical grounds for such acceptance." This is very similar to McDougall's definition of suggestion. It limits the process, however, to human ideas. Suggestion is, of course, part of the group life of animals also, as a process needful for group preservation. It is the means by which a group, animal or human, is unwittingly moved towards common activity, feeling and in its degree, knowledge. Even when considering human susceptibility to suggestion there is no need to limit the process to ideas. Human activities and emotions are largely influenced by suggestion.

In his treatment of magic Dr. Brown seems unduly influenced by Frazer. He refers to Frazer's view that magic preceded religion and that the deeper minds perceived the inefficacy of magic and turned to religion. But what we know of primitive races suggests that such a cleft between magic and religion could not exist. Their attitude is not "either magic or religion," but "magico-religious." That is true of many even to-day who are far removed from the primitive mentality. Dr. Brown does indeed criticize Frazer for trying thus to explain religion in terms of magic, but he tells us that "Magic launched science," that it is an element of practical science rather than of religion. But sorcery, or black magic, is certainly no ancestor of science, whilst sympathetic or "white" magic is not an attempt at scientific understanding. The man who dials a telephone number has no idea how he gets his call through. He knows there is an explanation, but for him it is enough to go through the prescribed movements and await a reply. The savage who thinks that by a certain ritual he gets a desired result acts similarly. When the telephone refuses to work, the caller assumes something has gone wrong and dials again or gives it up. Exactly the same thing applies to the savage when his magic fails him. Magic and religion cannot be separated in any satisfactory way at the earlier stages of thought.

Such points of criticism are, however, incidental. The main topics of the book are well treated. Personality is rightly distinguished from individuality. It has a universal element which transcends the individual. Dr. Brown has a true sense of the importance of the religious factor in individual and social life, the lack of which was so great a drawback to Freud's contribution to psychology. He hesitates upon the ascription to God of personality on the ground that he is above personality as we know it. Perhaps he would like Lotze's saying that God was personal but it was difficult to say if we were. Yet the only analogy that helps us to understand the nature of God is that of our own highest achievement, personality, and surely, used as analogy, it is more to the point than to speak of Power or the Absolute, or even the Numinous, to use Otto's term from *Das Heilige*, which by an oversight in revision apparently, we are told has "recently" been translated into English. But the sincere and thoughtful working out of a wide subject which Dr. Brown affords us, is more than compensation for small blemishes of this type.

E. S. WATERHOUSE.

Philosophical Understanding and Religious Truth. By ERICH FRANK. (Oxford University Press, 1945. Pp. x. + 209. Price $2.50.)

This book, which contains six lectures given at Bryn Mawr College, deals with some of the perennial problems of the philosophy of religion—The Nature of Man; The Existence of God; Creation and Time; Truth and Imagination; History and Destiny; and Letter and Spirit. To each is appended a full selection of explanatory notes and wide references which indicate a vast amount of reading. In some respects these are the most valuable part of the book, as in the main Dr. Frank's treatment of his subjects, whilst competent and well expressed, is an exposition of a Christian philosophy of religion. That is in no sense to depreciate it. The notes range over so wide an area and bring in tribute from so many sources and, moreover, are so well documented, that his eruditon must be encyclopaedic who finds nothing fresh here, and is not sent looking up new points indicated. There is a full index to aid the quest.

One owes a debt, then, to Dr. Frank for what he says and for what he has so widely gathered. There is a strain of mysticism in much of what he says. For example "Existence of God can be only an analogy of existence. For the existence of God infinitely transcends our thought, our will, and even our belief. And it is precisely in this transcendence that God and His existence can be grasped by us." Or again, "Creative freedom makes man aware of the fact that whatever he may do of his own free will is at the same time an ultimate necessity." That seems a paradox, if not a contradiction, and Dr. Frank admits that creative freedom cannot be verified by reason, as freely as did Kant. Modern philosophy, he declares, has failed to establish freedom through positivistic or rationalistic postulates, but adds that in the experience of Spirit, the Christian finds a new meaning of freedom. For the Greek it meant liberation from the senses, for St. Paul the liberation of man from the narrowness of his ego. It is one of the most interesting features of these lectures that Dr. Frank finds in St. Paul much more than a theologian, a philosopher with a new view of truth. Not all will agree that religious thought can illumine metaphysical issues, but at least it must be said that Dr. Frank puts forth a good case for his thesis.

E. S. WATERHOUSE.

The Structure of Life. By E. L. ALLEN. (London: Nisbet and Co. 1945. Pp. 202. 8s. 6d.)

This is not an easy book to describe in a brief review. Dr. Allen, who is lecturer in theology in the University of Durham, divides it into ten chapters and fifty sub-headings, and the general subject is Christian ethics, but not in any sense treated in the usual text-book manner. Concern is rather with the conflicting loyalties, the state, industry, society, and the Christian laws of life. There is a width of treatment which makes it hard to summarize the book as a whole. There is nothing hackneyed. Dr. Allen is not a systematic expositor, but he is often an original one. For example, he argues that Marxism has the outlook of the Old Testament despiritualized. In both man is thought of as bound up with his environment, and community, which for Marx means class. At the same time he also links Marxism with Cartesianism, from which it takes the sharp separation of matter and spirit, though subordinating the latter to the former, and fathers itself on Spinoza whom it discovers as a materialist!

The main outline of the book is on these lines. The world to-day has not the sharp sense of absolute distinctions which our fathers possessed. It

tends to see grey, not black and white. Dr. Allen holds that an absolute ethic is found in the New Testament, and expounds its nature and development. Naturally he must then indicate the sub-types of Christian ethics, Catholicism, Protestantism and "Sectarianism" though the last is used in a somewhat restricted sense. After a further development of the questions involved, the book closes with practical applications of Christian ethics as concerns the family, society, and freedom. Never tedious, often suggestive, Dr. Allen is readable without effort, and comprehensible without a dictionary. What more can we ask of such a book?

E. S. WATERHOUSE.

Religious Experience. By C. C. J. WEBB. (Oxford University Press. 1945. Pp. 70. Price 7s. 6d.)

This is the public lecture delivered in Oxford in 1944, printed with a bibliography of Professor Webb's published work, and presented to him by a group of friends and pupils on his eightieth birthday in 1945. Professor Grensted, who succeeded Professor Webb in the chair of the philosophy of the Christian religion at Oxford University, writes a bibliographical foreword of an interesting and indeed intimate kind.

C. C. J. Webb has been for many years the foremost philosopher of religion in this country, and this short book is enough to show that even in his eightieth year, he has lost none of his clarity or force. He begins by indicating the way in which the connotation of the term "experience" has widened. It is not so very long ago that it carried merely the suggestion of sense experience. Professor Webb credits the British Idealists with the recognition of the reality of religious experience. Without wishing to detract from anything due to these writers, it should be said that as good a claim might be made for William James and his school, who certainly ought not to be omitted in this connexion. For Professor Webb religion is an experience of ours, but that is in no way inconsistent with its being a revelation of God, and what is more, the initiation of the commerce between man and God is the work of God. Though the main interest of the lecture is in the Christian revelation, there are other revelations. The knowledge given by revelation cannot be separated from that which comes in other ways. All religious truth is revealed, but all is addressed to the reason of man. Nor can we accept any part of revelation as by its nature infallible. "I can recognize infallibility nowhere, in Pope or Church or Bible." To this one might, I suppose, add reason also, for many claim its infallibility, meaning, for the most part, the infallibility of their own type of reasoning!

To those acquainted with the philosophy of Professor Webb, the book will afford a brief "refresher course" of those things which he most consistently believed and sought to demonstrate. To others, it will be, amongst other things, an object lesson in succinct and unambiguous expression of certain fundamental truths, the product of a mind of rare quality and a pen of expressive ability. Should this prove the last of Professor Webb's contributions to his subject, which one sincerely hopes it will not be, it will be the worthy completion of a distinguished life spent in sincere search for truth.

E. S. WATERHOUSE.

The State of Public Knowledge. By K. E. BARLOW. (London: Faber and Faber. 1946. Pp. 112. Price 8s. 6d. net.)

The main doctrine of this vigorous essay is that our common technique of thinking is inadequate to the claims of the life within us. The compelling call

of the time is the need to refashion the frame of our public philosophy and to recognize the indwelling forms of biological and personal experience. Our social beliefs and organization suffer grievous distortion owing to our failure to comprehend and to provide for the characteristics of life.

The thesis is approached by way of a scrutiny of the foundations of knowledge. It is agreed on all hands that knowledge is dependent on the senses but recent work in physiology and psychology has offered new information relating to the functioning of the senses in the task of constructing public knowledge. Physiologically acts of perception are accompanied by internal as well as external nerve impulses. There are delicate references to inner sense-organs in the muscles as well as to energy coming from beyond the body, and both outer and inner schemes of impulses are organized into extraordinarily complex systems that function as wholes. A number of different senses are integrated in the process, each having their own internal and external systems. Psychologically the chief point is that apprehension refers to a field or system; the object of attention is apprehended in relation to its field. Further, the examination of primitive awareness reveals that perception is welded with action from the beginning; the mind imposes appearances on its data in accordance with its interests.

The argument passes at a leap to the process of fashioning symbols by which the systems of private images becomes means of public intercommunication. From elementary verbal signs to the clock-time, the weights and measures of physics, the human mind is engaged in fabricating public frames of references, bringing a common and neutral order into personal observation and behaviour. Now modern conceptions of knowledge, which are dominated by physics, have fastened certain conventions upon our public modes of interpreting experience. They have imposed upon the texture of our thinking the notions of atomic analysis, of quantitative structure and of equivalent causation. It is true that these methods of thought have recently been shown to be inappropriate within physics, and to be even less applicable to the territory of physiology. Yet our social ideas are largely controlled by these points of view.

In the course of Mr. Barlow's argument so far a number of valuable suggestions have been brought forward. He does not allow himself more than a bare and selective sketch of primitive knowledge and the account of the formation of the symbol, the process that Kant names schematization, is particularly abbreviated. Some important words, for example, "knowledge," seem to be used a little loosely. But the conception of "frames of reference," intermediaries between man and the illimitable universe of the unknown is enlightening.

The concentration on the physical frame of reference results in the sustained endeavour to make our knowledge fit our experience and our experience and behaviour fit our knowledge. But our experience is far wider than our knowledge. A long passage from Fabre serves to suggest that despite the wonderful plasticity of human consciousness man is moved by deep impulses that are continuous with the universe of life. In face of the mechanistic frames of reference that govern our thought we should do well to nurture and promote the indwelling patterns of life. At this critical point Mr. Barlow, after quickening the reader's expectation by the epistemological discussions of the earlier sections leaves him suspended. Some passing observations on spontaneity and on the interdependency of the living creature and its habitat are nearly all that we are offered. Instead the argument reverts to the social frustrations that have followed from our one-sided frames of public thought. And the proposal to trace to the philosophy of physics the manifold political

and economic disturbances that are mentioned, requires considerably more justification. The positive recommendation that emerges in the final section is the view that reason and policy must build upon the free life of the family. It is to be hoped that Mr. Barlow will develop the hints that he has put forward in this stimulating little book.

M. H. CARRÉ.

Time and Thermodynamics. By A. R. UBBELOHDE. (Oxford University Press. Pp. 105. Price 6s. net.)

This modestly written and unpretentious little book, by the distinguished professor of physics at Belfast, is offered as a contribution to "scientific humanism," by which the author means the integration of knowledge in philosophy. This the author considers as a third function of natural science, separate from its two recognized functions of the advancement of pure knowledge (satisfaction of curiosity) and the advancement of the welfare of mankind. (I think that all three aims can be better summed up in an older-fashioned formula, that the objects of science are to help man to live the good life and to see into the mind of God.) With this purpose in view, the author eschews any full exposition of thermodynamics, even in non-technical terms (he has published previously a separate work on these topics) and confines himself, generally speaking, to value-considerations which emerge in thermodynamic contexts. But he permits himself descriptions in fresh, unhackneyed language, of the roles of the first two Laws of Thermodynamics, illustrating his arguments from the steam-engine, evaporation, the fixation of atmospheric nitrogen, and more especially radiation. His comparative examples, of the relative degrees of occupancy of the differently-priced seats in a cinema and their build-up of a steady state, and the varying influx and efflux streams of customers to a restaurant at different hours of the day and their relation to the percentage of tables occupied, are entertaining and truthful; though the author nowhere even hints that a steady state is not necessarily a state of thermodynamic equilibrium, possibly because his own studies have not been in the domain of astrophysics, where such a distinction is both proper and necessary. But the wit of the author makes one forgive some of the shortcomings of his science, as for example where he remarks that "had the eighteenth century known the oxides of nitrogen as well as it knew sulphur-dioxide, (the smell of which has been known from the time of Homer), it is arguable that the Cock Lane Ghost would have disappeared with a nitrous rather than a sulphureous smell."

Philosophers may be most interested in his chapters on radiation equilibrium, and what he calls the *Primacy of Vision*. He rightly points out that for an observer placed in a black-body chamber (which may in a particular case be a white-hot furnace) the observable universe would just cease to exist. The pencils of radiation reaching his eye would all have precisely the same composition, as regards intensity, frequency-distribution and the like, and no discrimination of objects in the enclosure would be possible, even were they the mocking idols heated by Babylonian stokers of his actual illustration. Since perception by vision depends on the non-equilibrium nature of the radiation used, its occurrence is associated with interchanges which must always result in increases of entropy, and so with a natural "time-direction." It is a sobering thought, after all the energy philosophers have expended in analysing the nature of sense-data, and whether they imply "real" objects, that every portion of the universe is tending to a state in which no sense-data of an optical kind can any more be perceived.

So much for what is good in the book. There is a serious mistake on p. 14, where the author gives the "rest-energy" of a mass m as $\frac{1}{2}mc^2$ (c being the velocity of light), whereas it is actually mc^2. It is not the fact that the actual energy is double what Ubbelohde quotes that is important; it's the haunting suspicion that the author has harboured a false analogy with the kinetic energy $\frac{1}{2}mv^2$, and that accordingly the author has entirely failed to appreciate the relativity doctrines on this topic. In actual fact, this book is quite antiquated in what it says about the relationships of time, energy, entropy and the fate of the universe, and is no reliable guide to recent research on these subjects. To begin with, the author opens with a section entitled "Farewell to 'personal' time," ignoring the discovery by kinematic relativity (the subject of more than one article in PHILOSOPHY) that the Lorentz formulae of relativity can be deduced purely from the observer's personal awareness of the passage of time and an analysis of the method of perception of point events by light; but the time-scale in which the Lorentz formulae hold good, namely t-time, is not that of our ordinary dynamics, τ-time, given by the logarithm of t. In the second place he nowhere faces the fact that the world-wide conservation of energy is strictly speaking incompatible with special relativity, in which energy ranks with momentum as having its measure dependent on the frame of reference; the difficulty is resolved by kinematic relativity, in which energy is a four-dimensional scalar, taking the same value for all fundamental frames of reference, i.e. whatever nebular nucleus in the expanding universe is chosen as observing-headquarters. In the third place, his arguments on the reversibility of time fall to the ground as soon as we realize we are living in an expanding universe: the precise sequence of positions and velocities of a particle cannot naturally be retraced unless the velocity of every particle in the universe is likewise reversed, as is shown by the form of the equations of motion is absolute or t-time; reversibility in history is only possible in the ephemeral τ-scale, in which the galaxies constituting the universe are treated as at rest. Lastly, it is time that both philosophers and men of science ceased to accept what is called *heat-death* as the fate of the universe as a whole. That is a relic of the obsolescent Einstein finite universe, which is not strictly relativistic. On kinematic relativity, the universe though spatially finite contains an infinity of galactic systems, the overwhelming majority of them having only just (at our *present*) been created. Each system itself ages and suffers increase of entropy, but there is no sense in speaking of the age of the universe as a whole, and there must be an unending sequence of worlds *now* at an arbitrarily early stage in time, capable of being the scene of an evolutionary process. This is the conclusion to which kinematic relativity is led when it does not shelve the meaning of time, but starts with an analysis of the before-and-after relation for the individual. The Second Law of Thermodynamics as Ubbelohde says, holds good for only isolated portions of the universe; but it loses its significance for scientific humanism if we confine attention to limited portions of the universe.

The author concludes with an interesting chapter on thermodynamics and life, wherein he favours the view that living organisms may be continually effecting processes which result in local entropy decreases at the expense of rather greater entropy increases in the surroundings: "living beings would then be parasites on the entropy fund of the universe." This metaphor puts the thing the wrong way round: it would be more correct to say that living beings would be living on an overdraft! I ought to add that the author's thermodynamic balance-sheet on p. 37 is the clearest exposition I have ever seen of the meaning of Carnot's treatment of reversing one heat engine to make it drive another.

E. A. MILNE.

Books also received:

Aristotelian Society Proceedings, 1945–46 (New Series, Vol. xlvi). London: Harrison & Sons, Ltd. Pp. 266. 25s. net.

KATHLEEN FREEMAN. *Companion to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1946. Pp. xiii + 486. 25s. net.

GEORGES FRIEDMANN. *Problèmes humains du machinisme industriel*. Paris: Librairie Gallimard. 1946. Pp. 381. 230 fr.

MIRIAM THERESA ROONEY, LL.B., Ph.D. "Borrowings in Roman Law and Christian Thought." Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America. (Reprinted from *The Jurist*, Vol. vi, No. 4, Oct., 1946.) Pp. 22. No price quoted.

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Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution, 1945. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office. 1946. Pp. 484. $1·75.

MARTIN BUBER. *Between Man and Man*. Translated by Ronald Gregor Smith. London: Kegan Paul. 1947. Pp. viii + 210. 12s. 6d. net.

YELVERTON DABERN. *The First Christian*. In 3 Parts: 1. Galilee. 2. The Era of Our Lord. 3. The New Age. Printed and published for the author by Rush and Warwick (Bedford) Ltd. 1946. Pp. 220. 3s.

WILLIAM GERBER. *The Domain of Reality*. New York: King's Crown Press. London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press. 1946. Pp. x + 81. English price, 8s. 6d. net.

FREDERICK COPLESTON, S.J. *Arthur Schopenhauer, Philosopher of Pessimism*. No. 11 in the Bellarmine Series. Published by the Jesuit Fathers, Heythrop College, Oxon. Distributors: Burns Oates and Washbourne, Ltd. 1946. Pp. xi + 216. 12s. 6d. net.

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The Vedantic Buddhism of the Buddha. A collection of historical texts translated from the original Pali and edited by J. G. Jennings, M.A., C.I.E. London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press. 1947. Pp. cvii + 679. £2 2s. net.

RALPH BARTON PERRY. *Puritanism and Democracy*. New York: Vanguard Press. 1944. Pp. xviii + 688. 5 dollars.

KAHLIL GIBRAN. *Tears and Laughter*. Translated from the Arabic by Anthony Rizcallah Ferris. Edited by Martin L. Wolf. New York: Philosophical Library. 1947. Pp. xii + 112. $2·75.

KAHLIL GIBRAN. *Spirits Rebellious*. Translated from the Arabic by Anthony Rizcallah Ferris. Edited by Martin L. Wolf. New York: Philosophical Library. 1947. Pp. vi + 121. $2·75.

MAHARAJ RANA SIR UDAIBAN SINGHJI. *Eastern Light of Sanatan Culture*. Calcutta: Thacker, Spink & Co. (1933) Ltd. London: W. Thacker & Co. 1946. Pp. xii + 364. 12s. 6d.

HUME'S *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion*. Edited with an introduction by Norman Kemp Smith, D.Litt., LL.D., F.B.A., Emeritus Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. Second Edition, with Supplement. London and Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson & Sons. 1947. Pp. xi + 249. 10s. 6d. net.

The late PROFESSOR W. G. DE BURGH, M.A., F.B.A. *The Legacy of the Ancient World*. Third Edition, revised and enlarged. London: Macdonald and Evans. 1947. Pp. xx + 550. 21s. net.

The Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume XX. "Logic and Reality." London: Harrison and Sons, Ltd. 1946. Pp. 232. 21s. net.

MAURICE MAETERLINCK. *The Great Beyond*. New York: Philosophical Library. 1947. Translated by Marta K. Neufeld and Renee Spodhem. Pp. 226. 3 dollars.

G. N. DHAWAN, M.A., Ph.D. *The Political Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi*. Bombay: The Popular Book Depot. 1946. Pp. xvi + 354. Price Rs. 8/8.

STEPHEN C. PEPPER. *A Digest of Purposive Values*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1947. Pp. 100. $2·50.

KEWAL MOTWANI. *India: A Synthesis of Cultures*. Bombay: Thacker & Co. 1947. Pp. xx + 319. Rs. 7/14.

ALEXANDER BRYAN JOHNSON. *A Treatise on Language*. Edited, with a critical essay on his philosophy of language, by David Rynin. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Great Britain: Cambridge University Press. 1947. Pp. ix + 443, English price, 26s. 6d. net.

BARON ERIK PALMSTIERNA. *Rifts in the Veil*. London: Andrew Dakers, Ltd. Pp. 96. 5s. net.

H. D. LEWIS. *Morals and the New Theology*. London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd. 1947. Pp. 160. 7s. 6d. net.

Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Volume xxvii, 1946. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. 1947. Pp. 207.

MATTHEW M. DE BENEDICTIS, O.F.M., M.A., Priest of the Immaculate Conception Province. *The Social Thought of Saint Bonaventure. A Study in Social Philosophy*. (A Dissertation for the Doctorate of Philosophy.) Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press. 1946. Pp. xv + 276.

A. N. WHITEHEAD. *Essays in Science and Philosophy*. Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern University. 1947. Pp. 347. Price, $4·75.

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor of *Philosophy*

February 2nd, 1947

Dear Sir,

May I reply on a point of fact to Professor Field's review of my book, *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (Vol. XXI, No. 80 of your Journal)? Professor Field mentions on page 275 Plato's *Politicus* as "a dialogue which Dr. Popper, except for one or two casual references, ignores." But upon looking over the references in only my first two chapters on Plato (chapters 3 and 4 plus notes), I find 25 references to 20 different passages of the *Politicus*. These passages bear mainly on my interpretation of Plato's views on the relation between the primitive and the ideal state, criticized by Professor Field on p. 274. I suppose that what Professor Field wanted to censure in the above-quoted passage was not that I ignored this dialogue altogether but merely that my references to this dialogue, in connection with certain other problems, were not as frequent as he could have wished.

Yours faithfully,

K. R. Popper.

The London School of Economics
and Political Science,
Houghton St., London, W.C.2

(The Editor has submitted the above letter to Professor Field, who has replied as follows:

"Dr. Popper's statistics are, of course, perfectly correct, and I am sorry if I gave a misleading impression. Perhaps I should have spoken of 'references to one or two points' instead of 'one or two references.' On considering the length of the references, as compared with the space given to passages from other dialogues, I think that, with one possible exception, the adjective 'casual' is justified."—Editor.

INSTITUTE NOTES

ANALYSIS

The journal *Analysis*, which has not been published since 1940, will reappear in October, 1947. There will be six numbers a year, at an annual subscription of 10s. 6d. (U.S.A. $2.12). Orders should be sent to the publishers, Basil Blackwell, Broad Street, Oxford. Other communications should be sent to the editor, A. E. Duncan-Jones, The University, Birmingham 3.

Members will receive in due course a syllabus of the lectures arranged for the Session 1947–8.

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A CHALLENGE

Members are reminded that from the beginning the Institute has encouraged the formation of Local Centres. In those cities possessing a University or University College, it is suggested that members living in the vicinity should form a group and approach a member of the teaching staff of the department of philosophy to act as their guide and leader in the study of Philosophy. In places where there is no University, it is suggested that Reading Circles should be formed and competent leaders elected. It is well to remember that there are excellent commentaries on many of the great classics in philosophy.

For these enterprises it is essential that energetic members of the Institute in various places should take upon themselves the task of organizing such Local Centres and Study Circles. Before the war there were active Centres in Bangor, Cardiff, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, Durham, and Sheffield, but recently they have not all been functioning, and there is room for expansion.

The members of the Institute are scattered throughout Britain. Intending organizers of Local Centres will, on request, be supplied with the names and addresses of members living in their neighbourhood.

S. E. H.

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